

HITLER'S CONSPIRACY
AGAINST PEACE

by

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CHAPTER I

GERMAN PEACE

OVER FOUR HUNDRED YEARS ago Machiavelli laid down a precept to guide his master's tactics: "A prince must always conceal his plans, and approach his goal by those paths which seem to lead furthest away from it."

Adolf Hitler, Chancellor of the German Reich, inheritor of the expansionist policy of Pan-Germanism, came on to the stage as an angel of peace. He brandished the olive branch in the same way that conjurers make striking gestures with the right hand to distract attention from the secret movements of the left. Hymns of peace drowned the noise of armies on the march and the sounds of the foundry and the forge, the die-stamp and the hammer, working day and night in the armament factories.

This first period of unconditional assurances of peace was intended to give Germany a breathing space for re-armament. By means of professions and declarations of pacifism, which were reported in every part of the world and hammered into the minds of countless people, by means of denials

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of warlike plans and intentions, Hitler was able to complete the process of re-armament, to bring it to a point which made a war of aggression possible.

Meanwhile the extent of German re-armament altered the relation of forces in the whole of Europe. It was no longer necessary for Hitler to disguise himself as an apostle of peace, nor to approach his goal "by paths which seemed to lead furthest away from it." He had come near enough to be able to speak openly of the armed strength which he had secretly attained.

Europe found itself in a new phase of Nazi foreign policy: the stage of the menace to peace, the "pacifism" of the *fait accompli*, the surprise *coup*.

Withdrawal from the League of Nations

The two tactics became more and more interwoven: the tactics of "hypocritical pacifism," and the tactics of the surprise offensive.

On October 14, 1933, Germany left the League of Nations. The real reason for this step was revealed by *Deutsche Wehr*, a journal of the German General Staff. The withdrawal from the League of Nations was welcomed as the signal for open re-armament, which was to be carried out, according to the generals, "to the utmost limit of our powers."

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The appearance of a desire for an amicable arrangement was maintained, in spite of the introduction of this policy of aggression. It was believed that this double-dealing policy would give the best results.

The Hitler government published an appeal "To the German Nation," adorned with peaceful phrases which were in sharp contrast to its unpeaceful actions. It revealed the contradiction between words and the deeds that followed them:

"The German government and the German people are at one in their desire to pursue a policy of peace, reconciliation and agreement, as the basis of all decisions and of every undertaking.

"The German government and the German people therefore reject the use of force as a means of removing the differences which exist within the European community of States.

"The German government and the German people renew their pledge to agree to every actual measure of disarmament in the world.

"The German government and the German people have no desire to enter into any armaments race with other nations; they only ask for that measure of security which will guarantee to the nation tranquillity and freedom for its peaceful work."

A breathing space was to be won for the rearmament which was just beginning, by means of

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these unconditional declarations in favour of peace and disarmament. In the same appeal the idea of "Continental pacts of non-aggression" was mentioned as it were quite casually: those pacts which, as the future was to show, were initiated by Hitler diplomacy in order to facilitate an attack on third States. The slogan "for real equality of rights" was also brought into the discussion at this stage, and in this vague form the claim to future revision of the *status quo* was introduced.

Re-armament Supreme

In the revision of Polish-German relations, Machiavelli's precept was successfully applied. It appeared that all the old positions—the Nazi programme of no renunciation of Danzig, Upper Silesia, the Polish Corridor and all the former Prussian-Polish provinces—were being abandoned, by ways that in fact were actually leading to them. On January 26, 1934, the pact between Germany and Poland was entered into. Poland was to be caught up in the tow-rope of Hitler's foreign policy. The *Deutsche Wehr* cited as one of the most important motives of this policy, at the stage which had then been reached, the fact that:

"Above all, Germany would be relieved of the danger of sudden conflict on her eastern borders,

such as was likely to break out from the long-accumulated inflammable conditions of previous years."

A period of diplomatic caution followed. Re-armament presented itself as a question of greater importance than any other problem of foreign policy. No challenge from any opponent must be allowed to endanger it.

The ill-fated Vienna *Putsch* of July 1934 was an experience which served as a warning and put Hitler on his guard. Any unnecessary complication, even some complication arising at an inappropriate moment, in a situation not particularly favourable to his plans, involved the greatest risk and the most serious consequences. This was the ominous meaning of the Italian march on the Brenner. Security for re-armament therefore was the determining factor for the leaders of German foreign policy, for at that stage no other move in foreign politics so vitally affected their opponents. It was only in the spring of 1935 that Hitler Germany had advanced far enough in strength to be able to venture on a bolder policy.

On March 16, 1935, the German determination to arm was declared. On May 21, 1935, universal military service was introduced throughout the Reich. The Nazi Congress in that year demonstrated to the whole world the significance of these military measures; the army provided troops

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to take part in a military spectacle at the official celebration of the National Socialist Party. At last the aims of Pan-Germanism had secured their military basis. And they reached such strength that it was possible, hardly a year later (on March 26, 1936), for *Deutsche Wehr* to describe Germany quite explicitly as "the most powerful continental State."

With the increase in armed forces, Hitler's hypocritical pacifism changed its tone. The pseudo-pacifist expressions remained, indeed, but threats were more and more often intermingled with these ostensibly peaceful declarations. At the time of the announcement of its determination to arm the Hitler government addressed a new appeal to the German people, which, in its whole setting, was really a proclamation to foreign countries; and already both tone and content were aggressive.

According to this declaration, it was not Germany but the countries of the Entente who had renounced the obligations of Versailles. Contrary to all their pledges, the Entente powers had re-armed, and it was only the opposition of the victorious States that had wrecked disarmament. But the re-armament of the new Germany was a factor making for peace.

"What the German government desires, as guardian of the honour and interests of the

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German nation, is to secure the possession of armed forces on such a scale as is necessary not only to maintain the integrity of the German Reich, but also to ensure international respect and appreciation for Germany as a guarantor of universal peace.

“ For at this moment the German government renews its assurance to the German people and the whole world that it has no desire to go beyond the maintenance of German honour and freedom, nor to create through German re-armament any instrument of militarist aggression, but only the means of defence and the preservation of peace.”

Against the “ Collective Security Mania ”

The re-armament of Hitler Germany, growing more and more threatening, drove even powers whose conflicting interests would otherwise have involved precarious relations into temporary or permanent alliance.

The Stresa Conference of April 11 to 14, 1935, brought Britain, France and Italy into an agreement for closer co-operation. Pacts of mutual assistance were entered into by France and the Soviet Union on May 2, 1935, and by Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union on May 16, 1935.

It was Hitler's desire to break through this development of a system of collective security.

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In his Reichstag speech of May 21, 1935, he was more aggressive than hitherto. He denied to foreign diplomats the right even to question the value of his declarations of peace.

“ If the German government declares, in the name of the German people, that it desires nothing but peace, then either this declaration has precisely the same value as the signature attached to any particular form of pact, or the latter could be worth no more than the first solemn declaration.”

He referred contemptuously to a “ mania for collective security,” and treated it as a policy of alliances for war. He declared that the time for organising peace on a collective basis belonged irrevocably to the past. The authors of the Versailles Treaty had struck a death-blow at the idea of collective co-operation between nations and collective peace. Hitler turned white into black: the conception of the indivisibility of peace, of the collective organisation of security, of the inviolability of international agreements—in particular, those which have a direct bearing on the maintenance of existing frontiers, on armaments and military aggression—in other words, the very policy which aimed above all at a peaceful solution, was presented, in defiance of all facts, as a collective preparation for war. The system of pacts proposed by Hitler reverted to the principle

of the localisation of war, which he advocated in so many words. For the first time Hitler threatened to tear up the Locarno Treaty, announced the revision of frontiers, and demanded complete equality of rights.

“ This equality must apply to all functions and rights of possession in international life.”

The Offensive in Foreign Policy

Hitler's speech of May 21, 1935, was the beginning of a period in which the foreign policy of the Third Reich took the offensive. A naval agreement with Britain was signed on July 18, 1935. The *Deutsche Wehr* bluntly announced that it was the anniversary of Waterloo; the “ commemoration of the day when England and Germany stood together against French domination.”

The old balance of power had been destroyed.

The first heavy blow was struck against the *status quo*: fascist Italy attacked Abyssinia.

On August 29, 1935, the *Deutsche Wehr* examined the effects of this event on the world situation, and made the significant statement that “ No one can believe that this is an ordinary occurrence, such as might have taken place in the eighties; on the contrary, it is the beginning of a new epoch.”

Hitler Germany had gradually developed its

political relations in such a way that its expansionist designs were being worked out in several different directions.

There were obvious signs of a Japanese-German combination. On January 15, 1936, the Japanese withdrew from the London Naval Conference; Japan embarked on the military expedition to the Amur and the frontiers of Outer Mongolia. The tension in the Far East became more acute; Germany and Japan exchanged military missions.

The Occupation of the Rhineland and Hitler's Peace Plan

Hitler thought that the time to reap the harvest was drawing near. He ventured on a great *coup*. The Locarno Treaty was denounced and, on March 7, 1936, Hitler's troops marched into the demilitarised Rhineland.

At the same moment Hitler carried his offensive a stage further—at first in the diplomatic sphere—in his Reichstag speech. He used the threat of the *Irredenta*:

“The historic actuality of a nation cannot be obliterated by acts of dismemberment contrary to historic development.”

He hinted at acts of force against countries containing German minorities. He touched for the first time on the problem of Danzig and brought forward a new demand for revision of territory (the old theme of Nazi propaganda:

“brutal dismemberment of an old historic territorial unit”). He embodied the desire for the re-division of the world in a phrase such as the pre-war imperialism of the Kaiser used to coin:

“The German people desires no worse opportunities than are granted to other nations.”

He formulated reasons for war against France, and accused France of having abandoned the policy of renunciation of war, the policy of Locarno, by entering into alliances. And at the same time he put forward proposals which contained in guarded form the demand for the abolition of the Maginot Line.

He abruptly raised the question of the Netherlands.

He demanded the re-distribution of colonies and the reform of the League of Nations, so as to bring it into conformity with his plans for supremacy.

In the “German government’s peace plan of March 31, 1936,” presented to the British government by Ambassador Ribbentrop, all these problems reappeared.

“*Revolutionising Policy in Europe*”

The flood of demands burst forth as if a dam had been swept away. By April 23, 1936, the *Deutsche Wehr* already felt itself justified in speaking of “revolutionising policy in Europe.”

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“ Out of the mass of contradictions and crises a state of confusion has grown up, which a sober-minded German reporter in Geneva has aptly described as the ‘ revolutionising of policy in Europe.’ It is actually nothing less that lies behind the crisis of the League of Nations. After tottering for a long time, its four pillars—Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon and Lausanne—are collapsing, dragging down everything and everybody with them. Reparations are a thing of the past, since they have revealed themselves as suicidal. The guaranteed ‘ perpetual ’ inequality of defeated and ‘ victorious ’ countries is now only history.

“ The guaranteed ‘ permanent co-operation ’ of the victorious nations has turned into hostility to each other, bringing with it grave symptoms. The system of compulsion through sanctions, so ingeniously devised, hit the League of Nations powers who were called upon to carry it out almost as hard as Italy. It is clear to-day that it will prove ineffective in the future if it is applied against a State with adequate internal resources. Italy has given evidence of this. And now, after such severe shocks, can Italy’s war against Abyssinia be brought to an end by means of any of the articles of the statutes of the League of Nations ? No serious politician can imagine it.”

As a matter of fact the war was brought to an end not by articles but by poison gas.

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The "revolutionising" of policy in Europe was drawing near to an explosion. Duff Cooper, the British War Minister, declared that the situation was even more critical than in 1914.

Hitler Germany boasted defiantly of its military strength. Its armaments increased. The new international tension offered a prospect of victory. It was necessary to be technically prepared. German finances were strained to the utmost. The *Morning Post* of June 25, 1936, estimated German expenditure on armaments for 1936 at 11,300 million marks. Hitler's policy was aided by the disunity of the League of Nations powers, their lack of decision and of direction. English comments on the localisation of conflicts and the desire for neutrality played their part in stiffening the aggressive attitude of Berlin.

New and unexpected developments of Hitler's policy were carried out.

The League of Nations régime in Danzig was violently abolished. One more fragment of the old Versailles order was thereby removed, and the last remnants of political freedom in Danzig were done away with at a single stroke. In Danzig, "the German city which can never become Polish," as Nazi propaganda puts it, Poland came face to face with her Nazi partner. According to the Polish journal, *Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny* of July 8, 1936:

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“Under cover of the Polish-German pact of non-aggression, Germany has carried through a manœuvre which puts Poland in a difficult position.”

Hitler Germany made use of the strained relations between Britain and Italy for its own policy of force. This time it was possible to bridge the gap between Hitler and Mussolini. They had revisionist interests in common. Italy was striving to secure the conquest of Abyssinia. The co-operation of the two fascist countries, however, was not a marriage, but merely an engagement which could be broken off. Mussolini chose this alliance, from which he had most to gain. But as long as the union lasted, both powers gained a free hand to advance on other fronts.

By these moves Hitler Germany was attempting to establish a position of supremacy in European politics. Revision of frontiers, reversal of the *status quo*, abolition of the old Versailles order, destruction of all collective security for peace, the establishment of military alliances—these were the determining principles of German action both in its main lines and in details. One line became more and more clearly marked: the line from Berlin to Rome, Budapest, Vienna and Warsaw, which was ultimately to lead to Bagdad.

According to the Italian official *Giornale d'Italia*

the German-Austrian agreement of July 11, 1936, was "the closing of one phase of European politics, and the opening of another." One more point of the Versailles Treaty, of which Paragraph 80 prohibited Austria from making an agreement with Germany unless France accepted it, was done away with.

A fascist *bloc* was formed, in order to divide eastern and western Europe. The central European and Balkan policy of Germany was carried an important stage further.

Even more significant than the agreement itself, according to a leading article of July 14 in the British Conservative *Morning Post*, was the fact that Hitler had once again taken the initiative in European politics. The two western powers had been out-manœuvred once more, because, unlike Hitler and Mussolini, they did not know exactly what they wanted. Great Britain and France should draw the moral that unless they determined on a clear line, all the important positions would be taken by the others. Never since the end of the war had this point of influence counted for so little as at the present time. Indeed, they were permitting a development which was both humiliating and dangerous for themselves.

In the course of this period, Henlein, leader of the Sudeten Germans, the Czecho-Slovakian

offshoot of Pan-Germanism, made a speech at Eger putting forward the demand for "self-government for Germans." The *Deutsche Wehr* (July 23, 1936) announced that the signal for an attack on Czecho-Slovakia, one of the next points in the Pan-German offensive in Central Europe, had been given:

"In France it was recognised that the Danube policy and the isolation policy had been defeated. The anxiety of the French was directed chiefly towards the security of the Little Entente and its association with France, now that those central European barriers had been rendered altogether unreliable by the occupation of the Rhineland, and the German-Austrian agreement. Czecho-Slovakia was extremely nervous; its statesmen saw the country surrounded by a *bloc* of powerful States, and revision of frontiers, like a sword of Damocles, hanging over its head."

The result of the Montreux Conference on the Dardanelles was regarded as a counter-move.

"England's retreat, in face of the Franco-Russian formulation of the right of passage for warships and merchant ships in the carrying out of the Franco-Russian pact or under instructions of the League of Nations, has had the effect of securely establishing the Franco-Russian association. This means that the Central European barrier is being circumvented at this point. But

the complete satisfaction of Franco-Russian designs would still require that Turkey also should openly adhere to this policy and this pact, since the command of the Straits which she has now secured gives her the decisive voice. The immediate efforts of Britain, as well as of France and Italy, each for its own purposes, will therefore be concentrated on Turkey, whose importance as a key power has been immeasurably increased." (*Deutsche Wehr*, July 23, 1936.)

In the struggle for influence in the Mediterranean, too, Hitler Germany is anxious to be in the forefront—following an old tradition. Germany's increased activity in the Mediterranean, arising out of the civil war in Spain, is proof of this.

"Our desire to look after German interests in the future with the greatest energy found expression in the sending of the two armed cruisers *Admiral Scheer* and *Deutschland* to Spain, in connection with which very interesting international problems seem to be developing."

A fresh incident showed the seriousness of the whole situation. On August 24, 1936, Hitler issued his decree introducing two years' military service, which makes it possible to double the size of the German army. Its consequences are likely to be similar to the consequences of the sudden increase in the German Army in 1913, on the eve of the World War.

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The Nazi Congress of 1936 at Nuremberg, as a new demonstration against the peace forces of Europe, followed immediately upon the announcement of the two-year military service period, and the consequent enormous increase in the army. This "Congress of Honour," as it was officially called, was marked by the evidence, only half concealed, of the rapidly growing economic and social difficulties in Germany resulting from excessive re-armament, and its rulers' unconcealed threat of war as a way out. In every one of his speeches and proclamations at the Nuremberg Congress, Hitler made it as clear as he could that the aim of German diplomacy in foreign policy would consist, in the next stage, in forcing a military solution of existing conflicts, in working for such a solution—in other words, in making war inevitable!

Thus in the period since his seizure of power Hitler has displayed two tactics; the furtive methods of the pacifist, and threats with weapons drawn. Along with Machiavelli we find Bismarck, who once laid it down as a maxim that an opponent should be confused by diplomatic talk while the truth is thrust down his throat.

Strange Pacifism

The claims of Hitler Germany were announced over and over again—a very successful method.

Hitler's opponent was frightened into believing that the claims announced from time to time would satisfy the desires of a re-armed Germany and that peace could be secured by fulfilling these demands, and he allowed himself to be influenced by the soothing sound of peaceful declarations. This is the fatal line of such typical French intellectuals as Alain, Challaye, Boucher, and their friends, whose point of view was expressed in the following words:

"Hitler has already achieved a number of gains, and we do not hesitate to say that further gains will have to be conceded. . . . At present we can see no revision of the Versailles Treaty except one which will be to the advantage of Germany. This we cannot and must not prevent. But the whole problem consists in making just concessions and in combining these with the right to equal armaments. . . . The success of this policy will have the result that Hitler will accept disarmament as counterbalancing the territorial, colonial and economic advantages which the peaceful revision of the Treaty would give him. . . . We must not be unyielding towards Hitler, on the contrary, we must be just and compliant, and we must give Germany what she is entitled to claim, so as to influence her to accept partial disarmament. . . ."

This strange pacifism is not without parallel

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in history. On March 23, 1907, Paul Adam referred in the *Revue Hebdomadaire* to the intentions of Wilhelm II to become Kaiser of Europe. He revealed that there was a group in France which was in favour of submitting to this fate, provided it could be done voluntarily. The spirit of Goethe and Kant (Alain to-day talks about the spirit of Goethe and Schiller) would be a guarantee of brotherhood and reasonable treatment, even under the sceptre of the Hohenzollerns (for Alain it is the sceptre of Hitler).

The attitude of Senator d'Estournelles de Constant, writing in the *Matin* of June 11, 1909, is an even more striking historical example.

The Senator, one of the leaders of the pacifist movement of the time, had accepted as genuine the peaceful declarations of the rulers of Germany under the Kaiser. In his article he maintained that the assurances of peace which had been given by the two hostile governments of that period, Britain and Germany, were undoubtedly reliable. The pacifist Senator was particularly favourable to the Kaiser's government. It was obvious to him that Germany could gain nothing by a war. If nevertheless a danger of war did exist, it was to be found, in his view, not in the aims of Pan-German militarists, nor in similar British aims, but in British public opinion. According to opinion in Britain, it would not

do to wait until both industrial and naval superiority were lost; on the contrary, it was necessary to take advantage of the favourable moment, when England was still the stronger power at sea, and had just formed an alliance with France, in order to defeat Germany.

In his own time Senator d'Estournelles stood more or less alone. This fact was regretted by the historian Delbrück, a Pan-German in disguise, who tried to find a "psychological explanation" for it. He believed that the German system of government was unpopular abroad; the English system allowed greater leniency and freedom, so that the extension of English influence was more willingly accepted. He added that Britain, as a naval power, was not in a position to threaten the interests of other countries so seriously as was possible for a military power—but this was only a secondary point. Delbrück's theory became the doctrine of the Nazis.

In the *Preussische Jahrbücher* of March 1919, Delbrück gave advice on how to prepare for a policy of revenge. He openly recommended that socialists and pacifists should be made use of to calm down the excited world. "It is on them," he wrote, "that our hopes must rest."

He pointed out the way which Hitler took, amid the applause of these strange pacifists. Many of these enthusiasts attribute to Hitler

alone the ability to restrain the wild national feelings which he has aroused. They do not ask whether the man who stirred up the nationalism of the new Germany has any desire to control its destructive forces. When Hitler himself was asked this question he stated that he could undertake it, but only at a price: the price must be a German peace.

This phrase has often been used since then. It is time to ask what this propaganda of "A German peace" stands for, and what its inventors mean by it. Peace with honour, peace with equal rights—these words too are used as substitutes for "German peace," but all of them are merely euphemistic phrases for the state of affairs at which the German ruling class is aiming.

The Origin of German War Aims

Militarism had left a lasting impression on the ruling section in Germany. State and society were built up on the old Prussian military constitution and drew their spiritual nourishment from it. This militarism did not consist merely in the organisation of a strong army and an inclination towards an imperialist policy. These characteristics would scarcely have distinguished it from other great powers and other militarist tendencies. German militarism, as the

philosopher Troeltsch put it, was a "political institution, a determining element in the constitution of the State, because at the same time it was the very essence of the ruling section of German society."

The old Prussian-German Reich was a structure which, politically, was based on the direct, unconditional, military power of the Prussian King and the General Staff who were closely associated with him. This privileged position of officers, however, was only possible—once again we are following the statement of Troeltsch—on the basis of the old social tradition of Prussia, by which the small landed nobility had at their disposal the various military and official sinecures, and at the same time, in their capacity as landlords, acquired and asserted characteristics of violent arrogance.

This was the foundation of the education of officers and reserve officers, and with few exceptions of the whole of the bourgeoisie, owing to the social preponderance of the officer class. The teaching of history in the schools was along these lines. Students were attracted by this view of life, easily capable of satisfaction; socially it prevailed everywhere, and became the condition for every career and the test of all social connections. And to complete its dominating influence, the new large-scale industry and finance also became

involved, established their enterprises in the closest association with these sections, joined the nobility by means of the ownership of land and military service in the higher ranks, and combined with these forces to keep down democracy.

Troeltsch goes on to speak of the army, the terrible instrument of militarism. "In spite of its character as a national army, it was actually identified with the officer corps, who were instinctively in the closest sympathy with the conservative view of hereditary power, and with the Pan-German conception of national honour and dominion to be achieved through conquest. The imperialist plans of big industry merged as a matter of course with this political idea of glory, power, honour and unhesitating aggression."

This class, soaked in militarist and Pan-German ideas, regarded history as a demonstration of blood and iron. For them the greatest height to which a nation could rise was war, national war, race war, imperialist war. It seemed to them that the supreme duty of their society was to establish the best possible military organisation.

At the end of the World War, when this system had met with annihilating defeat in its own sphere of military achievement, it seemed to have been destroyed for ever. But recovery was swift. The idea of revenge became its driving force.

In March 1919, when the terms of peace became known, Delbrück, one of the heralds of the greater Germany, issued a call to the despairing nationalists.

“Whatever they do to us, they cannot kill us, and if they cannot kill us, we shall come into our own again; once more there will be an appeal to force, to heal the injury that force has done to us to-day. What the Entente is sowing is the seed of new wars. Let them take our colonies, annex the Saar, and hand over German provinces to the Poles. The day and the hour will come when we shall demand all this back.” (*Preussische Jahrbücher.*)

The Aim of Reprisals

Reprisals became the central aim of nationalist politicians after the war. The small circle who kept this aim in view continued to hold the decisive positions in the State. At first their programme did not extend beyond this circle and therefore in a sense it remained a secret programme. But in the end it had to be brought before the masses to give it powerful support. It was here that the policy of Adolf Hitler came into effect. Hitler became the mouthpiece and the propagandist of the Pan-German programme.

In his book *Mein Kampf* Hitler adopted the teachings of Pan-German generals, professors,

historians and politicians, in order to pass them on. He often confined himself to paraphrasing the political treatises of the teachers of Pan-Germanism, altering them from an academic into a popular form. But the content was the same. This was the basis of Hitler's "German peace."

The complete re-organisation of the relations of European powers, with all its consequences for the world, was involved in this slogan. "German peace" was a more or less disguised form of the ultimate demand for world conquest, aggressive in its intention, but when necessary, pacifist in its presentation. The desire for power was hidden behind a façade of self-defence.

"German peace" was defined in a work issued in 1917 by the Munich publisher Lehmann. (Lehmann became a personal friend of Hitler.) In this book Dr. Reup explained what German peace is, and what every friend of peace has to aim at. On the east, according to Dr. Reup, the demand must be for the annexation of the Baltic States, and White Russia. The native population would have to be "transferred" (that is, driven out) and German settlers brought in to take their place.

On the west, Reup went on, German peace would be secured by the annexation of Belgium.

But as "reconciliation with France is impossible," the tablelands of Briey and Longwy, with their mineral resources, would have to be annexed also, as well as the northern part of the Pas de Calais.

German peace must embrace the world. Reup threw himself into a frenzy of conquest: the annexation of Malta and Cyprus, the seizure of the Suez Canal, the conquest of Egypt, the establishment of bases at Aden, Gibraltar and Cape Verde Islands, to secure German sea routes, and the re-distribution of the British and French colonies, including Cape Town and Tunis.

After this Dr. Reup turned on the Balkans. According to the principles of German peace, the Balkans too were to be re-organised, in other words, annexed to the empire of peace. Only a single central European State, extending, according to the intentions of 1917, from Hamburg to Bagdad and the Crimea, could secure the aim already described in the programme of that date, and appearing to-day under the same name: the peace of equal rights.

It is impossible, owing to Hitler's tactics, to recognise at first sight how much of this expansionist programme he adopted. But it becomes clearer if we examine more closely the ideological basis of the Pan-German programme. There are

sentences in Dr. Ritter's *Der Organische Aufbau Europas* (published during the war) the sense of which is reproduced in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, the bible of the Third Reich:

"The German nation is the strongest of the nations and is destined to play a leading part in the world."

Hitler gives expression to the same missionary megalomania:

"Germany is the germanic mother of all life, which has given its cultural form to the world of to-day."

And the conclusion: "Germany will either become a world power or will cease to exist." (*Mein Kampf*, p. 742.) This sentence seems to contain an alternative, but actually it is the single-minded expression of the desire for conquest.

Dr. Ritter had already stated that the aim was only to create the conditions which would do justice to Germany's historical and racial claims. This is followed by arguments for the annexation of northern France and the whole of Belgium by Germany, because the Riparian Franks had their origin in these regions; an argument which still plays its part in the irredentist propaganda of Eupen-Malmédy.

The proposed annexations were given an ideological basis, and after a number of arbitrary

and roundabout historical views, the Europe remodelled in accordance with German peace was to consist of an empire of 200 million people, of whom 80 million were to be Germans.

An examination of the Pan-German origins of the policy of the new Germany cannot fail to emphasise the extent to which Hitler was influenced by Ritter's grandiose schemes. According to Hitler, Germany must prepare for "a final settlement with France, and in the last decisive conflict for Germany's highest ultimate aims" must fight to carry through a tremendous programme.

"To-day," Hitler adds, "we number 80 million in Europe. But our foreign policy will only be justly appreciated when, scarcely a century hence, 250 million Germans will inhabit this continent." (*Mein Kampf*, p. 767.)

The Source of Hitler's Pacifism

"The Pan-German Union: national defensive and offensive association, founded April 9, 1891, by Heinrich Class, as the General German Union, desires to inoculate all Germans with a national sentiment based on loyalty and devotion to German characteristics and with a national will directed towards the well-being of the nation, as well as to uphold Germany abroad and overseas; in the war, led the opposition to the policy

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of Bethmann-Holweg." (Because, in the view of
Hitler's predecessors, Bethmann-Holweg's policy
was not annexationist enough.)

The above description of the Pan-German
Union is taken from the 1936 *Handbuch der
neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften* (Handbook of
Modern Military Science), the encyclopædia of
the German General Staff.

What are the "peace aims" of this Pan-
German Union? They declared that, for future
security, it was indispensable that Germany
should have at least one permanently open
frontier. As the great Russian nation was in
possession in the east, and beyond that Asia with
its hundreds of millions of Mongols, a perma-
nently open frontier must be attained on the
west. For this it was not absolutely necessary to
exterminate the enemy who was in possession
there—and at this point purely military considera-
tions began to be turned into moral considera-
tions; the demands of the aggressor were dis-
guised as a desire for world peace. We shall see
how closely Hitler followed this line of thought:
first aggression, then pacifism. The Pan-German
programme expressed it more precisely: it would
be enough if the frontier line was such as to give
Germany military superiority over her enemies.
According to the Pan-Germans this could be
achieved if Germany held Belgium and the

northern French coast of the Channel as far as the mouth of the Somme, so as to give security against England; but for security against France, it would be necessary to hold a corresponding hinterland on the northern coast of France and a line of fortifications from Verdun to Belfort.

The head of the Pan-German Union, Admiral von Vöeltinghof-Scheel, gave a more detailed explanation of these demands, described as peace aims, in a document on "The Security of Germany's Future": the frontier on one flank must be formed in such a way that it is possible to reach not merely the throat of the enemy, but right to the heart at one short move, unhindered by the obstacles that exist to-day. In other words, it would be enough to have a frontier on the west, from which Germany would have military control of all possible enemies. But France and Belgium do not represent all the possible enemies on the western frontier. For if Belgium and all the eastern border of France were annexed, then as a necessary result Holland too would have to be brought into this system. This further point is indicated in the Pan-German programme of peace aims: Germany would have to be able to keep these powers permanently in check, and could only maintain military control over them all, as the programme puts it, by having a frontier on the Channel. In fact, Germany would have to secure

such a position in the world as would make it impossible for any combination of all other powers to become strong enough to make war on Germany.

This was explicitly laid down as the aim of German peace. This too, was one of the fundamental conceptions published by Hitler in *Mein Kampf*, which we shall consider later in more detail.

Such aims assume the domination of Europe at least. The Pan-Germans realised this, but it did not deter them from once again expressing their peculiar pacifism in the following declaration:

“ Even those who are fundamentally opposed to us cannot fail to recognise that our aims have nothing whatever to do with striving after world supremacy or even supremacy in Europe.”

They added that it would be no violation of France if it were amputated in the interests of German peace; this would be simply a means of securing perpetual peace with France. “ Peaceful relations between France and ourselves can certainly be permanent, but only from the moment when we have crushed France so completely that it is impossible for her ever again to rise up against us.” This was the statement of a Pan-German publication of December 12, 1914.

Pan-German pacifism was expounded with

equal emphasis by Professor Johannes Haller (whose treatises on foreign policy were used exhaustively by Hitler) in the *Süddeutscher Monatshefte* of January 1917:

“Permanent peace between ourselves and our western neighbours can only prevail when our common frontier is such as to destroy any prospect of success in an attack on us, and on the other hand gives us the possibility of making France feel our military superiority.”

The same surgical methods were to be applied to other countries. Even Britain's power was to be curtailed in the interests of peace, but in this case the aim was to prevent any new increase in strength.

German pre-war literature on foreign policy repeatedly expresses the idea that a stronger Germany would have a compensating influence in the world in relation to Britain's supremacy, and would therefore fulfil a peaceful mission. The power of Germany would compel Britain to adopt a cautious policy and to refrain from fresh conquests in any part of the world. Turks, Chinese and other nations would have to be treated with restraint and allowed to enjoy the rights of self-government. Germany would protect the independence of other countries, not for their sake but for her own, in order to keep Britain within bounds.

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Dr. Karl Kumpmann, in a book published during the war on Imperialism and Pacifism in the light of Economics, carried the argument to its furthest point. Unlike the militarist imperialism of Britain, German imperialism was pacifist. Pacifism was to be achieved through imperialism. Britain, according to Kumpmann, desired to be sole lord of the world, but Germany was striving for equal rights for all nations.

The Pan-German theorists of the post-war period went a step further and declared that the world supremacy of Pan-Germanism was the ideal fulfilment of pacifist aims. Möller van den Bruck, one of the most eminent of them, associated it directly with the idea of Germany's mission. "The problem of German pacifism is closely bound up with the question of our super-national mission. The idea of eternal peace is the idea of the Third Reich. But its realisation must be fought for, and the Reich must be asserted." (*Das dritte Reich*, pp. 240-1.)

Hitler, Leader of the Third Reich, also accepts this imperialist pacifism. He has gathered together precisely those arguments which he could cite as evidence of his desire for peace. In his public statements he tries to deny the warlike character of this pacifism, and in recent months a reference to his book has often been met with the objection that this work no longer

reflects the views of the present leaders of National Socialism.

The Pan-German Guard in Hitler's Reichstag

The single fact that, in the Reichstag which was appointed by the election farce of March 7, 1936, the number of Hitler's Pan-German disciples was almost doubled, throws a searching light on this objection. If we examine these new deputies more closely, the tendency of their foreign policy becomes clearer still. The section of the Nazi programme dealing with foreign policy is copied word for word from the Pan-German programme. The firebrand representatives of Pan-Germanism and their successors have their seats in the new Reichstag.

Among them is Professor Martin Spahn, who was urging a Pan-German policy long before the war, and had the task of inspiring the Catholic Centre with enthusiasm for the imperialist aims of the Hohenzollerns.

Among them, too, is Count Reventlow, who used to represent, and still represents, the most extreme policy of aggression; as far back as 1917 he was described by Delbrück as "the most gifted and influential of the Pan-German champions of a Napoleonic policy for Germany."

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There is Dr. Friedrich Everling, the second President of the Prussian League.

There is Ahlemann, Ludendorff's Pan-German adviser, and Feldmann, the Pan-German adviser of Hindenburg.

Another figure to be seen once more among them is Dr. Bang, who raised money for the Nazis from the Hohenzollerns, planned the Kapp government, carried on propaganda for the restoration of the Kaiser and the re-establishment of the Holy Roman Empire, and financed the Third Reich.

Finally there is Hugenberg, one of the founders of the Pan-German Union, whose influence is still strong, in spite of official exclusion, and at his side the legendary figure of Heinrich Class, barrister; president of the Pan-German Union, creator of the annexation programme, strongest champion of peace by conquest in 1917, re-organiser of defeated Pan-Germanism, inspirer of the propaganda of German revival, and one of the leaders of imperialist policy for forty years. The summoning of this man and his vassals to the Reichstag of March 7, 1936, is a clear refutation of the pretence that the doctrines of *Mein Kampf* no longer represent the views of the Chancellor.

Locarno

The line of development laid down in Hitler's book has been followed right up to the present day. Therefore we must regard those parts of it that have not yet been carried out as aims which are still in view.

Even the tearing up of the Locarno Treaty was foreseen in *Mein Kampf*, and this is one more proof of the falseness of the arguments with which the Hitler government cloaked the unilateral breach of the pledges of Locarno.

Nazi propaganda gave three main reasons to justify the action of March 7, 1936—they were enumerated by Hitler's ambassador, von Ribbentrop, in his preface to the collection of documents on Locarno (Berlin, 1936):

First, France had destroyed the foundations of Locarno one after another, by violating the letter and the spirit of the Treaty. France had not disarmed, and Germany by the declaration of its determination to arm and the re-militarisation of the Rhineland had "merely established the conditions for the restoration of military equality in Europe." Ribbentrop cited the generals' most serious argument: fifteen million Germans had been excluded from German re-armament by the de-militarisation of the Rhineland, and the act of March 7, 1936, restored "equal rights" in this sphere.

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Secondly, France had not disarmed morally, but had maintained the policy of antagonism and military alliances against Germany. The alliances with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia involved an enormous increase in the difficulties of Franco-German relations.

Thirdly, the signing of the Franco-Soviet Pact involved "the complete abolition of the European balance of power, which the creators of the Locarno Treaty had in mind." In his speech to the Council of the League of Nations in London on March 19, 1936, Ribbentrop went so far as to make the following statement: "The Franco-Soviet Pact, however, according to the German government's view of history, means the complete abolition of the European balance of power which has existed hitherto, and therefore of the fundamental political and legal conditions under which the Locarno Pact was concluded."

This is a grotesque misrepresentation of the true facts. Consider the tremendous political change that has taken place since the signing of the Locarno Treaty. The period of the Locarno Treaty was marked by the fact that France held the military hegemony of Europe. But to-day France has to seek allies against the military hegemony of Hitler Germany. In so far as the balance of power has shifted since Locarno, the change has been primarily in favour of Germany.

Hitler Against Hitler

It was Hitler himself who destroyed all the ingenuity and subtlety of official Nazi arguments against Locarno, as well as the misleading legend that Hitler wrote *Mein Kampf* before Locarno.

To the Weimar Republicans who represented Locarno as a success, Hitler in *Mein Kampf* recalled the example of Prussia at the time of Napoleon: at that time it took seven years, from 1806 to 1813, to prepare the revolt against France. But now it was the Locarno Treaty that had been signed seven years after November 1918.

"The process," according to Hitler's accusation, "was one already indicated. Just as formerly they agreed to the shameful terms of the Armistice, so now they had neither the energy nor the courage to offer a sudden resistance to their opponents, whose oppressive conditions were afterwards renewed over and over again. But these opponents were too clever to ask for too much at once. They always limited their demands to what they themselves regarded as tolerable at the moment, in the sense that there was no need to fear a popular outbreak as the result. But the oftener such terms were signed and swallowed, the less justifiable it seemed on account of some particular new extortion or humiliation to do what had not been done on so

many similar occasions before. So it came about that disarmament and enslavement, political disablement and economic robbery followed each other in Germany until at last they gave rise to a spirit which regarded the Dawes plan as a piece of good fortune, and Locarno as a success." (*Mein Kampf*, pp. 761-2.)

Here Hitler tears to pieces his own and Ribbentrop's arguments, and contradicts himself and all his supporters who maintain that *Mein Kampf* was written long before Locarno, at the time of the occupation of the Ruhr. Hitler himself made this statement in an interview which he gave to the French journalist Bertrand de Jouvenel in March 1936.

For us the controversy over Hitler's weak memory is not so important as the evidence, given by this passage, of the extent to which he adheres to his original programme. However much he denies it, *Mein Kampf* has been and still is the foundation of Hitler's foreign policy.

And this policy is the policy of Pan-Germanism.

The following passage from *Mein Kampf* is even closer to the programme of the Pan-Germans than any that we have quoted—"Whoever really desires the victory of pacifist thought must give his whole-hearted support to the German conquest of the world. For if the reverse were to come about, it might easily happen that the end of the

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Germans would be the end of the pacifists. Therefore we must be resolutely determined to make war in order to achieve peace.

“ The pacifist-humanitarian idea may perhaps be quite good when the world has been conquered and subjected by the highest type of man, who would be made supreme ruler of the earth. There would then be no possibility that this idea could have a harmful influence, in so far as its practical applications would become rare and finally impossible. Therefore, war first, and afterwards perhaps pacifism.” (*Mein Kampf*, p. 315.)

Could the disciple of Pan-Germanism reveal more clearly what he understands by German Peace, and what the world has to expect from his pacifism ?

CHAPTER II

A NATION WITHOUT SPACE

THE SLOGAN of "German peace" was the keynote of Hitler's diplomacy. The keynote of his propaganda within Germany itself was the slogan of *a nation without space*. The obvious purpose of this slogan was to distract attention from the unsatisfactory social conditions in Germany, to put the blame on causes outside the country, and in this way to provide an outlet for the growing discontent with the existing state of things.

It was already in use at the time when the Nazis were carrying on their struggle for power. The following statement was made by Colonel Hierl, who is now head of the German Labour Service and therefore holds one of the most important positions in connection with re-armament:

"Whoever desires to restore German arms and German honour must first of all desire a radical change in the prevailing system. Whoever wishes for German liberty must know too that the necessary will to liberation cannot be kindled with sound pacifism and well-moderated patriotism.

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The tremendous pressure of an overcrowded nation, which weighs upon our whole people, will have an increasingly sharp effect upon the lowest sections of workers and peasants, who are economically the weakest. From these sections the flame of resistance will flare up. If the revolutionary will to liberation of the lower sections is not to lead to an explosion which will destroy our own house, it must be turned into a driving force for national liberation, for liberation from the burden which is weighing on our whole nation.” (*Grundlagen einer deutschen Wehrpolitik*, p. 33.)

The line of action laid down here is still being followed. It achieves two results: a temporary evasion of the social attacks of the discontented, and the discovery of a popular slogan to justify the drive for expansion. Even this slogan was taken from the Pan-Germans to be dished up by Hitler for popular consumption.

Germany went Short when the World was Divided up

According to the theorists of overcrowding, Germany has gone short: during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in the division of Europe, and in the second half of the nineteenth century, when the world was divided up, Germany did not get enough. At the time when the English aristocracy were laying the foundations of Britain's world empire, the German ruling

powers were engaged in an internal struggle for the constitution of their States, and for a long time there was no political centre around which the German nation could be built up. Therefore Germany took no part at first in the occupation of decisive positions in Europe and the world.

Even when Germany became the leading military power on the continent, thanks to the wars of national unification of 1866 and 1871, and again later on, after she had also become a naval power and had reached the position of being one of the strongest of the great powers, the territory governed by Germany, compared with the territory of her rivals, bore no relation to her political, economic and military strength. Her colonial possessions were much smaller than those of any of her great European opponents.

On the continent of Europe the position changed, very much in Germany's favour. In 1864 Prussia, whose military strength was the foundation of the new German empire, had only 19 million inhabitants, compared with 38 million in France and 30 million in England; but in 1914 the population of Germany had already reached 65 million, as against 46 million in Great Britain and 40 million in France.

But the course of development in the outside world was different. The German bourgeoisie took no part in the great epoch of expansion,

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in which vast territories and immense natural wealth were opened up by forcible colonisation and exploitation, and each new acquisition created new markets for the growing industries of the mother country, new opportunities for the investment of capital. Even when Germany's capital resources came into action, they were not strong enough politically to safeguard their position. German capitalism made its appearance too late, just as it had been too late in Germany itself, where for a long time it was far behind the feudal landowners in political strength, although economically it was the dominant class.

The German Empire entered very late into the great campaign for colonial conquest, and never realised the claims which were supposed to correspond with Germany's European strength. German capitalism lagged behind the other European powers in the race for colonies, because national policy was so strongly influenced by the landowning interests that industry and finance only succeeded in pressing their demands for expansion at a time when the key areas of colonial territory had already been occupied.

In 1914 French colonial possessions included three times the area and four and a half times the population of the German colonies; Britain had more than eleven times the area and more

than thirty times the population, and even small states like Holland and Belgium possessed larger and more valuable colonial territories than Germany.

The Old Slogan Revived

The phrase "a nation without space" had its origin in the demand of imperialist interests for a re-division of the world in the period immediately before the World War. When Hitler Germany took up the slogan after the war, the drive for more territory had a twofold economic motive, which may be described as the search for profit and the search for ground rent. It involved both colonial expansion and increased possessions on the continent.

Hitler and his supporters openly demanded "land in the east," and this was the chief purpose of the "overcrowded nation" propaganda, from the standpoint of internal politics. The aim was to divert the attention of the people who were really overcrowded, the land-hungry peasants and agricultural workers who needed land and were denied it by the feudal landlords and their allies. In defence of feudal property relations it was argued that the big estates were essential for food production and "defence of the land" in times of war. The people who put forward this argument were the German

militarists, who were either landowners themselves, or closely connected with the landowning class. "Defence of the land" meant defending the estates of the Junkers, the interests of a section which represented the remnants of feudalism, against the demands of the peasantry.

In the economic, social and political life of Germany, survivals of a medieval society still exist, because feudal property relations have been maintained, and these survivals have a dangerous influence on home and foreign policy.

The density of population in Germany is 135 per square kilometre. Germany therefore counts as one of the over-populated countries, as the "overcrowded nation" propaganda is constantly emphasising. But in the eastern part of Germany, through the maintenance of feudal conditions and the suppression of all attempts at agrarian reform, the supporters of Pan-Germanism, who are ostensibly so much concerned about land for the people, have themselves been responsible for the depopulation of the country. German landworkers could not stand the conditions on the big estates of the east, and chose to become wage-earners in the towns rather than remain as miserably paid serfs on land that was not their own. In west Prussia and Posen, in spite of the ceaseless political repression of the Poles, economic conditions led to an increase in the population.

The lies about an "overcrowded nation" could not be more emphatically disproved.

Peasant and Landlord

Before the seizure of power by the Nazis, agitators went into the villages and roused the peasants and landworkers with demagogic speeches. But even the most moderate agrarian reform could never be the aim of the National Socialist system. On the contrary, one of its main functions was to uphold the feudal ownership of land in Germany. It was for this reason that Hitler was brought into the government by Hindenburg: the Junkers did everything in their power to secure the handing over of the government to Hitler, in order to suppress one of the worst financial scandals in Europe, in connection with the so-called eastern relief scheme. Rosenberg, a typical Nazi theorist, made no secret of the "anti-national" tendency of National Socialism, when this was in the interests of feudal ownership:

"A revolt against the State may have a justifiable anti-national character if it is led by men of a race-conscious ruling type, and not by those with the mentality of serfs. For the right of such men to the ownership of land has been encroached upon and stolen from them. This can be seen to-day, when the democratic rabble,

after the seizure of other forms of property, is stretching out its hands towards landed possessions, and is indirectly robbing peasants and landlords by means of mortgages, the reduction of duties, etc. Bismarck once said that a State which deprived him of his property would no longer be his fatherland. That was the renunciation of a ruling spirit: impelled by the same feelings, Germans who have been robbed of their lands have gone out into all parts of the world." (*Mythos des 20 Jahr-Hunderts*, p. 543.)

There could scarcely be a better illustration of the real aim of the "overcrowded nation" propaganda than this, from an official Nazi theorist. For him the interests of the big landowners was the decisive question.

This propaganda was carried on with as much energy as the earlier campaign which was apparently directed, before the Nazis came into power, against the existing system of land ownership. A land theory was now developed to appeal to workers, peasants and the middle class.

According to this theory there are many thousands of Germans, within the Reich and outside it, who have been uprooted; workers and peasants and people of the middle class in the old German-Austrian territory and scattered

throughout the world, who used to be the flourishing founders of new settlements, but are now ruined and broken up. In vain they return in search of land and a home. A natural instinct impels these Germans to come together to form a powerful, united population—this would be possible, if only they were given land enough for a new settlement.

At the same time, Germany itself could send out peasants as well as workers and middle-class people, to colonise unpopulated areas. It is only necessary to go into the German villages and see what is happening there. What becomes of the sons of the peasants? Only a small population remain on the land as owners, inheriting farms or marrying into a farmer's family which has no male heir. The rest become landless. They are drawn into the towns, and become miners and dockers, but also teachers, clerks, magistrates, doctors, technicians and artisans. To a great extent, therefore, the surplus numbers of German workers and intellectuals come from the German peasantry, who can no longer find employment in agriculture. From the peasantry too, according to this propaganda, came the great number of Germans living abroad. When the Nazis took power they made a systematic inquiry into this question. They ascertained that the number of Germans living in England, France, Belgium and

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Italy amounted to tens of thousands, and that, as a result of this crisis, they were nearly all living in great poverty. Under such conditions it was easy for the Nazis to put their propaganda in a form that appealed to them.

The way that led to the over-production of intellectual and industrial workers in the home country had proved to be a wrong way. In order to remove the cause of Germany's most difficult social problems, Germany must secure land for peasant settlement, so that the sons of peasants would not have to go into the towns, but would have the prospect of becoming farmers themselves. This would be an incalculable service to the well-being of the whole people. Germany could only be saved by peasant colonisation in the east. In this way the body of the nation would grow and develop, instead of flinging countless Germans out into some remote part of the world.

Through this propaganda, the Nazis are now attempting to rouse the widest sections of the German population.

The Junkers' Revenge

The campaign for war in the east was not concerned with peasant colonisation, but with its opposite. The Junkers were trying to take their

revenge for the real peasant colonisation taking place in countries bordering on Germany and Austria, which they regarded as a dangerous threat to their interests; they felt that wherever peasant settlements were attempted or carried out in these regions they were directed against the big landowners of Germany.

Professor Hans Jürgens-Seraphim published the following statement in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of August 18, 1933 (after the beginning of the Hitler régime) under the title "Peasant Settlement against Germany":

"Up to the year 1928 about twenty-four million hectares had been seized by agrarian reforms in the countries bordering on Germany and Austria, against the interests of the big landowners in Germany. The strengthening of the peasant elements was very significant. It arose in three ways. To begin with, large areas of rented land were transferred to the ownership of the peasants. This applied to about one and a half million properties of this kind, of which 265,000 were in Czecho-Slovakia alone.

"Further, small lots and small peasant holdings were enlarged by additions of land. The number of persons whose economic position was improved in this way amounted to 850,000, with an area of one and a half million hectares.

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Of these, 200,000 owners with nearly half a million hectares were in Poland, and 300,000 with 420,000 hectares were in Czecho-Slovakia.

“ Finally and most important, there was the creation of new peasant holdings. They numbered more than two million, on an area of nine million hectares. In Lithuania the number of these new peasant households was 52,000, in Poland 110,000, in Hungary 550,000, in Jugoslavia 250,000, a total of more than 950,000. During the same period in Germany, on the basis of the Reich settlement law, hardly a tenth of this was accomplished.

“ In Lithuania 52,000 new peasant farms were established on an area of 430,000 hectares, but in East Prussia up to 1930 only 7,800 farms were set up, covering 93,000 hectares. The States bordering on Germany and Austria allotted nearly two and a half million hectares of land for internal colonisation. Germany up to 1931 showed only about half a million hectares, or one fifth of this total.”

Seraphim showed the significance of this successful colonisation in neighbouring countries:

“ The drive for land must not always be interpreted as a movement that has been artificially created for reasons of national policy. It has its origin in far-reaching social causes. Two facts of great importance have to be taken into

account: the unfavourable system of landownership and landholdings (Poland, Hungary, Jugoslavia) and an extraordinarily rapid increase in population. While in Germany the excess of births per thousand of the population is 4·7, in Hungary it is 6·7, in Czecho-Slovakia 7·2, in Lithuania 11·0 and in Poland 14·8. If this high surplus of births occurs chiefly among the agricultural population, and if at the same time there is agrarian over-population owing to an unfavourable distribution of landholdings, as in central Poland, then a migration of the surplus population into neighbouring districts necessarily takes place, with a heavy pressure on the place where resistance is weakest. The whole of east Germany is threatened in this way, and in particular East Prussia and the two German peninsulas of Pomerania and Silesia. A chain is as strong as its weakest link. Let every German benefit by this knowledge."

In association with the militarists, the Junkers intensified the "overcrowded nation" propaganda. But this conceals a motive for war which hitherto has received too little attention: it will not be a war to win land for the peasants, but a war for the restoration of the landowners in Germany, in which solidarity with the Polish and Hungarian landlords would undoubtedly be the strongest basis for joint action.

Home Sweet Home

Professor Oncken, a well-known advocate of the German irredentist policy, who however was driven into disgrace by Hitler, gave these political tendencies a cultural disguise in an appeal to Germans living abroad:

“ In the oldest German settlements nationalist greed is hidden under so-called legal forms of expropriation (in Poland, the Baltic States and Czecho-Slovakia) in order to get possession of what is left of German cultural and economic achievements. But from the most recent settlements, both on the eastern borders of Germany and in the colonies, a tide of disappointed hopes flows back to the home country. The tragedy of existence for those who are crushed together within the cramped space of central Europe is reaching its climax: in desperation they are tearing themselves to pieces in their struggle against the wretched conditions at home and the barbed-wire barriers of neighbouring States. A novel by Hans Grimm shows not only the physical but the moral effect of this process on the German people. In *Volk ohne Raum*—as in every great novel of a great nation—the fate of individuals becomes the universal fate of our people, and these vital questions, which are the unspoken secret of every member of the German race

to-day, are put into a form which has poetic strength and completeness." (*Nation und Geschichte*, 1935, p. 290.)

German Dominions ?

The present Minister for National Economy, Schacht, presented the slogan of "an overcrowded nation" in a much less diplomatic way. In a document published in 1932 as Volume 44 of the official National Socialist Library, under the title "Vital Questions of German Population," he treated it as expressing the war aims of Pan-Germanism. After stating that in central Europe, including Alsace-Lorraine, there is a German-speaking area with a population of about eighty million, he went on :

"Germany is hemmed in, in the centre of Europe, with open frontiers on nearly all sides and only a narrow outlet to the ocean through the North Sea and the land-locked Baltic Sea. If at least the compact territory colonised by Germans were united with the German Reich, its size would ease the problem of our many frontiers, and would give central Europe tranquillity and peace. The frontiers of our nationality have been torn away on every side by the policy of the robber States of Versailles, and, with the decrease in our national strength, foreign nations

are pressing in upon us still more closely." (p. 7.)

Here Schacht gives the slogan a new meaning, linking it up with a German irredentist programme. It is to be understood in the sense not merely that Germany is overpopulated, but that the German nation in Europe is not united in a single political area.

Arguments about over-population are here replaced by a nationalist theory, which has been expounded in great detail by German historians. In the old Austria-Hungary, in spite of the majority of Slavs, Latins, and Magyars, the German ruling class was the dominating influence. Through them the thirty million Slavs and others were "neutralised" and subordinated to the policy of a Greater Germany. The influence of German imperialism spread out from this "dominion" into the whole of the east as far as Turkey. According to Delbrück, in an article on the "War Danger" written in 1908, a defeat of Austria "therefore in any case involves a defeat of the German nation. Loyalty to Austria is the highest law of German politics. Just because fate compelled us in 1866 to exclude our German brothers in Austria from the German Reich, we are bound all the more to stand by them in international conflicts and to protect their rear. Our own national future depends on Austria with its German nationality."

A Mainland Malta

The new Austria, with its smaller territory and population, had to be made into an outpost of Pan-German influence, if the policy of German expansion in the south-east, the main route to world supremacy, was to be re-established; in other words, Austria had to become directly or politically dependent on the controlling power of National Socialism. To win Austria would be to establish a very important base for operations in central Europe. For this reason, Austria was described by Pan-German expansionists as the heart of the Danube territory, a term which also expresses Hitler's extreme interest in Austria. From a strategic standpoint, Austria is important because of its Rhine-Danube communications and Alpine passes; but the annexation of Austria would also secure "the division of the Little Entente into a northern and a southern group, the separation of the Balkans from the industrial north, without which it could not carry on a war" (*Deutsche Wehr*, October 3, 1935), and in addition, it would establish a central point of attack against the influence of all the non-German powers in central Europe and the Mediterranean region—France, Italy, and England.

According to *Deutsche Wehr* (March 26, 1936), Austria was at one time under consideration by

Britain as a kind of "Malta on the Mainland," because of its importance in Central Europe and the Mediterranean region :

"Even Straits like Gibraltar and Suez have ceased to be reliable barriers, because they can be flown over. A blockade by aeroplanes and submarines from Sicily to Tunis would divide the two Mediterranean basins (east and west) and cut the Suez-Gibraltar line of communication. Therefore the Empire is compelled to make its supremacy in the Mediterranean more secure against the rivalry of Italy, to come out from its island position, to consider military policy on the mainland, and, in addition to supremacy at sea, to look for communications by land with the eastern Mediterranean. Such communications would pass across France (Belgium), Germany, Austria (Hungary), Jugo-Slavia (Rumania), Greece (Turkey) towards the east, outflanking Italy's plans. A possible air route would be London to Graz, Graz to Athens, Athens to Haifa or Alexandria." Austria would thus become "a mainland Malta, in view of England's designs in the Mediterranean; like Malta, hotly disputed, but even more dangerously threatened."

Germany's designs on the "mainland Malta," however, are more immediate than England's.

The Mediterranean route had always been one of the chief aims of German expansionist plans.

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Germany tried to secure an outlet to the Mediterranean through the Triple Alliance, and her policy in the east had even bolder aims in view. In a book called *Bismarck's Erbe*, written during the war, Delbrück described the character and the aims of this Pan-German policy:

“From the North Sea and the Baltic to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea will stretch a territory where the German spirit, German talent for organisation and German economic energy will be in control.” (p. 209.)

The Trail of the Bagdad Railway

“The Bagdad Railway to the Fore” was the title of an article published on September 18, 1935, in the *Militär Wochenblatt* (a technical journal of the German General Staff) which was something more than a mere study, and attempted to direct attention once more to the problems of the eastern Mediterranean. It began with the statement that a very important change had taken place. At the beginning of 1935 Britain had opened the pipe-line, 1,100 miles long, from Mosul to Haifa, with great pomp and publicity. “This event, the result of a policy which has persevered for decades, is the most remarkable occurrence in this field of development since the war.”

A great centre of traffic and commerce had

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come into existence here, where Europe, Asia and Africa meet. This was due to four important factors:

The constantly increasing industrialisation of the Near East, particularly Turkey and Iran.

The advance in Palestine and Egypt.

The development in Africa.

The growing idea of a single economic area from the east coast of the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf (the setting up of a customs union between Irak and Transjordan, etc.). This region formed an important junction between the African and the Asiatic possessions of British imperialism.

According to the *Militär Wochenblatt*, the complex problems thus roughly outlined showed the extraordinary political importance of south-eastern Europe. The economic concentration towards the eastern Mediterranean is obvious. It is the junction for oil from Irak and oil from Baku, grain from South Russia, oil from Rumania, cotton from Egypt, and the developing industries of Africa and Asia. From this vital centre of world politics, the argument runs, Germany has been excluded.

“It is the tragedy of Germany’s fate that we foresaw this development quite clearly before the war. To-day it is clear even to the uninitiated why France and England at Versailles secured the

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mandates for Syria and Palestine and, up to a point, for Irak. Before the war this chapter in economics and world politics was known under the name of the Bagdad Railway. At that time, when motor and air transport were in their infancy, this name had a very different significance. In the British Press of the pre-war period the Bagdad Railway appeared as a terrifying spectre. At the beginning of the World War, therefore, Britain immediately occupied Bagdad with extraordinarily strong forces. The aim in view should have been clear from what had gone before. It becomes even more obvious when it is realised, from a glance at the map, that the Bagdad Railway would have opened up a new and shorter route to the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean touches Britain's African possessions, and through it lies the route from Suez to India and Australia. The line from Berlin through Vienna, Sofia and Constantinople to Bagdad is much shorter than the sea route from London via Gibraltar, Malta, Suez and Aden. The Bagdad Railway, gigantic project of the Deutsche Bank, backed by an ascendant Germany, meant not only supremacy in central and south-eastern Europe, but economic access to the Near East, and the opening up of further possibilities, as yet unknown. India would be endangered, from the standpoint of commercial policy. The route to the

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Persian Gulf, communications with India, would be quicker and cheaper, and Berlin would be brought into the front line. Turkey, Syria, Irak and Persia would be linked up with German trade. The tragic outcome of the World War destroyed the hopes of this great future."

But the decisive region is not lost—according to the German view. "A chapter is being written in world economic history." There are strong forces in Hitler Germany which will take care that Germany is not left out of that chapter. The struggle for supremacy in this region and the neighbouring spheres of influence begins, however, in the Alps.

"Economic Space"

The militarists of Hitler Germany see yet another side to the question of territorial possessions, in relation to the economics of war. A modern war with its enormous requirements, particularly its industrial requirements, can only be conducted—according to the experience from which German military science draws its conclusions—by States which either themselves possess and produce all the necessary foodstuffs and raw materials, or can absolutely rely on being able to import from abroad what they cannot supply. According to Nazi military science, the possession and security of agricultural and industrial

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areas, as well as assured supplies of raw materials or finished goods, are the material conditions of all future wars. A State which is preparing for war, and has to reckon on a war of fairly long duration, cannot avoid the problem; it must either have all foodstuffs and raw materials without exception, or it must be able to obtain by absolutely safe means those materials which it cannot produce. The mere hoarding of materials in peace-time could obviously never really meet the purpose, because requirements in any future war would be unforeseen, owing to the constantly increasing development of technique. Actual requirements would far surpass any estimates or conjectures which a State and its army might make before entering into a war.

Just as a State trains its army in time of peace, so in future it must build up its economic resources with a view to the coming war period. It must also direct the policy of its alliances with other States from the standpoint of war economics and not simply from the standpoint of political and military power. Ewald Banse, a specialist in military science, wrote with particular reference to Germany's position that "a modern war, considered purely from the point of view of the economics of war, cannot be carried through unless the States engaged in it are supported by one of the three economic giants, Great Britain, the

United States, or Russia. This may be a bitter pill for our national pride to swallow, but we must not shut our eyes to facts." (*Wehrwissenschaft*, p. 27.)

But if a State does not succeed in forming an alliance which can be used to meet the economic needs of war, or if the allied country is too far away to be able to maintain the exchange of goods without interruption, then its position is perilous, and it must try "to conquer new economic areas at the beginning of the war."

Hitler's policy has followed this advice. The Austrian question was to be cleared up if possible "before the beginning of the war," because Austria is a bridge-head from which important economic areas can be reached quickly.

These views were arrived at by German military science on the basis of the experience of the last war. Purely economic considerations, such as the feeding of the population, may have an absolutely disastrous influence, from the military standpoint, on the whole conduct of the war. From time to time operations were undertaken in the World War which, in a military sense, should not have been attempted. Many of the German Army's movements were undertaken for economic reasons alone.

"The shortage of food and raw materials in the case of the Central Powers, particularly

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Germany, became more and more acute each year, and induced the army command to provide relief, without regard to military needs in the narrower sense. There were two typical examples: the advance on the Rumanian oilfields, which was to supply a particularly urgent need of raw materials in Germany, and the march into the Ukraine at the end of 1917. The latter, owing to the large area, required a great number of troops, who were withdrawn from the west. This action has been criticised, and from the standpoint of military expediency the criticism was quite justified. But to arrive at a correct judgment, the military and economic interests which prevailed at the time must be carefully weighed against each other. A war cannot be won in a military sense if it has already been lost on the economic front. And in the war of the future the economic front will have even more decisive importance than in the last." (Justus Schmitt, *Wirtschaftliche Mobilmachung*, pp. 13-14.)

Hitler had another strategic reason for his designs on Austria, which he himself put forward as the key to his demands for territory, apart from the economic expediency that compels the war-maker of the future to secure positions from which he can launch an attack. He showed that the size of the territory possessed by a particular State is of military importance.

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“ The size of the country occupied by a nation is an essential factor in determining its security from without. The larger the territory which a nation has under its control, the greater its natural protection. Decisive military action can be taken more quickly and easily, above all, more effectively and completely, against a nation which is crowded together in a small area, than is possible against States with extensive territories. A large area provides a certain amount of protection against frivolous attacks, because success can only be achieved after long and heavy fighting, and the risk of such an onslaught appears too great unless there are altogether exceptional reasons for it. The largeness of a State is therefore in itself a safeguard of the freedom and independence of a nation, while the smallness of a State's territory is a direct challenge to annexation.” (*Mein Kampf*, p. 150.)

CHAPTER III

AWAY WITH THE FRONTIERS OF 1914

ACCORDING TO Hitler's demagogues, Germany is the country with the worst frontiers. How do they arrive at this conclusion? Because they consider Germany's frontiers entirely from a military point of view.

Frontiers can be regarded in different ways: as points of contact for cultural interchange, as clearing stations for peace, as natural divisions between neighbouring worlds which, for all their differences, can seek intellectual and economic co-operation. Whoever considers these boundaries merely from a soldier's point of view must be influenced by special reasons. He must wish to disregard the peaceful solution, which can be reached just because of the existence of certain frontiers. For him beyond the frontiers there is war, not peace.

The development of armaments has its special influence on this line of thought.

With modern guns and aeroplanes, and the mechanisation of armies, war is extended over

gigantic distances. The radius of operation of a mechanised armed unit is ninety miles. The range of guns has already increased to over eighty miles. With rocket shells it may reach 300 miles in the immediate future.

Even more gigantic distances can be covered by an air force, with an operating radius of 600 miles and a speed of 200 to 250 miles an hour.

The extent of territory of the great powers is therefore a favourable factor of unrivalled importance. These States are much more secure from air attack than those with a smaller and more densely populated area. Further, their military strength in the air is increased because their own security gives them greater freedom of movement and better opportunities for air attack on their enemies. Finally, the larger area gives better means of defence.

“The last war showed that pursuit must stop when the enemy in retreat puts more than sixty miles of railway out of action.” (Gen. Armengaud, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, June 1, 1933.)

With the range of modern armaments, therefore, distance is the beginning and end of political and military strategy.

As a result a great change is taking place not only in military organisation, but also in policy. The policy of alliances, the plan of campaign, the choice of the country to be attacked first, are

influenced by this factor. In the first volume (1936) of the *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau* (*Military Science Review*), the new scientific journal of the German General Staff, Colonel von Bülow wrote as follows: "Although the political connections between countries change more rapidly at the present day, alliances totter and new agreements spring up overnight, yet the real reasons are not always immediately obvious. The motives in such intercourse are not friendly inclinations, but the economic needs of war, and one of the most important is the inter-relation between the basic requirements of war economy, and the danger to them of attacks from the air (p. 87).

"Countries that are within the range of guns disappear from the range of history." One of the German advocates of expansion used this phrase in 1935 to express the secret thoughts of his friends. It is repeated in various forms in a great number of German writings, and is developed into elaborate war propaganda in a collective work issued by the German Air Ministry, called *Der zivile Luftschutz* (*Civilian Air Defence*). According to this book Germany of all countries in the world "is the most exposed to air attack and the most vulnerable from the air. If there were really any equality and justice in the world, Germany would have the undisputed right to

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demand the most powerful air force and the strongest air defences, in order to secure her own safety. . . .

“Germany is surrounded by neighbours whose air armaments are very strong. The effective range of the air focus of these States overlaps on German territory. Every part of Germany therefore is threatened from the air.

“The line from Hamburg through Magdeburg and Leipzig to Passau can be reached from the western frontier by a bombing plane of the usual type, with a flying range of 250 to 300 miles each way. From the east Nuremberg can be reached, via Hanover and Kassel, in a long-distance raid, and from the south-west, the Baltic coast and the middle and upper Rhine. If the range for a short-distance attack is put at 150 miles, there would be a free area along the Weser and the Elbe, north of Magdeburg. At the same time it is clear that the most important districts, the Ruhr, the industrial areas in the south-west, and the districts of Upper Silesia, Saxony and Thuringia, as well as the capital itself, would be exposed to short-distance attack. In a short-distance raid the attacking aeroplane carries less fuel and more bombs, and can repeat the attack all the more quickly; therefore, it is the most effective form of air-raid.”

This statement leaves no doubt about the

terrible losses that bombardment from the air must inflict on the German population. But the conclusion drawn from it is not that German policy, in the interests of the people, must support every effort to secure collective peace. On the contrary: Germany must have "the most powerful air force," giving her preponderance over all her neighbours. But even this superiority would not remove all dangers. If enemy aeroplanes have no difficulty in finding their mark, the German population must still suffer. The book on civilian air defence describes this danger:

"Germany's geographical character offers no difficulties, but considerably assists in the finding of direction and of important objectives. It is only from the south that approach by air is difficult. The course of rivers and the lines of mountains are useful landmarks from other directions. . . .

"Again, from the point of view of the position of objectives, Germany shows the greatest concentration of inhabitants and factories. It is true that in England the absolute density of population is greater (180 to the square kilometre, against 135 in Germany—although in the Ruhr it is 368), but a larger proportion of Germany's population is concentrated in large towns. In addition, the type of dwelling in Germany is

much more exposed to danger from the air than in England or other European States. Gigantic blocks of apartments, with their countless tenants, are characteristic of Germany's large towns, while in England the low-built house, planned for a single family, is predominant. In London the average number of persons per building is 8, in Paris 35, and in Berlin not less than 75."

Another reason is given for Germany's special danger from the air:

"It is only in Germany that the concentration of factories in distinct industrial centres is to be found on so large a scale. Moreover, they are situated close to the frontiers. Nearly 60 per cent of all German industrial undertakings, and 65 per cent of people engaged in industry, are included in these industrial centres, which are exposed to special risks."

What is the Meaning of "Vulnerable from the Air"?

The assertion that Germany is in a unique position as regards danger from the air does not bear serious investigation, even on the basis of statements made by German experts.

England, with its densely populated areas and its large number of factories, proves the contrary. Its geographical position lays it open to easy attack on the capital. London is less than sixty miles from the coast, and only about a hundred

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miles from the coasts of France and Belgium, which were occupied by Germany in the World War.

Air attacks on London can be carried out without difficulty at night, because the mouth of the Thames gives the direction. In the last war, when air warfare was in its early stages, London was attacked from the air, by Zeppelins and aeroplanes, a hundred and twelve times—far more often than Paris.

The *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau* (Number 3, 1936) in an article on "The Air Defence of the British Empire," showed that not only the eastern part of England, but the whole of England, Scotland and Ireland would be within the range of attack by modern aircraft from northern France.

Germany's air force is already so strong that hardly any one of the bordering States is a match for it. It must not be forgotten, when German militarists talk about Germany's unfavourable frontiers, that the position of the small States on Germany's borders has become extremely critical since Hitler's re-armament of Germany became effective.

The von Epp Plan

Germany's northern frontier is completely free: Denmark, with her small but agriculturally

important territory, is almost entirely without armaments or natural defences.

On the west France and Belgium have established a fortified position. At various points the strength of this position has become uncertain owing to the rapid development of means of attack. In addition, there is the possibility of evading these defences by a flank attack from Germany through Holland. Discussions which are taking place at the present time among the German General Staff, on the question whether an invasion of Dutch territory would not have been expedient in 1914, show that this alternative is under consideration. This idea is the basis, as the Dutch Press has repeatedly shown, of the German plan of campaign known as the von Epp plan. This plan was submitted to General von Schleicher, Reichswehr Minister in the von Papen government, by the present governor of Bavaria, General von Epp, in the summer of 1932. It was apparently based on the following strategic assumptions: at the beginning of the World War the battle of Paris was already lost in the south of the Dutch province of Limburg. Here, according to the von Epp plan, the advance of the German army was wrecked in August 1914. If the Third Reich does not want to lose the victory for a second time, to be held in check by the fetish of Dutch neutrality, then it will have

to make short work of south Limburg. The Dutch province of Limburg separates Belgium from Germany by a distance of about forty miles. A rapid advance through this strip of territory would avoid the Belgian defences and bring the German army into a dismayed and already half-conquered France.

Invasion of Holland: views of the General Staff

It is impossible to ignore the attitude of the *Handbook of Modern Military Science*, published under the auspices of the German General Staff, with a foreword by von Blomberg, Minister for War, on the problem of a march through Holland.

The whole treatment of the question is significant, as well as the heading under which it appears—*Belgium, invaded territory of 1914*. The possibility of a march through Holland is introduced by a direct justification of the forcible invasion of Belgium:

“Before the World War Belgium did not maintain the neutrality which was imposed upon her by treaty, but entered into association with States in the ‘Entente Cordiale.’ Therefore she was drawn into the World War on the side of these powers, and refused free passage for German troops in return for an

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indemnity offered by Germany.” (*Handbook*,
p. 320.)

According to the interpretation of the General Staff the forcible invasion of Belgium was justified by a breach of neutrality in 1914. The same pretext has already been prepared for the same operation in the next war. The *Handbook* says:

“ Belgium has been bound by treaty to France, and finally deprived of her former position of neutrality. On September 9, 1920, Belgium entered into a military agreement with France, which was signed only by Marshal Foch, General Buat, and the Belgian Chief of Staff, Maglinse. It is therefore not an international agreement in accordance with Article 18 of the Statutes of the League of Nations. As a purely defensive agreement it is superseded by the Locarno Treaty, the Kellogg Pact and the Rhineland Pact. The agreement comes into effect if one party to it alone, for example France, is attacked by a third power.”

There is one serious obstacle to an invasion, which the German General Staff itself recognises: the Belgian line of fortifications on the frontier, the continuation of the French Maginot Line. Therefore the General Staff looks north-east, towards Holland, which presents no such obstacle, and has no Maginot Line. Already it is considering and preparing reasons for an invasion.

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“According to the French view, the fortifications on the Belgian eastern frontier will compel Germany to advance through Dutch territory in any war of aggression against France. Therefore France is attempting to warn Holland against this danger, and to draw her into the Franco-Belgian alliance. So far, Holland has rejected this desire and has not given up her neutrality. In the situation created by the Versailles Treaty, there is no question of a German invasion, but rather of a French and Belgian attack through the Maastricht province of Holland.” (*Handbook*, p. 21.)

In 1914 it was Belgium's “breach of neutrality” which forced the German invasion. In the next war the General Staff of Hitler Germany may be obliged, as the *Handbook* suggests, to forestall a French and Belgian advance by attacking Holland.

German plans for the invasion of Holland were discussed by General Baratier in two articles in the *Temps* (June 3 and 10, 1936). He was convinced that the Epp plan exists, although it may have another name, because such a plan corresponds with German strategy. According to his view, the fact is that “the German defence lines will rely on the new German fortifications on the left bank of the Rhine,” and the attacking forces will advance through Holland and Belgium,

avoiding the French fortified line. It is doubtful, in his opinion, first whether the Dutch fortifications on the Maas are strong enough, and secondly whether the available French and Belgian forces are adequate for the defence of the Luttich-Antwerp line. His reference to "over-confident States, which do not take the necessary precautions day by day to keep their defences up to the standard required by possible surprise attacks," is an allusion to Holland.

The Czecho-Slovakian Nut

The *Handbook* of the German General Staff, quoted above, observes contemptuously that Czecho-Slovakia has "many frontiers and little land."

The problem of Czecho-Slovakia is discussed in a publication called *Brennpunkt Bohmen* which was written in 1935 by a Sudeten German irredentist, employed on the General Staff, who writes under the name of Markomanus. Of the 2,000 miles of Czecho-Slovakia's frontier, about 1,000 miles border on Germany, which clasps Czecho-Slovakia on three sides, north, north-west and west—Germany holds the heights of the bordering range of mountains, which are easily crossed to the Czecho-Slovakian side by a whole number of railways and roads. Two of the main

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railway lines—one running southwards from the Erzgebirge in the north of Bohemia, and the other in the east towards central Moravia—extend to within ten miles of the frontier; the most important mining areas, the most important munitions centres, and the capital city of Prague are situated close to the frontier.

The argument that Germany is in danger from “eleven powerful and partly hostile neighbours” could hardly be more effectively disproved than by this description of one of them. But Nazi Pan-German plans are centred on attack rather than defence, and therefore they regard Czecho-Slovakia as a barrier, an obstacle, an obstructive block. According to Markomanus:

“Czecho-Slovakia lies with her main body in the centre of Europe. Prague is at about an equal distance from Berlin, Munich and Vienna. Bohemia is almost in the centre between the Baltic Sea and the Adriatic, between the Atlantic coast of France and the Russian plain on the Dnieper at Kiev. The whole of the western part, chiefly inhabited by a Czech population, lies like a great block right inside German territory, while the eastern part, Slovakia and Ruthenia, forms a long cross-bar between Hungary and Poland. In the eastern part Czecho-Slovakia's frontier meets her ally, Rumania, for a distance of 120 miles. The Czechs have

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penetrated further towards the west than any other branch of the northern Slav race; the Czech wedge in western Bohemia extends right up to the line from Berlin to Rome."

From this picture of the Czecho-Slovakian position, Markomanus reaches a conclusion which shows that complaints about Germany's frontiers are intended solely to justify aggression.

"The Bohemian *bloc* will be such a danger to Germany, in the event of war, that the simplest solution would be to make a pincers attack and crush Bohemia like a great nut."

Frontiers of Victory

Hitler has stated quite openly that he is not concerned about the revision of the frontiers of 1918; he demands the revision of the frontiers of 1914.

"To demand the restoration of the 1914 frontiers is, from every point of view, a political folly which amounts to a crime. The frontiers of the Reich in 1914 were quite illogical, for they were neither complete from the standpoint of including all people of German nationality, nor reasonable from the standpoint of military expediency. They were not the outcome of any considered political relations; they were the temporary boundaries of a political contest

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which was by no means settled, and indeed were partly the result of chance. It would be just as reasonable, and in many cases more reasonable, to pick out any other year in German history, and to proclaim the restoration of the relations existing at that time as the goal of our foreign policy. . . . The frontiers of 1914 mean nothing at all for the future of the German nation. They were neither a protection of the past nor a strength for the future. Through them the German people will not maintain its internal unity, nor will its food supplies be made secure; from a military standpoint these frontiers cannot be regarded as expedient or even as satisfactory, and they cannot improve the position in which we stand at the present time in relation to the rest of the world. The disparity with England would not be reduced, there would not even be any real curtailment of the importance of France in world politics." (*Mein Kampf*, pp. 736, 738.)

Once again it is evident that Hitler's aim is imperialist war. The just frontiers that he demands are the frontiers required for permanent military supremacy in Europe. But such claims would have no end, because each new military frontier would soon appear to be insecure and unsatisfactory, and would have to be improved by the annexation of more territory. The frontier could never be finally settled, because

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the victorious State would always hold it by force against the defeated State, and therefore it would be the potential cause of a new war.

From every point of view the idea of protecting the people by the conquest of better frontiers must be rejected. There can be no fixed frontiers for military or political or economic interests. Again and again in the course of history conquering States have attempted to secure better frontiers by means of the strongest material guarantees. But after a short time their power collapsed like a broken reed.

Germany's frontiers are not the worst. Other countries are worse off. They are inadequate only from the standpoint of military conquest.

Germany is not a landless nation. The question of acquiring new territory from neighbouring countries arises only out of the drive towards imperialist aggression.

But, according to Hitler's final argument, German history demands the re-establishment of a Pan-German empire.

On this basis the Spaniards might proclaim their right to the Vienna of Charles V, Luxemburg could demand the whole of northern France, which belonged to her princes in the fourteenth century, and the Italians might claim that the whole of Europe should be remodelled on the

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foundations of the Roman Empire, whose northern outposts were in the forests of Scotland.

Nazi Pan-Germanists might be unpleasantly surprised if Poland were to recall that the Kurfürst of Brandenburg was a vassal of the Polish republic !

CHAPTER IV

GERMAN AFRICA

ON FEBRUARY 11, 1933, immediately after he came to power, Hitler gave an interview to the representative of the *Sunday Express* on Germany's need to acquire colonies; the reserve which he had hitherto maintained on this question was broken. But counter-declarations followed very soon. Propaganda abroad was different from propaganda at home. While concessions were made for tactical reasons outside Germany, internal propaganda was vigorous and definite. Demonstrations in the country, organised under the leadership of General von Epp, by colonial associations affiliated to the Reich Colonial League, were now constantly taking place.

The Programme of 1933

The colonial tactics corresponding with the extent of re-armament, which was still weak, found expression in an attack published in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of August 6, 1933, under the title "For Colonies and Sea Power."

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It was written by Rear-Admiral D. Gadow, one of the leading figures in German colonial propaganda. The main object of German colonial policy at that time was, at first, to win influence in various forms, to put forward general proposals, but not at the moment to aim at the acquisition of territory:

“The demand for the restoration of our colonial possessions, taken from us under pretexts which are not valid, remains unshaken, although the world situation is dead against it. We need colonies for many reasons; above all, we need the mental stimulus, the training in affairs of the world abroad, so that we may not fall back into the narrow outlook from which we suffered in the past. As for sea-power, the world will never see Germany demanding more than a just and reasonable degree of naval armament, sufficient only for purposes of defence. We desire to keep out of the armaments race in which others are openly engaged; we have our limited but unalterable aim. To this aim belongs the building of new bridges to new land across the sea, the recovery of Germany's overseas trade with German colonies, and the protection of their communications by adequate naval forces, which would not be a menace to anyone.”

This restrained treatment of the colonial question changed in course of time, as the

strength of German armaments increased. According to the *Völkischer Beobachter* of March 20, 1935:

“We maintain that all mandated territories are legally still German property; without prejudice to any friendly relations, it is the concern of Germany alone, whether she reclaims her property, or whether she sells it and thus hands over her legal title to other powers.”

Germans abroad were appointed as special propagandists, in accordance with this policy; they established connections with the Press and the politicians of the countries concerned, supplied material, and won over non-Germans to support their aims. The re-distribution of colonies became an international issue.

The Effect Abroad

The response was awaited with the keenest interest. On September 5, 1935, the *Deutsche Wehr* published statements from the French and English Press, dealing with the question of the re-distribution of colonies:

“We have repeatedly found that German claims were considered in letters and statements in the English Press, and even in sermons on the necessity for a new distribution of colonies from the standpoint both of the terms of the peace treaty and of our urgent need; and now we see

similar statements appearing from time to time in France, under the influence of Italy. According to *Figaro*, England and France are well provided for, and it is easy to criticise those who have to live packed together like sardines; their feelings would be different if they had 80 million people instead of 40 million in the country, and so on. It would be premature at the moment to attribute practical or far-reaching importance to this incipient understanding, which throws a new light on the forces at work in Japan, Italy and Germany, and might lead to the attainment, without a struggle, of the inevitable re-division of the world. But even official circles in England cannot continue to ignore it. At the present moment the *Daily Mail* is again urging closer friendship with Germany; this should be the corner-stone of British foreign policy, and, following on the necessary naval understanding, could certainly be achieved, in return for full equality of colonial rights. England should take the first step and give back her mandates."

The tone of this article shows very clearly how the various factors involved in colonial re-distribution had changed the outlook of German foreign policy.

Mussolini's war on Abyssinia had a decisive influence. The doorway to a re-division of colonies had been violently forced open. Germany found

herself outflanked. The perpetual fear of being too late once again became the incentive to action, as it was before the last World War. Hitler, who had made one declaration after another against colonial acquisition, suddenly changed his tone. In a conversation with the French Ambassador, François Poncet, he emphasised the fact that Germany would never give up her colonial claims, and the *Deutsche Wehr*, discussing this interview, made the slogans of German colonial propaganda known to the whole world.

Conflicting Motives

On December 5, 1935, the journal of the General Staff wrote as follows:

“ In Italy’s conflict with England and Geneva, too little attention had always been given to this supremely important problem of the need of certain nations to acquire territory and raw materials. We must deplore the fact that the English Press is only just beginning to inquire into Mussolini’s aims, and that Baldwin should have raised the same question, after all the declarations that Italy has made to the world. Although disregard of international obligations and of British opposition has led to a bad legal position, Italy’s demands and vital needs are clear enough; even the most elementary statesmanship must

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recognise that these desperate needs cannot be met by blockade and starvation, by the suppression of colonial and military ambition. It is said that Italy is more ready to negotiate, now that the difficulties of her position have become clearer, and will raise the question of mandates in compensation for Abyssinia. Let us hope that this has no reference to German colonies; the world is big enough without them. Syria and Palestine, for example, are also geographical areas, which, moreover, are mandated territories in the hands of overfed empires (France and England). Italy was finally compelled to change the slogan of 'a war of defence' to the slogan of 'the need for territory'."

Here the most varied motives found expression: on the one hand the fear that Italy, in her drive for expansion, might grasp at the colonies on which Germany had designs; on the other, satisfaction at the forcible changes which Italy had set in motion.

It would not do to offend Britain, because Germany's aims were to be achieved with Britain's approval; but the secret ultimate aim was to attack British world power.

Britain's Reply

The new German views filled column after column in the English Press. They were repeated

in the Nazi newspapers, and further discussed in England. The campaign reached its climax in the speech of Sir Samuel Hoare (who was then Foreign Secretary) to the Assembly of the League of Nations in September 1935, and the German reply. Hoare outlined a conditional British policy of colonial revision. He declared that "peaceful alteration of international relations, which are becoming a danger to peace" was an essential condition of general security. In this respect the League of Nations had as yet no achievements to record. In the forefront was the problem of colonial raw materials, in which certain countries had peculiar advantages—although these might easily be exaggerated—while others felt that they were at a disadvantage. In reality it was a question of sale and distribution, rather than of the disadvantage of any purchaser. The investigations of the World Economic Conference should be taken as a basis and extended to include the colonial raw materials of protectorates and mandated territories. The main point was a new distribution of these materials.

Letting the Cat out of the Bag

The German reply to this speech was given in an article in the *Deutsche Wehr* of September 19, 1935:

“Whoever interpreted these vague words as expressing readiness to agree to the re-distribution of colonies was immediately informed by the British Press that, of course, there was no question of anything of the kind. The first glimmering of an understanding of this issue is not due to any spontaneous impulse, but the brutal fact that a hitherto friendly power (Italy) is preparing to seize by armed force what was denied to her by ‘collective security’ and the ‘static principle’.”

Hitler's secret allies in Britain began to try and find some patent remedy as a solution of the problem. They looked for this remedy in a direction which the conservative paper *Czas*, journal of the big landlords in Poland, had suggested in the phrase “Nazi expansion must be canalised.” In other words, the aggressor must be incited to attack a neighbouring country. In the case of Poland, this led to the proposal to divert Germany's attention to the Ukraine.

France Must Pay

The canalisation theory was now applied to the colonial problem. On April 2, 1936, *Deutsche Wehr* referred to the French colonial empire:

“After the collapse of the first French colonial empire, France was able to acquire a vast new empire in the last thirty years of the nineteenth

century. Unlike England and Germany, France had no urgent cause, such as the existence of a surplus population, or the opening up of new sources of materials driving her to found this empire. From the first, its establishment served strategic aims. To-day the French colonial empire, with an area of 2,500,000 square kilometres, and a population of 62 million, is next in importance to the British Empire, whose territory it almost everywhere adjoins."

A few months later, following a speech by the South African Minister Pirow, which suggested a re-division of colonies at the expense of France, the *Deutsche Wehr* replied by showing that Pan-German demands extended to British territories:

"Pirow, South African Minister of Transport, has repeated his conviction that Germany must go back to Africa as a colonial power. He did not improve the matter by adding that since 1914 so many political, strategic and economic changes have taken place, and German East Africa is so indispensable to Britain, German South-West Africa so indispensable to the Union of South Africa, that it is impossible for these colonies to be given back to Germany. This, of course, is neither satisfactory nor well-founded, and reduces the question to an abstraction that is of no use to anyone." (July 23, 1936.)

But French claims to colonial possessions were denied not only on economic, but on moral grounds. In the summer of 1933 the French deputy Leon Archimbaud, in a debate on the French colonial budget, raised the question of increasing Nazi propaganda in the Cameroons and Togoland. He described the methods of this campaign, and spoke of the distribution of leaflets stating that the Versailles Treaty was at an end, and telling the natives that in a short time they would be German subjects again.

The German Colonial Society, the organisation for German colonial propaganda which was afterwards replaced by the Reich Colonial League, immediately replied to these statements in the *Völkischer Beobachter* of August 27 and 28, 1933:

“Dissatisfaction with French administration of the mandate is constantly increasing, and the belief that the mandate régime comes to an end this year, which grew up years ago among the natives out of their longing for the Germans, is becoming more and more widespread. We need no leaflet propaganda in the colonies under mandate; our colonial achievements and the attachment of the natives speak much more plainly in favour of our claims than any written word.”

Aryan or Mulatto?

Opposition to French colonial power, according to Nazi propaganda, has a racial foundation. The French are held to be a stagnant nation, no longer possessing the vitality to hold their own against the black race and to defend the interests of the white rulers. This is Hitler's doctrine. "The colonial policy of France to-day cannot be compared with Germany's policy in the past. If the present development of France continued for three hundred years, the last remnants of the blood of the Franks would have come to an end in the Mulatto State that is growing up in Europe and Africa. From the Rhine to the Congo would be a great closed area, inhabited by a lower race which is slowly being established by a long process of bastardisation. This distinguishes French colonial policy from the old German policy." (*Mein Kampf*, p. 730.)

Germany's "Natural Programme"

Germany went into the war to enforce a redistribution of colonies. The extension of the German colonial empire was of the greatest importance in the interests of the capitalist class. Their spokesman Delbrück demanded an increase in colonial power far beyond the existing borders. He put forward these demands, which

he called Germany's natural programme, after the Morocco dispute:

"We refuse to recognise Britain's claim to supremacy. We demand equal rights for Germany. We do not desire that England and France should divide the world between them, as the Morocco Treaty provides, without regard to Germany and her interests. We shall not hesitate to draw the sword, if such attempts are made, but our intentions will be perfectly friendly as soon as we receive the recognition that is due to us as a nation with a great culture."

If Delbrück's *Open Letter to the Editor of the Contemporary Review* in 1911 is compared with the propaganda of the Third Reich, it appears to be almost identical, as if it were a document of the very recent past. Delbrück wrote that in foreign policy it is the duty of the patriotic German politician to do all he can to ensure that the German nation receives a fitting share in the rival efforts of great nations to become supreme in the world, and to carry their own culture to backward or completely barbarous areas.

At a colonial conference in Berlin in June 1935, von Epp said: "Foreign countries must recognise that we will not give up our natural claim to colonies, so that we may carry our culture into uncivilised areas. The German colonial problem exists to-day as it did half a century ago."

A Self-contained Empire

This old and new propaganda is identical not only in its phrases, but in its practical results. The acquisition of a self-contained colonial empire was its most important problem.

At the time when the acquisition of colonies was still comparatively easy, capitalist interests in Germany had not yet developed so as to form the basis of systematic colonial expansion. According to Max Weber "chance commercial undertakings in West Africa, chance activities of individual pioneers in East Africa, determined the direction of overseas development. Our colonial expansion came too late and remained insufficient in its character and its extent."

To escape from this fundamental weakness, a self-contained empire had to be established. The whole of central Africa must be united with the old South-West Africa under German rule—Senegambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, populous Nigeria with its harbour at Lagos, the Cameroons, the rich islands of St. Thomas and Principe, the French and Belgian Congo, the mines of Katanga and the whole territory of East Africa from Zanzibar to Northern Rhodesia; and, in addition, the great harbour of Ponte Delgado in the Azores, one of the most important coaling stations, and Horta, one of the chief trans-

Atlantic cable stations. These territories together have about 100 million inhabitants, and if they were united under one rule would offer immeasurable possibilities. They are rich in natural wealth, in opportunities for colonisation and development, and in a population which could be used as workers or as soldiers. And yet this claim is not unjust nor contrary to the principle of the balance of power, because Germany would only acquire a colonial empire, such as England, France and America have possessed for a long time. (*Krieg und Politik*, Vol. II, p. 226.)

Germany must Recover her Colonies

Intensive propaganda for a self-contained German Africa is being carried on everywhere in Germany. Teachers are instructed to spread the idea of colonies among the children. At the University new lectureships have been founded for overseas questions; workers' clubs have been formed to study the colonial problem. The colonial school at Witzenhausen-Werra has been enlarged and its students carry out propaganda tours throughout the country. The Hitler Youth, who are the main agitators, issue postage stamps with the imprint *Germany : get back your colonies !* The year 1934 was celebrated everywhere as a colonial year of commemoration. Songs about Africa were encouraged, and demonstrations

ended with a colonial song which soon became popular: "What we have lost must not remain lost!" Particular attention was paid to the sections of the people who had connections with the colonies before the war, officers, civil servants and the patriotic lower middle class. Men of about thirty, whose technical qualifications had not given them the standard of living they expected because of the crisis, were reminded of their impossible position. Colonies were represented as the only way out. If we had colonies, they were told, you could become pioneers of German culture; as technicians, doctors, officials and army officers you would represent the upper class in relation to inferior races. You could become the aristocracy of German planters and merchants. An attractive picture of the tropics was painted before the eyes of men who were hard hit by the crisis, and a certain sentiment was spoken of which had to be cultivated down there—a sentiment that might be called German-African national pride.

Nazi propaganda had already prepared for the growth of this sentiment. In his chapter on "Aryans as founders of culture" Hitler put forward the theory that one of the most essential conditions for the development of a higher culture was the presence of inferior human beings.

" . . . at first it was the conquered slave who

pulled the plough—the horse only came afterwards. But only pacifist fools regard this as a sign of human depravity.” (p. 323.)

The drive for colonies was justified on the grounds of German over-population. Colonies as land where the surplus of German people can settle; colonies not only for the establishment of a new “culture,” but as vast areas to be populated by settlers, as Germany used to have formerly.

This word “formerly” on closer examination quickly disposes of this line of argument. Before the war, as everyone knows, Germany had fairly large possessions in Africa. Togoland, the Cameroons, German East Africa and German South-West Africa were hers. At that time, just as to-day, intensive propaganda was carried on, urging the need for land for the ever increasing population. But in spite of all such assertions, and in spite of the fact that Germany possessed colonial territories, the number of the white population in all German colonies in 1913 only amounted to 28,000, of whom 18,000 were Germans. There were more Germans making a living in Paris, the capital of Germany’s “hereditary enemy,” just before the war, than in all the German colonies put together.

The same rear-admiral who spoke on colonial policy in the mildest tone in 1933, adopted quite

a different note in 1936, when he replied to those English "friends" who advised Hitler Germany to leave the colonies alone:

"It was pointed out with friendly persuasion that there are a number of countries which are well off without colonies, and that colonial possessions are over-rated. We might reply that in that case the possessors have little reason for refusing to give up colonial territory. Further, it was stated that the need for land would not be met by acquiring colonial countries, where the settlement of Europeans on a large scale could not take place. The answer is obvious and has been given a hundred times, that colonial products are always required by a highly industrialised country, that they mean employment, and therefore must be highly valued; above all, they save payments abroad. The same applies to the further statement, that the whole of Germany's colonial needs could not be met by giving back her colonies. This is like saying that if a man needs 100,000 marks and only gets 60,000, the money is no use to him. And finally we have the old familiar story, that governing natives is a sacred charge which England takes very seriously. It is clear enough that this is simply an attempt to turn a purely economic question into a pseudo-moral problem."

The Real Masters

Capitalist accumulation in Germany is advancing with giant strides, but the possibilities of investment at home have not kept pace with it. The newly accumulated capital, which cannot find opportunities for investment in Germany, seeks for more profitable employment on a higher rate of interest abroad. But conditions for this are much more favourable and more secure in a subject country. Here competition is easily excluded by monopoly. German large-scale capitalism has found in Hitler a zealous advocate of its need to find opportunities of profitable investment. His policy of continental expansion and his demand for colonies both aim at expanding the economic sphere in which capital can operate. The real meaning of this intensive colonial propaganda, which appears to have been worn so threadbare, can only be seen by examining its economic motive. The sentimental and patriotic speeches of von Epp and others appear on the front pages of the German newspapers; but the names of those who really pull the strings are hidden away, almost unnoticed, in the commercial columns.

For example, consider the report of the inaugural meeting of the Deutsche Orient Verein. The men who met there had never inquired about

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“ the longings of the natives,” nor thought of the future of the men of about thirty ; although they financed the National Socialists, they simply smiled at Nazi racial theories ; their thoughts were occupied not with ideas of national honour, but with financial results.

Among them were Dr. Reyss, director of Siemens and Halske, who was elected president. He appointed to the board as vice-chairman Dr. Justus Ruperti of the Allianz combine, and, secondly, Dr. Max Hahn of the German group of the Central European Economic Conference. In addition there were twenty representatives of leading German industrial and financial undertakings, including I.G. Farben-Industrie, Krupps, and Lufthansa.

Were these eminent people concerned about the struggle for a fuller national life, about preserving the purity of Aryan blood, about missions of culture or a better future for German youth ?

Certainly not. They wanted to secure coolie labour for rubber, coolie labour for copper and ivory and bananas and oil. In other words, markets, sources of raw material, monopoly profits.

CHAPTER V

THE DRIVE FOR RAW MATERIALS

NO MODERN STATE is free from concern about supplies of raw materials. Whole fleets of merchant ships are engaged in the transport of raw materials, but nothing prevents it from being carried on peacefully, until some State decides that it can get what it wants more cheaply by force.

According to Colonel von Bülow, writing in the German *Review of Military Science* (No. 3, 1936):

“The world to-day is living in a period of tension, whose chief cause can be traced to the unjust distribution of territory and raw materials.”

In 1917 a strictly confidential memorandum was issued by the German steel industry, which outlined the problem not from the standpoint of “injustice,” but from the standpoint of industrial capitalism. The most significant headings of this memorandum were as follows:

1. Our dependence on supplies of iron from

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abroad gives rise to the greatest dangers for industry, for the State and for the nation.

2. The alteration of the Lorraine frontier is absolutely necessary to secure supplies for the future.

The third paragraph is the clearest, and gives a new basis for our statement that the aims of German war-makers have not changed, but were planned on a very far-reaching scale.

3. The value of the mining areas (Briey and Longwy) to be incorporated is immeasurable for our national economy, and for a future war. . . .

This memorandum was referred to in another document, issued on February 25, 1919, by the French Government: *A Memorandum on the alteration of the German western frontier on the Rhine, and the inter-Allied occupation of the Rhine bridges*. The following was the relevant passage in the German memorandum:

“ It is universally recognised that every country has an interest in protecting its vital industrial areas. The rapid occupation of these vital areas gives the aggressor a decisive advantage, because he increases his own means of production by those that he takes from the enemy. Therefore it is obvious that the possibility of securing this advantage is a factor in the military position. History proves it. Germany had this in view in 1815 in regard to the Saar coalfields, in 1870 in

regard to the iron ore of Lorraine, and in 1914 in regard to the iron mines of Briey. Thus it was explicitly recognised that Germany could only carry through the last war if she took possession of the French ironfields by a sudden attack, without which she would never have been able to win this war." (Memorandum of the German Iron and Steel Federations, December 1917.)

German industrial capitalists have not changed—the coming war still has to achieve the old aims, and—as we shall see—others even more far-reaching. The *Handbook of Military Science of 1936* gave the following picture:

"The geographical distribution of sources of economic strength is even more unfavourable than the position of frontiers. It is reflected also in the distribution and characteristics of the population. Germany is predominantly an industrial and commercial State, dependent on foreign countries for supplies of raw materials and food, and on the world market for the sale of her products. These conditions, as well as the frontier position of the most important economic areas, have a decisive influence on all military measures. If sources of raw materials and foodstuffs were inadequate in 1914, this applies still more since the establishment of the new frontiers.

"Agriculture provides about 80 per cent of

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our requirements in foodstuffs; rye, oats, wheat, potatoes and sugar are produced in sufficient quantities, but we have to import barley, rice, maize and animal products.

“Raw materials and industry: coal-mining is the foundation of German industry; the surplus can be used to pay for the ore and fuel that have to be imported. The manufacture of oil from coal might have decisive importance in a crisis. The situation of the coal mines on the frontier meant that the majority of German industries developed in frontier districts, a tremendous economic disadvantage from a military point of view. The first requirement therefore would be decentralisation and transference into the interior of the country. Largest coal reserves in Europe. Supplemented by brown coal, more favourably situated, and forming the basis of industry in central Germany; limited reserves, with some imports from Czecho-Slovakia. Available water-power, 2 million, in use, 1·2 million: main district, Bavaria (frontier province). Electricity from coal and water facilitates the decentralisation of dangerously concentrated industries. Imports of mineral oil, 3 million tons. Internal supplies of iron ore only cover a third of the requirements, the remainder having to be imported from Sweden and Spain. Copper, tin, zinc and lead have to be mainly imported. Aluminium manu-

facture is situated on the frontier and is not yet sufficient for requirements. The chemical industry, depending mainly on brown coal, is still the first in the world. The textile industry employs most workers, and uses foreign raw materials almost entirely." (Vol. I, p. 677.)

In an attack on Britain, Rear-Admiral Gadow asserted that Germany was worse off than any other State in regard to raw materials:

"Of the thirty-five most important raw materials, Germany has adequate supplies of only two, potash and coal; Japan five, Italy eight. Among the chief producers of the fifteen most important foodstuffs, Germany appears only as producing beet sugar." (*Deutsche Wehr*, May 20, 1936.)

Others are in the Same Position

This and similar statements might be applied to other countries. There are special reasons for examining their position. Discussion of this question has become general in all European countries; it is a discussion of the hidden causes of war. Comparative figures on the basis of the year 1933 show that the position of the various countries was as follows:

Mineral oil: 70 per cent of world supplies came from the United States, 8 per cent from Mexico, 6 per cent from the Soviet Union, 5 per

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cent from Venezuela, 3 per cent from Persia, only 2 per cent from Rumania, and the rest from other countries. Oil supplies from Europe, therefore, are insignificant, except from the Soviet Union and Rumania.

Copper: 53·5 per cent of copper output was from the United States, 13·7 per cent from Chile, 7·3 per cent from the Belgian Congo, 5 per cent from Japan, 3·6 per cent from Mexico, 4 per cent from Canada and the rest from other countries.

Rubber: the production of rubber is concentrated in Malaya and Ceylon (British) with 61 per cent of the total, and the Dutch East Indies with 35 per cent. South America has 4 per cent. The chief users of rubber are the United States, which takes 70 per cent, countries on the continent of Europe (14 per cent), England (6 per cent) and Japan (3 per cent). Here we find that European countries, and also the United States and Japan, are completely dependent on imports from overseas.

Cotton: the United States supplies 58 per cent of world production, British India 18·4 per cent, China 7·5 per cent, and Egypt 6 per cent. Here, too, European powers and Japan have to rely on overseas imports.

In a series of articles in the *Daily Herald* (April 1936), Francis Williams gave a list of the

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twenty-five most important raw materials and showed their distribution.

“Of these twenty-five essential raw materials, the British Empire has adequate supplies of eighteen; some supplies of a further one; and no supplies of only six.

“The United States has adequate supplies of twelve, some supplies of two, and no supplies of eleven. Soviet Russia has adequate supplies of seven, some supplies of three, and no supplies of fifteen.

“What of Germany, Italy and Japan? Germany has adequate supplies of only four, some supplies of two, and no supplies within her own political boundaries of nineteen of these essential raw materials of industry.

“Italy has adequate supplies of four, but has no supplies under her control of twenty-one out of the list of twenty-five.

“Japan has adequate supplies of three, some supplies of another five, but is totally without any supplies under her political control of seventeen.

“Superficially, therefore, the case of the dissatisfied powers appears to be a strong one. But is it so in truth? France, which is not among the dissatisfied powers and has a colonial empire, is in this matter of raw materials identically in the same position as Germany. Like Germany, she has under her political control adequate supplies

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of only four of these essential materials of industrial civilisation, some supplies of a further two, and no supplies at all of nineteen.”

Therefore, we find the following position: France imports the whole or almost the whole of her requirements of oil, copper, manganese, rubber, cotton, wool and silk. Italy imports mainly by sea 90 to 100 per cent of her supplies of coal, oil, copper, cotton and rubber. Even the United States, which in most respects comes much nearer to self-sufficiency than any other power, is dependent on imports for the whole of her supplies of rubber, tin, silk, jute and nitrates, and for half to two-thirds of her supplies of wool and manganese. The needs of industrial technique are so varied that no single area alone can supply them, no single country is in a position to satisfy all its requirements.

The last war showed Germany and the other Central Powers exactly what a shortage of raw materials means in the complicated conditions of modern economic life.

In the period of more highly developed chemical and technical warfare, this question becomes even more urgent. At the end of the nineteenth century, oil and rubber had hardly begun to be used on a large scale, but to-day they are essential for transport over sea or land, for the means of communication which play a decisive

part in modern war. Supplies of all these raw materials are indispensable from a military point of view, and it is from this standpoint, taking into account the experiences of the last war, that economic conditions in Hitler Germany are being organised.

At the beginning of the World War Germany was deficient in many important raw materials, and there was no systematic organisation of supplies. Industrial mobilisation on a far-reaching scale had not been carried out before the war, because the German General Staff were reckoning on a war of short duration and did not realise the importance of material supplies in a war between highly industrialised States. When the War Office undertook inquiries into the question of food supplies in the years 1884, 1906 and 1911, raw materials were not taken into account, and, although a complete blockade of the country was assumed, calculations were based on a war lasting for nine months.

It was Rathenau, the Jewish finance capitalist, who at the beginning of the war saw the importance of a comprehensive plan for supplies of raw materials, and insisted on an interview with the Minister for War to discuss this question, which had been completely ignored. Rathenau established a unified control of all raw materials; special Government offices were set up, and the

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organisation of raw materials led to the formation of a new department of the War Office. In the course of time this department became the central authority for economic administration.

Oil a Vital Necessity

It was said that the Entente Powers won the war on oil. Oil is essential for a mechanised army, and above all for an army whose strategic aim is to take the offensive.

The *Deutsche Wehr* of January 30, 1936, dealt with this problem:

“ The supply of motor fuel in the event of war is of equal concern to all the powers, and runs like a red line through the politics of the year 1935. The manufacture of liquid fuel from coal is the basic answer to the problem and takes all sorts of forms, down to the most primitive substitutes; but the liquefaction of coal is still a very expensive process, with costs amounting to four times the cost of producing mineral oil. This is a low estimate. The process will become cheaper, the larger the sales in peace time. But at the present time mineral oil is economically the best. Although liquid air is being used in Japan, and colloidal fuel in Germany, both of these have the disadvantage of the danger of explosion. But now developments will probably take the direction of making motor fuel from mineral oil or coal more

effective, by the admixture of explosive substances. Motor construction will quickly adapt itself to new requirements in stability and weight. And if one thing is clear from the experience of the year 1935, in which the world has been so much concerned with 'sanctions' in general, and with 'oil sanctions' against Italy in particular, without coming to any agreement by the end of the year, it is that the mechanisation of armies, carried to an extreme degree, represents a very precarious and doubtful measure as long as the problem of motor fuel has not been solved on a national basis, and the enormous supplies of oil required for armies, air fleets and navies are not absolutely secure."

Italy's Experiences

Italy's experiences in Abyssinia in regard to this problem were discussed in the artillery journal of the Italian Army. The most instructive part of the article dealt with the military use of fuel substitutes. Under existing conditions it was only possible for the army to use liquid motor fuels, that is to say, either pure or synthetic petrol, or petrol combined with crude oil or alcohol or other such mixtures; this applied particularly to aeroplanes.

There are a number of reasons why solid fuel substitutes are unsuitable for use in the field, such

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as the difficulties of renewing supplies, the time taken in keeping generators in condition, the reduced carrying capacity, owing to the fact that the gas generator alone weighs 1,000–1,200 lbs., and irregularity of the motor—on account of defects in the quality of the gas.

Difficulties in the use of substitutes in the form of gas are due to the fact that compressed gas has to be supplied in heavy containers, and large reserve stocks have to be kept because any defect in the hermetic sealing of the containers means considerable losses.

The conclusion is that there must be a thorough investigation of the whole problem of substitute fuels, under State control, and that the use of them must be legally enforced in time of peace, not only under the necessities of war.

Preparing to Attack

A review of the measures that were carried out in Germany in 1935 and 1936, from the standpoint of economic preparations for war, gives the following general picture:

Great efforts were made to develop raw material resources within the country, and as far as possible to become independent. The lack of raw materials was to be compensated by systematic control of supplies. Restrictions on the supply of imported materials which are of value

for war purposes, particularly those imported from overseas, were repeatedly observed. Industries of military importance were more strictly supervised; specialisation of production took place, side by side with the closing down of the smaller factories. At the same time there was a decentralisation of industry, in the sense that the large industrial centres, specially exposed to attack from the air, were broken up and transferred from the big towns and from the frontiers into the interior of the country.

Natural and Artificial Stocks

The most useful stocks have always been those which take the form of a general abundance of goods. The richer a State is, the more it can reduce the effects of isolation from foreign countries. All kinds of articles of consumption and means of production, manufactured in previous years, may become substitute raw materials in time of need, and thus form a rich reserve. Copper, cotton, and wool can be obtained from existing products. In agriculture, stocks of cattle provide great reserves of food supplies. This is wealth which can be brought into use without any connections with economic areas outside the country.

In addition, there is the systematic building up of stocks of important war materials, including

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both increased internal production, and increased imports. But an artificial increase in stocks of raw material is not an ideal solution. Large stocks mean idle capital. Even in a period of good trade this is undesirable: in an economic crisis it may be disastrous. In Germany the State stepped in; but a limit was reached in the financing of stocks by means of subsidies.

Further measures of war economy attempted to find a solution in the production of substitutes within the country. Scientists are doing their best to make these substitutes popular, and the government is carrying on propaganda to prepare for them. Hitler made a great point of this at the Nazi Congress at Nuremberg in 1936.

Allies for Raw Materials

Another important step is to form alliances with countries which may become suppliers of raw materials and foodstuffs in a "crisis." For this the closest territorial connections are essential.

"An ally at a distance or overseas can hardly assist Germany's food supplies in time of crisis, because, owing to her unfortunate geographical position, Germany can be completely blockaded. All the more, when we have been denied the right to possess naval forces such as should belong to the German nation. There would be the possibility

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of an alliance with the whole Danube region.”
(*Deutsche Wehr*, May 2, 1935.)

German policy is working in this direction too. For some years a campaign was carried on for the establishment of soya-bean production in Hungary and Bulgaria, because oil from soya beans is an important raw material. The Soya Company, which was founded with capital provided by Germany, was successful in developing production both in Bulgaria and in Hungary, so that soya beans were already being exported to Germany in 1935.

German military experts have provided for a number of other emergency measures, which would be an improvement on what was done in the last war to meet a blockade. Communications with neutral countries are to be maintained, whatever happens, by merchant submarines; this is the reason for the intensive building of large submarines. Airships are regarded as being of special use in “exceptional cases,” for example for the rapid transport of a cargo of copper from Canada. The frequent journeys of German Zeppelins to America in 1936 were obviously practice flights.

The German war economists expect the most important results from systematic foreign trade by aeroplane. “Aeroplanes flying at night and at a great height would be comparatively safe,

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because they could avoid anti-aircraft defences. Their capacity is great." (*Deutsche Wehr*, August 1, 1935.)

But it is obvious to the originators of these plans that all such measures can only be supplementary. The Danube region cannot meet Germany's war needs, any more than the transport of raw materials, however persistent, in the small space available in aeroplanes. And the tonnage of merchant submarines, the largest of which have a capacity of only 750 tons, would be of very little importance compared with the enormous consumption of war, and of a population of 65 million.

The Possibility of Help from Britain

There is the further necessity, therefore, to find an ally who controls the resources of an empire. There are only three possibilities: the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. In regard to Britain a German military authority made the following statement:

"It is always necessary to remember, in considering the military aspect of the question, that even in 1914-18 the whole world was only partially successful in carrying out a blockade, and that to-day no combination of powers in Europe is conceivable that could really blockade us

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without Britain's help. This, incidentally, reveals Britain's strong position in Europe."

The attention of the German government was turned to Britain. Hence the naval agreement and the sympathetic comments of the whole German Press. Hence the emphasis on blood relationship with the Anglo-Saxons, and the celebration of the anniversary of Waterloo. Hence, too, the appeal to Britain as arbitrator after the occupation of the Rhineland.

But opinion in German military circles is by no means united as to the value of British aid in supplying raw materials. The more considerations of purely military expediency assert themselves, as war becomes imminent, the more often doubts are expressed about the possibility of British help. In a book called *Der Krieg der Zukunft im Urteil des Auslandes* (*Foreign Opinion on the War of the Future*), which was published in 1936, the writer showed that the "Achilles heel" of Britain is her dependence on overseas supplies of food. "A sudden powerful attack by air on the ports of London, Southampton, and Liverpool can seriously endanger Britain's food supplies." (p. 18.)

The author, Lieutenant-Colonel von Belli, also discovered that Britain depends on imported oil and raw materials:

"Those countries which control supplies of

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oil have a much greater military advantage over others than they had a few years ago. If they also have the other important raw materials within their own borders, like the United States and Soviet Russia, as well as the essential foodstuffs, then the weapon of economic pressure cannot touch them. But those States which have to import oil from countries overseas have become all the more vulnerable. Although Britain is one of the fortunate countries, nevertheless her supplies of oil have to be transported by sea, and she is, therefore, exposed to hostile attacks." (pp. 15, 16.)

The various conditions on which Britain's supplies of raw materials depend were further examined in the *Deutsche Wehr*: "In the last few years Britain has done a great deal to ensure the safety of her oil imports, which reached over ten million tons in 1934. This may be taken to have been successfully achieved, if transport of oil to the British Isles is not interfered with. But the necessary condition is that Britain should control the Mediterranean, since the routes to Irak and Persia, as well as to the Dutch Indies (Britain's chief sources of oil) are through the Mediterranean. But these lines of communication pass through that narrow part of the Mediterranean which lies between Sicily and Tunis. British tankers, therefore, would be threatened by the submarines

and aeroplanes of France and Italy, if military complications were to develop between these countries and Britain. This consideration undoubtedly had a decisive influence on the British attitude in the settlement of the Italian war with Abyssinia, and relations with France. It will become still more important as the tension in the Far East increases, and with it the necessity for the British Navy to be constantly prepared for war." Whether Britain can obtain supplies of raw materials, therefore, depends largely on France and Italy, and this fact too must be taken into account in the calculations of the German General Staff.

But assistance from allied countries in the supply of raw materials is not the whole story. German re-armament is reaching its limits. However hard the people are driven, German soil cannot yield more than a certain amount. And so, once more, it is a question of colonies; if Germany had colonies, re-armament would be secure.

"The possession of colonies is of supreme importance for economic mobilisation. Those countries which were first in the field in seizing territory and getting control of resources, are the world powers of to-day, which, because of this economic independence, have the greatest endurance in time of war. Peace or war, the pros-

perity or the destruction of nations, depends in the last resort on the way the world's raw materials are distributed." (*Review of Military Science*, No. 1, 1936, p. 83.)

Conciliatory attempts to solve this problem appeared in the British Press. "Legitimate desires can be satisfied." The important point was not the control of territories, but the free movement of goods. Everything depended on the international exchange of commodities. Difficulties had only arisen because of the disturbance of international exchange and finance.

The National Socialists maintained that it was not a question of the exchange of goods nor of lower British prices; these questions only concealed the real issue, which was Germany's subordination to British monopoly.

German Monopoly

German capitalism, fully aware of its own interests, aims at monopoly control of raw materials. Hitler's supporters have openly stated that British "free trade" proposals are an absolute contradiction of any form of monopoly control. Monopolies must be able to dictate, must have all sources of raw materials within their power. Only the possession of colonies can guarantee success against all the counter-moves of an opponent.

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It is not a question of raw material quotas but of an exclusive market, and of Germany's inability to pay. According to Rear-Admiral Gadow, English writers give statistics, showing that in 1933 only 3·7 per cent of the world supplies of industrial raw materials, and 3·2 per cent of foodstuffs came from Africa, and that its importance is, therefore, over-estimated. But these statistics conceal, and are intended to conceal, the question of what could be produced in Africa and is not produced, because of the competition for markets. The African market means in fact the British and French colonies, within which competition and restriction of production mainly operate. These statistics show nothing of the possibilities of development of African possessions under different economic and exchange relations, such as the German or Italian. Here then would be no question of competition with their own products from other places, while their own transport, and control of customs duties and currency would ensure a lowering of prices.

There can only be one solution—not the redistribution of raw materials, but the distribution of colonies.

“ A re-distribution is impossible, because none of the more powerful producers would be prepared to restrict their own supplies for international reasons, but would always act from

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national motives, in other words for the sake of profits or of defence or of internal economic advantage. For the nations with smaller possessions, the principle of providing for themselves must be the rule for a long time to come."

"Germany, get back your colonies!" has become the slogan of the period of re-armament, because Germany must have colonial raw materials in order to prepare for war on a solid foundation. The only other alternative is one which involves a very great risk.

"Nations which are dependent on imported foodstuffs and raw materials will endeavour to reach a swift conclusion in war, by throwing in the whole of their forces at the beginning, so as to achieve a decisive result. This is the only way of avoiding the shortage of food and raw materials which is inevitable if the war lasts for a long time. As soon as a shortage makes itself felt, the enemy gains an increasing advantage. States which run this risk must, therefore, adopt definitely offensive, one might almost say explosive, tactics. Otherwise it is almost impossible to reach a quick decision. Italy was in this position. Recognition of these weak points was evident in the whole of her military organisation. Insufficient food supplies meant that Germany was subject to the same conditions, although it was not shortage of food alone that determined Germany's line of

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action. But it must have influenced the resolve to attempt to win a decisive victory before the whole of the enemy powers were brought into action, and before our own supplies were exhausted." (*Deutsche Wehr*, May 2, 1935.)

Thus the General Staff hesitates between the policy of arming allies for a long war, and the alternative of a sudden decisive war of attack. Because of the scarcity of raw materials, they prefer the second choice. But first they need rubber for incendiary shells, silver for poison gas, iron for high-speed tanks. First raw materials; and therefore, once again, Germany demands colonies.

CHAPTER VI

ECONOMIC WAR

AT THE TIME of the Washington Conference and the Genoa Conference, when Britain and the United States were attempting to find a peaceful settlement on the basis of re-establishing world economic relations, H. G. Wells published his *Outline of History*.

He worked out a pacifist programme, combined with a world economic plan for the acquisition of raw materials and the distribution of markets, and announced that this programme would be the salvation of the world.

From the point of view of Britain and America this programme was quite acceptable. In that period their commercial and economic interests had to be consolidated, and according to Wells they were to play the part of a sort of world police, while other countries were to be in the position of Dominions or of dependent States.

Many European countries had been reduced to this position in the post-war period, including Germany, which at first was no longer able to play the part of a great power. But German

capitalists hoped, by means of peaceful economic development, to re-establish Germany's position among the powers within a very short time. Groups within the victorious States formed connections with groups in the defeated States, and economic developments more and more determined the revision of political relations.

With the development of the world economic crisis new changes took place, not only in the relations of one country to another, but within each of the imperialist powers. The more it became clear that the possibilities of a so-called peaceful revision had been quickly exhausted, the more the ruling class in Germany concentrated its attention on a war of revenge. In Europe, as well as in the rest of the world, the crisis put an end to the pacifist period, and in Germany the National Socialist Party developed as an instrument of force for the realisation of long-cherished aims. Nazi propaganda made use of the sharpening conflict between the capitalist class and the working class, presenting it as the result of Germany's position. The German people must find the means to secure a higher standard of living, to abolish poverty and distress, not in the class struggle nor in internal political conflict, but in the struggle for imperialist power.

Pacifism as a Sign of Decadence

The scientists of militarism support their theory that pacifism is a symptom of decay with the following argument:

“Just as from time to time catastrophes have overwhelmed mankind, as the result of a state of tension in the universe or in the earth, so the tension that arises from conflicts between nations, from pressure and counter-pressure in the life of States, has always led—when it became insoluble—to a forcible outbreak, to war; and it will always be the same in the future. No attempts to abolish war as a decisive factor, or at least to soften its horrors, can make any real difference. They find expression in pacifism, which spreads in the most varied forms, particularly after long and arduous wars; in the main they are to be regarded as a symptom of exhaustion and decadence, which sees only the negative, destructive, and revolting side of war. This conception comes fundamentally from an egotistical over-valuing of life, of material well-being, and of the intellectual and physical possessions that have been gained in time of peace, as well as from an unheroic outlook on life.” (*Handbook of Modern Military Science, of 1936*. Vol. I, p. 171.)

A War Situation in time of Peace

In his book on economic mobilisation, published in 1935, Justus Schmitt explained his theory that the possible development of a war situation must always be taken into account, in every economic and political decision. "This is one of the basic principles which distinguish the new economics from the fundamentally and consciously unpolitical theory of economic Liberalism." The political theory of National Socialism, therefore, has its counterpart in "what may best be described as military economics."

But it does not satisfy the requirements of military economics to base economic mobilisation on the dangers of a future war. It is necessary to go further: to "regard the extent and character of these dangers as expressing a particular stage of political and social development. In this way we can judge economic developments in peace and in war by a single standard. For every age produces its appropriate forms of politics, economics and war, out of the common ground of social life.

"The boundaries between war and peace, government and economics, politics and the conduct of war, which used to be sharp and unmistakable, to-day have been wiped out. . . . In so far as the boundaries between war and peace

have disappeared, and, for example, the boycott has not only become a means legalised by international law for enforcing political demands (*League of Nations Statutes*, Art. 16) but also, in the form of protective duties and direct political intervention, has become an essential part of the modern economic system, to this extent a war situation already exists in time of peace, and appropriate measures must be taken."

Nazi politicians have shown very clearly what these threats signify. Indirect war, or, more correctly, economic war, has been developed to a high stage in a complicated economic system. "There are innumerable methods by which economic relations can be used on behalf of the State during a conflict. The experiences of private enterprise in the competitive struggles of capitalism come to the aid of State control, such as the World War produced for the first time. The State adopts the methods of the trusts, the banks and the stock exchange and adds them to its weapons for carrying on the struggle with another State."

A glance at the methods of economic warfare shows a whole series of different means of attack: in time of peace, the boycott, protective tariffs, export duties, monopolies, devaluation of currency, hoarding of gold, State trading, inflation or restriction of credit, refusal of debt payments,

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dumping, imitation of patents, preferential duties, forging of currency and banknotes; in time of war, blockade, destruction of economic resources, and, as a means of subjecting a defeated State, restrictions on production and supplies, indemnities, and the breaking up of economic areas. Each of these methods has been developed on a far-reaching scale.

In its issue of May 16, 1935, the *Deutsche Wehr*, which carries more weight than any other journal in Hitler Germany, put forward the policy of "devour or be devoured" in unmistakable terms. The question of finding a way out of the existing situation was first of all set forth in a series of articles on "Totalitarian Victory," and the rulers of Germany gave their inevitable answer: war. This followed from an analysis of the European situation, showing "a profound upheaval, which is taking place in every sphere of life, a crisis moving irresistibly and at an increasing speed towards catastrophe." The causes of this development, its direction and speed, and the nature of its end, arise so clearly and unquestionably from the history of the last fifty years that there is no room for any illusions. In this period the world was divided up and territories were expanded by sheer robbery, so that the disposal of products, which continued to increase in spite of this process of division, would only have been

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possible by way of a still more intensive opening up of existing markets. But here, too, there was a change: regions and States which used to be colonial or semi-colonial began to build up their own industries—mainly during and because of the almost complete stoppage of European production for export at the time of the war. Instead of customers, therefore, they became competitors, who adopted the most rigorous measures of protection against imports. The difficulties that arose from this were increased by the advance of the United States and Japan as highly developed industrial countries. The continent of America was lost, to a great extent, to European trade, and the same thing was happening with Asia.

Again, according to the *Deutsche Wehr*, the economic emancipation of the non-European world, constantly advancing but still far from complete, as well as the devastating effects of the World War, had injured and in part destroyed the economic life of almost every European country. But this was not all. It threatened to become the cause of a new and more overwhelming catastrophe. Scope for development, which essentially depends on the capacity of the world market, was more restricted day by day. The economic struggle for existence grew more and more intense, and at last became an open trade war. The “peaceful competition of nations” had

turned into a desperate struggle for daily bread, a struggle of all against all, in which the most violent competitive methods had broken down all the old conventions. Markets were closed by prohibitive customs duties and restrictions on imports. Free exchange was still further limited by preferential treaties and special agreements. Ruinous undercutting attempted not only to drive competitors off the world market, but to strike at them in their own country and in their own centres of production. Side by side with this official trade policy underground practices became common, such as the stealing of trade secrets and violation of patents.

This economic warfare had long ceased to be conducted by private undertakings. It was carried on by the State, which gave subsidies and export premiums to maintain the competitive position of its industries. The burden fell on the taxpayers, who had to provide the subsidies in part through taxation, and also through higher internal prices. It was borne by the working class who, in the words of the *Deutsche Wehr*, "with a falling standard of living, have to do more intense slave-labour." The result was such as was bound to follow all this waste of the national wealth: constantly increasing State debts, open or concealed measures of inflation, a falling standard of life.

Economic Disarmament no Solution

The conclusions which were drawn by the German General Staff from this view of the position deserve attention. According to them, there was no escape. The struggle for markets, in its existing form, no less than the drive for raw materials, is moving with the force of an irresistible fate towards war. The *Deutsche Wehr*, rejecting every other alternative, maintained that it was impossible to find a friendly solution of the conflict, that it must be fought out to a final decision. For the sharing out of markets, and an agreement on the kind and quantity of products to be allotted to each producing country, which alone could provide a solution, was ruled out in advance by the number and complexity of the interests concerned. Further, competition between national economies which would be self-dependent and not subject to any supreme controlling will could not be abolished by agreement, and under the pressure of actual conditions would soon put an end to all voluntary restrictions. Any attempt at economic disarmament, therefore, is even more hopeless than military disarmament. In a world in which everyone lives more or less at the expense of others and the only choice is "Devour or be devoured," it would be absurd to expect anyone to tighten his own belt, simply so

that somebody else should have enough. But this would be the intention, and the necessary result, of any restriction of competition. The cause of the bitter economic struggle is precisely the fact that available resources are not enough to satisfy all those who are dependent on them.

The States of Europe are like shipwrecked people in a boat that cannot carry them all. The safety of each of them can only be bought by the destruction of one of the others, and everyone is desperately trying to pay this price.

“Devour or be devoured !”—this is the official theory of Hitler Germany. It is put forward under many disguises as a race theory, in an economic or a military form, as the theory of “totalitarian war” and “totalitarian victory.” But that gain for one must inevitably mean loss for another is the law of an outworn political system.

World War is Inevitable

It is as impossible, according to these theorists, for an individual State to withdraw from the conflict as it is to settle it by agreement among them all. The share of any State in world trade more or less corresponds with the amount that it supplies to the world market, and therefore any restriction of production also means a decline in this share. A State which closes down its industries to any great extent, because it despairs of

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finding employment for its workers, is forced to lose ground and to reduce its chance of survival in an economic sense.

Modern war is highly technical, and therefore only the great industrial countries can conduct a war out of their own resources ; and for this reason the cutting down of industry beyond a certain point means not only a loss in competitive strength, but at the same time a decline in military power. Undoubtedly the disastrous economic rivalry is largely due to the fact that a highly developed and efficient industry is an essential part of modern war equipment.

And so the Nazi theorists arrive at the necessity of war, putting forward their arguments in support of it with an aggressive persistence of which they could not be capable unless war were their conscious and deliberate aim.

The Only Reward of Victory

The future war will be quite different, in the demands it will make and the destruction it will involve, from the war of 1914-18. The *Deutsche Wehr* continued :

“ This state of things permanently contains within itself a possible cause of war, because the weaker competitor, which finds itself in danger of

being destroyed by the stronger even in time of peace, will be tempted to try a settlement by force, to escape from slow but certain death. But it must mean, in addition, that such a war becomes a decisive conflict, the result of which can only be absolute catastrophe for the defeated country. For it is obvious that if the desperate struggle for existence, which is really a secret war in its nature and its effects, breaks out into open war, each party will be compelled, in the event of victory, to wipe out the enemy once and for all; for the enemy as competitor represents an intolerable difficulty and danger to existence. A victorious State, which allowed the defeated State to restore its industry and carry on the economic struggle, would have risked its own existence for nothing. The only reward of victory which can compensate for such sacrifice is the absolute removal of the defeated State from further rivalry, its destruction as an independent economic power. The enemy must no longer carry on production, must not create new difficulties by a revival of competition, must not be in the position, through the ownership of efficient industry, to make another war, perhaps with more success. The enemy must be destroyed—and buried. This, and this alone, means victory."

These words recall the victory plans of 1915. At that time six important economic associations

in Germany presented a petition to the Chancellor, which was signed by several thousand intellectuals, headed by a number of professors. The petition demanded that Belgium should be handed over to Germany, that the whole French north-eastern frontier province from the Somme to Belfort should be separated from France, and that all the more important undertakings in this province should be handed over to German ownership. All rights of citizenship were to be taken from the conquered people. In the same way the annexation of a large part of Poland, and the expropriation of enterprises was proposed.

The same people who were responsible for the petition are the controllers of policy in Hitler Germany. And Hitler himself adopted these demands, directly or indirectly, in his book. Students and children in the new Germany are being taught once more that these are Germany's vital needs.

Barbarism or Disarmament

In 1936 the idea of disarmament was once again under discussion, and it is important to examine the Pan-German attitude towards it. According to Delbrück:

“ The idea that great nations might easily agree to reduce their armaments at least by 10 or 20

per cent, and that the balance of forces would remain the same and the money saved could be used for cultural purposes, seems very reasonable, and easily wins the approval of men of goodwill. But if it is recognised that, on the contrary, this plan would increase the danger of war enormously and would make a war that had broken out longer, more bloody, and more terrible, then this apparent humanitarianism will be seen as the most revolting horror that could possibly be conceived."

In another passage he expressed the same view :

" Pacifists ceaselessly argue that the economic burden of increased armaments cannot be borne, but no one has ever undertaken to prove it. The truth is that no expenditure, no effort has brought so great a reward as the great military armaments of the nations in the nineteenth century, for we owe to these armaments the fact that this century was so much more free from war than any of its forerunners. And then the pacifists come and advise us to limit armaments, and if possible to abolish them altogether. A more uncivilised and barbarous demand has never been put forward."

It may be objected that these were the words of a megalomaniac, but that Hitler has actually proposed peace plans, that he has spoken of the limitation of armaments, and that the brutal

philosophy of war was buried with Delbrück. It is not necessary to repeat what was said about Hitler's pacifist disguise. But we quote a statement from *Deutsche Wehr* in 1935, on the question of disarmament:

“ The level of armaments has now reached a height which cannot be without its effects on the general position. In a whole number of States already, expenditure on armaments is approaching 50 per cent of the total budget, and as others must follow suit, for good or evil, this rate will soon be universal. In all countries a war apparatus is coming into existence, powerful and complicated to a degree hitherto unknown, which claims and turns to its service every man, every horse, and every motor in the country. But such an instrument is not created and maintained, at the cost of enormous sacrifice and effort, unless it is to be used at the appropriate time. In this war of silver bullets, the economic, biological and moral forces of a nation are not strained to the verge of exhaustion in order to find the fruits of all this effort in lost territory and a useless increase of population; in order to take up the armaments race again, and to face the possibility of a new catastrophe. This vast capital of death, once invested, requires a murderous interest. Only one kind of victory can fully reward such efforts made for and during a war, as our time

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demands of the victor: totalitarian victory, the
complete annihilation of the victim—through
this alone the survivor may hope to exist in
security and under tolerable conditions." (May
16, 1935.)

CHAPTER VII

GERMANY LORD OF THE EARTH

EXPANSION IN EVERY DIRECTION, with world supremacy as the final goal, were the aims which had been laid down; it was now a question of working out the best strategy to achieve these aims. This was a political rather than a military problem. The right moment had to be found and foreign policy had to be brought into line with re-armament plans and military policy.

All historians and military experts agreed that Germany had made fatal mistakes in the period of preparation before the last war. These mistakes were very widely discussed in Germany. Even during the war, when the government still seemed to be confident of victory, the whole question of the policy which led up to August 1914, and how it might have been better contrived, was being considered.

The Mistakes of 1914

There were doubts about the policy which had led up to the war, and uncertainty as to the result began to make itself felt. And at once the question

arose of how things could be managed better a second time. The strategy of the next war began to be devised.

In an article on "The Foreign Policy of Prince Bülow" which appeared in the *Süddeutscher Monatshefte* of January 1917, Professor Haller of Tübingen reviewed the course of German policy in the period of Wilhelm II. He reached some important conclusions, which were taken up by other German historians, and reappear in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. Haller showed that it had been necessary for Germany to turn from the continental policy of Bismarck to a world policy, but he believed that the line of this policy was wrong. In undertaking the Bagdad Railway Germany had embarked on an oriental policy which brought her into an insoluble conflict with Russia. Good relations with Russia, for which Germany had always striven, were impossible, because Germany had nothing more to offer to Russia. Instead of facing the danger that this involved, Germany had tried to buy Russia's goodwill by all sorts of concessions, such as loans and so on. These attempts naturally produced no results at all. Further, Germany had built a navy, which led to rivalry and hostility between Germany and England. Thus Germany had provoked her three most dangerous opponents at the same moment. This could only have one

result: that the three would combine against Germany. According to Haller, these things should have been done *one by one, not all at the same time*.

Haller's idea that Germany must deal with her opponents one by one, remove them one by one from her path to world power, had been discussed even earlier, in the years before the beginning of the World War.

Hitler, too, maintains that great aims can only be approached in gradual stages. This process of working towards a goal is an art to which the utmost energy must be devoted, so as to master each step of the way.

The policy of Wilhelm II broke all these rules. In the pre-war period Germany was involved in conflicts at too many points, and this policy was doomed to failures which had a serious effect on her prestige.

In the opinion of Haller, mentioned above, the building of a German navy ought to have been delayed at all costs. But the greatest mistake of all was to refuse an alliance with England when Chamberlain offered it at the beginning of this century. Germany ought not only to have accepted this alliance, but to have taken the side of Britain, in the way that Japan did. Germany should first have defeated Russia and France, more or less on behalf of Britain; afterwards she

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could have carried out her own world policy, and
settled accounts with Britain.

The "Morning Post" on Germany's War Plans

This was precisely the strategy which the *Morning Post* attributed to Germany on December 22, 1916, just before the publication of Haller's book.

"Germany is fighting for the mastery of the world. She has undertaken to conquer Europe. If England had stood aside, Germany would presumably have reached her first aim by now, would have compelled Russia to make peace, and would have forced France into the position of a vassal State. Then Germany would have prepared for her second blow. She would have struck at an isolated Britain."

This same strategy is the guiding principle of German diplomacy to-day. After an interval of twenty years, on June 17, 1936, the *Morning Post* once again called attention to Germany's aims. "What makes the European situation in 1936 so like that of 1914?" The answer given by the *Morning Post* is: the revival of German claims to world supremacy, to be achieved through military domination in Europe. The claims are the same, but experience suggests a more prudent choice of the means. In 1914 Germany accepted the danger of British hostility. To-day she is trying

to secure Britain's benevolent neutrality. But our neutrality will not save us from her subsequent wrath. "When the rest of the programme has been carried out, it will be our turn to be the last victims."

Advance through Belgium

It was one of the aims of German foreign policy before 1914 to keep England out of the war. The German General Staff had made its plans on the basis of a war on two fronts, against France and Russia. A war against France alone, or against France and Russia, in accordance with Haller's scheme, would have been approved by the Kaiser's military chiefs; but they did not believe that it was possible.

At the time of the declaration of war there was a moment when there seemed to be a chance of it. Oncken states in his book *Nation und Geschichte* that the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, suggested to the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, in an interview on August 1, 1914, the possibility that England would remain neutral, and guarantee no action on the part of France, if Germany did not attack France, in spite of the mobilisation; and that the Kaiser, believing that British neutrality could really be maintained in this way, and the war confined to the eastern front, proposed that the German

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forces should march to the east. But the Commander-in-Chief succeeded in getting his way and carrying through the march to the west.

The attack through Belgium had been the programme of the German General Staff from the time when the Schlieffen plan was accepted. It was the basis of their strategy, from which they expected the only real chance of success in a war on two fronts. Although it remains undecided whether or not this was correct in a military sense, the march through Belgium was a political action of an extraordinarily far-reaching character, and this was not taken into account in the Schlieffen plan.

Assault on Switzerland

German critics reproach the pre-war authorities with failing to appreciate this fact, and demand that the lesson shall be learnt at the present time. It is said that there are members of the General Staff in Hitler Germany who, for political reasons, reject the Epp plan, which proposes an attack on France through Holland. Such an attack would immediately bring England into the picture. In order to prevent this they propose to avoid the fortifications on the eastern frontier of France by marching through Switzerland. Presumably the German military experts calculate that Britain has less to fear from a violation

of Swiss neutrality than from a violation of the frontiers of Holland and Belgium, within reach of the Channel. This plan could only succeed if it were carried out with lightning speed: otherwise it would be threatened with a double flank attack from the French Army in Jura and the Swiss Army in central Switzerland. The German General Staff estimates that fifteen mechanised divisions would be enough to push forward as far as Geneva in one day. The only difficulty lies in the fact that the country between Basle and Schaffhausen is still insufficiently provided with roads and lines of approach, so that the massing of troops would take too long.

A German-Italian Attack

The possibility of German-Italian co-operation was foreseen by a Swiss writer, Angelo Pometta, in a book called *Warum Festungen?* (*Why Fortifications?*) published in 1934. A march through Swiss territory during a European conflict would be a probable, and within a few years the most likely, ground for an attack on Switzerland. But Italy alone would never contemplate such an attack, because the difficulties of such an operation would be too great. The natural barriers, if they were defended even by a comparatively small number of troops, would greatly delay the

advance. And delay would mean that Italy would have to meet a well-prepared enemy in the mountain valleys, with very much diminished forces. Neither the route nor the indecisive result offers any temptation to Italy to attempt a march through Switzerland.

But a German-Italian alliance, which suddenly became an immediate question in July 1936, would alter the whole position. Austria, no longer a cause of dispute, but, on the contrary, a bridge between the two powers, might become a base for operations through Switzerland.

“On the east lies Austria, crippled by the World War. Switzerland certainly need never fear an attack from Austria. But an attack through Austrian territory must be considered as a definite possibility. It must be remembered that Austria is situated between two great powers, Germany and Italy; and that the conditions exist for friendly relations between them, in spite of certain difficulties, which at the moment may seem very important. Even though Austria were to remain an independent State, she would scarcely be either able or willing to refuse her powerful neighbours the right to march through Austrian territory, if they were united. It is true that an attack on Switzerland would be largely through mountainous country, but a surprise assault with modern technique would penetrate

rapidly into open country at a number of points.” (Pometta, p. 7.)

In the summer of 1936 there was a sudden change in the previously strained relations between Germany and Italy, and Pometta's argument was strengthened by events. But the old contradictions still existed.

One of these was the question of the Brenner frontier. In the opinion of a German writer (*Der Mittelmeerraum*, Berlin, 1936), the choice of the Brenner frontier, which had never been a frontier at any time in history, was made for geographical and strategic reasons, and greatly increased the difficulties between Italy and Germany. Although the conflict over the Brenner was not the only point at issue, a marked change took place, with the result that not only a pre-war alliance between Italy and Germany, but also co-operation in an actual war became possible. Plans such as a German-Italian march through Switzerland appeared in a new light. Italy could enter into a war without having to wait for a decision from England.

What was the cause of this change?

Undoubtedly, it was due to the revolution in the conditions of war which resulted from the development of air warfare. Italy with her long coast-lines and unprotected harbours, and her dependence on imported raw materials, had

hitherto been at the mercy of the strongest naval power in the Mediterranean—Britain. But now the position was altered, as the Abyssinian events had most clearly demonstrated. A complete change took place in the relation of forces in the Mediterranean. What Britain lost through the development of modern armaments, Italy gained in political power.

Pometta, whose book was quoted above, showed that an agreement between Germany and Italy would mean the formation of "a vast western front, extending from Belgium to the Mediterranean, in which the so-called Swiss tableland would be far the weakest point."

The German generals drew a similar picture in their *Handbook of Modern Military Science*:

"Switzerland in the south, like Holland in the north, forms a neutral *glacis* of the Franco-German front. It is the main flank of the two great battlefields of Europe: the Rhine territory, and the valley of the Po. To the south of Switzerland the fortified frontier of France, which forms an unassailable defence, continues along the Italian borders. The only gaps that now exist, therefore, are on the Dutch and Swiss frontiers." (p. 680.)

The following paragraph suggests that, in the secret plans of the General Staff, Switzerland is to be the battlefield in the next war:

“The Swiss themselves have grave doubts as to the possibility of maintaining their neutrality in future military conflicts, in view of the changes in the strategic position in Europe.”

The General Staff looks ahead

The members of the German General Staff are intensely concerned with plans of this kind, and discuss them from a technical point of view in all their variations. It was significant that, at the time when the Hitler-Mussolini agreement became known, the *Deutsche Wehr* began to publish a series of articles on “The Reinforcement of the Swiss Army.” (July 9, 1936.) The journal set forth the problem of a sudden offensive through Switzerland in a veiled form, under the guise of historical narrative, using examples from the past to illustrate immediate questions.

“A great European war, in which the position of Switzerland would be extremely difficult, was foreseen as a result of the political tension at the end of the nineteenth century. It was natural that the general staffs of the great powers, in considering their strategy, should include the question of Switzerland, of her position, her policy and her military strength, particularly after the formation of the Triple Alliance necessarily raised the problem of combined military operations through Swiss territory.”

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In 1936 members of the German General Staff visited Rome, and it can be assumed that they discussed the question of combined operations through Switzerland with their Italian colleagues, because they were already at work on this problem.

The same article mentioned, in a casual reference, that an attack through Switzerland was considered by the General Staff on another occasion :

“ At the end of 1916 there were rumours at French headquarters that Germany was contemplating operations through Swiss territory; an army corps was held in readiness in Jura by General Foch, and in January 1917 two and a half divisions of Swiss troops, who had been on leave, were called up for frontier service ; in addition, discussions took place with each of the armies engaged in the war, on the question of co-operation to resist a violation of the frontier by the adversary.”

Various references show that a surprise advance through Switzerland is by no means an impossible operation, because the Swiss defence forces are far from being an insuperable obstacle. The training of troops and officers in Switzerland is not up to modern standards :

“ The increasing technical development of war brought new difficulties, and in addition a

whole series of problems, hitherto unthought of, arose out of the change from purely military to modern totalitarian war, and demanded an immediate solution. A study of the various conditions that have been mentioned here points to the conclusion that Switzerland's military strength has been considerably reduced in the post-war period."

Thus a lightning attack through Switzerland is likely to be successful, especially if a friendly Italy covers the rear, apart from the possibility of military co-operation.

The German Navy

The question of the navy is of special interest in war plans which are based on the idea of manœuvring to keep England out of the first stage of a war for world power. Haller's criticism of German naval policy in the period before the last war has a modern application. Prince Bülow rejected a British alliance, because it would have compelled Germany to abandon the building of a navy, and Haller in reply asked whether the navy was an aim in itself.

Hitler suggested the same question in *Mein Kampf*, and in a speech on May 21, 1936, referring to the naval agreement between Germany and Britain, he repeated Haller's conclusions:

"The German fleet is limited to 35 per cent of

the British, and is 15 per cent below the total tonnage of the French fleet. As it has been suggested in various statements in the Press that this is only a beginning, and that the German demand will be increased, particularly with the acquisition of colonies, the Reich government declares that this demand is final and permanent. Germany has no need nor intention, nor has she the means, to enter into any new naval rivalry.

“The government of the German Reich recognises that superiority at sea is of paramount importance for the defence of the British Empire, and therefore recognises Britain's claim, just as we are determined on our side to do everything that is necessary for the defence of our own continental existence and liberty. The German government sincerely intends to do all it can to establish and maintain relations with the British nation and the British State which will prevent for ever a repetition of the conflict between the two countries.”

The meaning of Hitler's “for ever” is to be found in Haller's strategic plan.

Isolation Through Alliance

In his criticism of pre-war policy, Haller showed that in 1905, when Russia had suffered heavy defeats by land and sea in the Manchurian war, Germany had an opportunity of

securing an "unassailable position" on the continent. Russia, with her material resources practically exhausted, could have done nothing against Germany. At that moment Germany ought to have ventured on a war of aggression, which would have wiped out France. Germany would have escaped the World War of 1914, if she had acted with decision in 1905, and had used that last favourable moment to prevent the three strongest powers in Europe from combining for her destruction.

Hitler, adopting these views in his book, argued that an alliance is senseless and worthless unless its purpose is war. However remote the conflict may be at the time when an alliance is formed, its real cause must be the prospect of a war situation. No State can do without alliances. Germany's disaster in the war was the result of the policy of alliances adopted by the Entente Powers. Germany must learn from this to avoid ever having to meet such a combination again.

With the breaking up of this coalition, German politicians began to make plans for their policy of revenge. The *Preussische Jahrbücher* of March 1919 published an article by Delbrück in which he declared that the time for the war of revenge would come "in the moment when a rift appears in the partnership of the Entente."

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When Hitler came to power, he showed that he had learnt a great deal from his predecessors. He understood how much could be gained from contradictions between other countries. He aimed at one thing above all: confusion in the ranks of his enemies, and increasing strength at home. Re-armament became the main object of German foreign policy, as the *Deutsche Wehr* admitted. Then came the question of alliances.

The Search for Allies

The choice of allies must be determined by the material requirements of war. Germany had to seek agreements with countries which could supply foodstuffs and raw materials. But only powerful governments were worth having as allies:

“ If we keep in mind the so-called totalitarian character of future war, it must be accepted that unless a government has the whole nation behind it in single-minded readiness for war, then it is of no value as a military ally. For a totalitarian war requires, literally and actually, the totality of the national will for war. In this connection military policy makes certain demands on those who are responsible for foreign policy, demands which cannot be ignored in the choice of war-alliances. The existence of German minorities,

often very important minorities, in a number of States, as well as neighbouring States which are wholly German, puts the Reich in the fortunate position of being able to count them at less than their full weight, so far as there is any question of war. On their side, these States are compelled to do their utmost to avoid a policy likely to lead to war with the Reich, because of the internal opposition that is to be expected." (*Deutsche Wehr*, December 5, 1935.)

Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, and all States with German minorities would find their defensive forces restricted in an attack by Germany. This is a very important factor in calculating alliances. But Germany's own military interests must influence her policy in regard to alliances.

"Foreign policy has to aim at securing the most favourable geographical conditions for the navy by coalitions or by treaties of neutrality. In the event of war, prompt recognition of possible improvements in geographical position may have an important influence on the plan of operation of all forces. Therefore it is essential that the government and the foreign office, as well as the military departments directly concerned, should understand the principles of naval warfare, and the conditions in which the navy can undertake operations. It is necessary to grasp the fundamental changes which have been brought about

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by aeroplanes, submarines, and new types of vessels, in order to realise the political and geographical possibilities which provide or improve the conditions for successful naval operations." (*Review of Military Science*, 1936.)

The statesman who fully appreciates the power of air warfare, and also takes into account the changes this involves in naval war, may easily adopt a conciliatory attitude; this was what happened, to some extent, in the conclusion of the Anglo-German naval agreement.

The Foreign Policy of a Lightning War

Organisation, military orders, training and army manœuvres, as well as the publications of military science, all point to the conclusion that the German War Office hopes to take the enemy by surprise. Military experts, as we have seen, use the raw material position as an argument for a sudden attack. Foreign policy must also make this its aim:

"If war begins with a sudden attack from the air, success or failure may be decided within a few hours. The operations of land forces will depend on superiority in the air. When once war has broken out, there will be no time for manœuvring. Therefore the policy of alliances has taken the place of the old method of strategic

manœuvres; it is identified with military defence. The foreign minister becomes a military commander, and it is impossible to imagine a successful foreign policy without the co-operation of the military command." (*Deutsche Wehr*, December 5, 1935.)

Foreign policy as a whole must follow a consistent course. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler gave his views on the line to be pursued. The development of two continental powers in Europe can never be tolerated. Any attempt to organise a second military power on the German frontiers, or even to bring into existence a State which is capable of becoming a military power, must be regarded as an attack on Germany, and must be prevented by every possible means, including armed force. If such a state exists, it must be destroyed. The strength of the German nation is not to be based on colonies, but on supremacy in Europe. (*Mein Kampf*, p. 754.) In this statement Hitler upheld a continental policy, as against a so-called colonial policy for Germany. These two theories are the alternatives for German foreign policy and for the whole development of modern Germany.

Continental Policy or Colonial Policy

The continental policy of Bismarck meant that Germany at that period deliberately renounced

naval armaments, and held back industrial development. At the same time, he was responsible for the beginnings of German colonial policy. It is important to realise that the alternatives of a colonial or a continental policy only refer to different views of the main strategy, and not to particular colonial or continental adventures. In fact, a continental policy, in Hitler's view, may be the best foundation for securing colonies in the future.

"There seemed to be a possibility of strengthening our position on the continent by winning new territory, and then being able, later on, to acquire colonies. But this policy could only have been carried out in alliance with Britain, or by such an enormous increase of military forces that cultural development would have been completely checked for forty or fifty years." (*Mein Kampf*, p. 689.)

Hitler's programme, however obscurely it is worded, is the immediate conquest of separate territories, and eventually, colonial world power. But at the same time he upholds the traditional continental theory of expansion: the stronger Germany becomes in Europe, the better she can carry on the fight for world supremacy.

Documents exist which show that members of the German General Staff before the war foresaw the dangers of carrying too far the policy of naval

development and the Bagdad Railway, and foretold defeat in a world war. Opposed to them were all the politicians, financiers and industrialists, who stood for a policy of expansion on the basis of Germany's economic achievements, and recognised no limits to what could be secured as a result of her immense economic progress.

Advocates of both theories, colonial and continental, aimed at conquests by force. In their discussion it very often became obvious that differences in practice—the extent of the programme of annexations—were comparatively slight. Delbrück, who supported the colonial theory, did not oppose “peasant colonisation” in the east of Germany, which advocates of the continental policy demanded. Another writer, replying to Delbrück's views, declared that it was not a matter of alternatives. To accept the necessity for peasant colonisation did not mean to exclude “the other kind of colonisation” overseas. Only the two together could establish the full strength of a nation that aimed at world power.

Both sides pursued a policy of annexation on a large scale. But the advocates of a colonial policy did not believe that the other programme could be the basis of a permanent world policy; within a very short time it was bound to collapse. But they thought that their own programme, with its

demand for a place in the sun—for a division of world power with other States—would more easily find allies, and therefore had a better chance of being realised.

Hitler, according to his own statement, believes in a continental policy and at the same time defends the Pan-German programme of world-conquest. His policy does not in any sense involve a renunciation of world power, but it proposes to reach the goal by indirect stages, because this will make success more certain.

Germany Lord of the Earth

The aim of revenge, as understood by Hitler, could only be achieved by a long process. The effects of the Versailles Treaty had to be removed, keeping within the framework of continental policy; first on German territory, then advancing towards future aims, such as uniting with Austria, and thus opening up the land route to "overseas Germany." The plan was to follow the lines of the old expansion to Bagdad, to work for the establishment of German supremacy in central Europe, and to extend towards the east.

A number of very important steps depended upon whether a continental policy or a colonial policy was adopted; this must determine, for example, what form armaments were to take. Although a stronger navy might be desirable on

grounds of prestige, from the continental standpoint an increase in land forces appeared to be far more urgent. But the interests of powerful sections could bring about a change in the course that was being followed.

A correspondent of the *Polska Zbrojna* (journal of the Polish General Staff), who writes under the name of Captain Nemo, published an article on "Germany's Naval Forces," in which he threw some light on the influences that led to the building of the German Navy:

"The question arises: where did the money come from—in a country which was exhausted by the war, and is now passing through a severe economic crisis? Money for a navy is not forthcoming in countries where it is treated as a strictly military question. But when its national and international importance begins to be understood, then it is of interest in all spheres of society. Foreign policy, industry and trade, export markets; the struggle against unemployment—in short, national welfare—all this depends on the possession of a strong navy. In Germany, therefore, it is not in military circles only that people are concerned about the navy. Hitler and the government first, but also the population in general and their representatives in the Reichstag. In these circumstances there is no difficulty about raising money to build a navy."

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The interests of trade, finance and industry are decisive in Germany; they are urgently pressing for a larger German navy and strengthening the drive for colonies, for which the development of the navy is essential. Germany is preparing to fight for world power. Germany, in the closing words of Hitler's book, must some day be lord of the earth.

CHAPTER VIII

A DEAL WITH ENGLAND

SOON AFTER the Anglo-German naval agreement was concluded on July 18, 1935, a Japanese correspondent sent a cable from New York to Tokio, giving the views of certain American circles on the agreement:

The agreement meant the end of the Versailles Treaty. It was a severe blow for the League of Nations, which Britain had not consulted nor even mentioned. It destroyed the Washington Treaty, and the London Treaty. It would mean abandoning the arrangements agreed on at the Stresa Conference. It would lead to a strengthening of the Franco-Soviet Pact, and of the Pact between France and Italy. German superiority in the Baltic was causing great uneasiness in Russia. America believed that the agreement would assist Japanese policy in the Far East. It would strengthen the Italian attitude against Abyssinia.

This report, with its eulogy of the position of Hitler Germany, could not fail to have an effect on the German groups supporting the policy of

revenge. The German Admiral Gladisch referred to it in his *Historical and Strategic Review of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, 1935*. The real success of the agreement, in his view, was the fact that Britain had entered into negotiations with Germany. The new situation was much more hopeful than any previous attempts at an understanding. He recalled the position in 1912. The British War Minister Haldane had gone to Berlin to take part in discussions; the opening was highly promising. But nothing came of it. In return for concessions on naval policy, Germany had demanded an undertaking that Britain would remain neutral in a war of Germany against France and Russia. At that time Britain simply refused. "In 1935, unlike 1912, Britain was prepared to make a political move against the interests of her French friends and allies, which placed the responsible British government in a new position in regard to foreign policy. This was all the more important because Britain was ready to enter into the agreement in spite of the fact that a protest had been received from France." This agreement would change the whole political relation between France and Britain. Although there was no actual Treaty, in practice there had been an understanding up to now in regard to the North Sea, by which the French navy left the defence of the northern coast of

France to Britain. "In the present position, which excludes military differences between Germany and Britain, Britain will not simply undertake the defence of the French coast and responsibilities in the North Sea, but will keep her navy in readiness so as to bring it into action where purely British interests are threatened." (Gladisch, p. 24.) France might be compelled by the agreement to make a complete change in her naval policy. Although the French Navy was strong enough "to safeguard the vital communications between France and Morocco, whatever political combinations might arise, and to threaten the sea communications of any opponent by means of her powerful fleet of submarines, cruisers and destroyers, nevertheless the Anglo-German agreement raised new problems and anxieties for France. More attention had to be given to the protection of French harbours on the Atlantic and the North Sea, and to keeping them open for overseas trade. The result was the decision to reduce the Mediterranean fleets and to increase the naval forces stationed at Brest, until a further speeding up of the naval programme secured the necessary levelling up." (p. 25.)

All this was intended to show how precarious the Anglo-French *entente* had become. But what Gladisch regarded as a vision of the future was almost a certainty for the *Deutsche Wehr*.

Fashoda

After Inskip's speech and the debate in the House of Commons on British re-armament (May 21, 1936), an article appeared in the *Deutsche Wehr* which drew the following conclusions: "It was satisfactory to see that in the course of the debate the old fossil Churchill, with his perpetual chatter against Germany, was effectively suppressed by the other side. His declarations about German re-armament, with which as usual he has been flooding the Press, were treated as the ramblings of a fool, and his views of the German danger as utterly out of date. Another member recommended English youth to take the Nazis as their model. In the House of Lords, Lord Davies spoke in support of the French peace plan, only to discover that he was the sole advocate of this aftermath of Versailles. England's position has changed; the friends of yesterday are losing their value, and at the present moment she is more inclined to look towards Germany, just as she did in 1898 at the time of Fashoda."

Fashoda became the catchword for an outburst of propaganda about Britain. The question of Fashoda, a town on the southern frontier of Egypt, very nearly led to serious complications between France and Britain in 1898. Nothing

would suit Hitler's policy better than a second Fashoda.

The story of Fashoda became part of a new history in Hitler Germany, which taught that in the nineteenth century the normal relation between France and England was one of conflict. The fact that in recent times England's foreign policy was not guided by this principle, and therefore was so often a disappointment to Germany, arose, in the opinion of Hitler's historians, from Britain's peculiar situation. Britain felt that she was too weak to become an enemy of France, and preferred, by remaining friendly, to hold in check France's efforts to dominate Europe.

Every alliance between Germany and Britain since 1898 has broken down because of the conflict of interests. The recent friendly approaches were prompted by extremely divided motives. For however much British politicians who advocate the balance of power theory are prepared to help Hitler in order to ensure hostility between Germany and Russia and Germany and France, they are quite as much afraid of his strength, which is attempting to make Germany so powerful that some day she will be able to destroy Britain's world power. In spite of the naval agreement, they do not welcome the appearance of a strong German fleet in the North Sea.

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Gladisch tried to convince them that under no circumstances would Germany's new naval armaments ever be turned against Britain. Warships were only being built with a view to a war on two fronts, against France and Russia. He referred to this war on two fronts as if it were something already absolutely certain. "In the event of war, future German forces will prevent the establishment of communications between France and her Russian ally through the Baltic." This would be done on Britain's account, because "an increase in Germany's strength must be desirable for Britain, whose Asiatic interests are seriously threatened by Russia, precisely for the purpose of keeping Russia in check by means of a sufficiently powerful German fleet in the Baltic."

When Tirpitz announced his first naval programme he gave an assurance—just like Gladisch—that he was building a navy entirely with a view to a war against Russia and France, that the development of the German fleet need not interfere in any way with good relations between Germany and England, and that anxiety lest German naval policy might some day be directed against Britain was entirely unfounded.

But when the navy had increased so much that it was becoming one of the strongest factors in international politics, then different language was used. England was openly threatened with

the power of the German Navy. In July 1912, Delbrück wrote: "It is quite possible that under favourable circumstances and by choosing the right moment, we might win a naval battle in the North Sea in a war against Britain. And for Britain this would be disastrous."

At the present time Hitler's followers talk about the allies of Waterloo and emphasise the traditional friendship of the two countries; if they mention the battle of Skagerak, it is to insist that this was the only and, it is to be hoped, the last military conflict between them. They are still in the stage of preparing for a new war, and so they make soft speeches about the country of which it used to be said "We have one enemy alone: England."

Italy Rejoices

In his review of the Anglo-German agreement, Admiral Gladisch showed that Italy welcomed the strengthening of German forces. "Her French ally, whose strength in the Mediterranean is not always looked upon as an advantage, will fortunately be diverted to the north, owing to the change in the direction of French naval policy—Italy is hoping that the same thing will happen with Britain." (p. 31.)

German diplomacy supported Mussolini's activity on the Suez Canal—in spite of differences

with Italy over the question of the Brenner frontier—because it would make Britain more inclined to give concessions in the North Sea and on the continent. The argument was as follows: Britain's relations with States in central, western and southern Europe essentially depend on two strategic problems, the military position of Great Britain itself, and that of the Suez Canal which is a key point in the British Empire. Any intervention by another power which touches either of these points inevitably brings England into action. An attempt at expansion in western Europe at England's very gates, whether on the continent (in Holland, Belgium or northern France) or in the North Sea, would arouse her most violent resistance.

Hitler Germany has designs in western Europe, and therefore welcomed any action by another power on the Suez Canal, which is a no less decisive point for the British Empire. Such action would give Germany greater freedom in the North Sea and on the continent, and England, which sees as great a danger to the empire in an attack on the Suez Canal as in an attack on Belgium, would be more inclined to make concessions. Mussolini, on the other hand, was able to venture on war in Abyssinia because the threat from Germany, with her new gigantic armaments, gave him a unique opportunity.

Help from Japan

German naval re-armament is an advantage to another power: Japan. Japanese operations in the Far East, which are also directed against British interests, are made easier by the fact that stronger British forces have to be concentrated in the North Sea because of the German Navy. German naval strategists are counting on these far-reaching effects of re-armament, and make no secret of them in their technical publications. In an article on "The German Navy at the Beginning of the World War" in the *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau* (No. 3, 1936), Admiral Bauer made some observations, in the form of a retrospect, which apply to the present time. He came to the conclusion that every effort should have been made, before the outbreak of the war in 1914, to maintain Japan's neutrality. Britain would have had to use far more forces against the German cruisers under Graf von Spee, which were making the sea unsafe in the Far East, if she had not had Japanese support:

"Japan, whose aims in eastern Asia could only be pursued in opposition to the Anglo-Saxon powers, could have found no more effective help than the German fleet, which had shown that it was capable of keeping the whole of Britain's naval forces in the North Sea, and thus delaying

any decisive action in the Far East. An agreement of this kind, even if it had only secured Japanese neutrality, would probably have prevented the outbreak of the war, because of its effect on Russia." (p. 359.) This reference to past history is intended to point to immediate possibilities. In the German view, the situation which was sanctioned by the Anglo-German agreement gives Japan a free hand in the Far East.

The agreement increased all these tendencies, each of which is a danger to peace. To begin with, this "first practical step towards the limitation of armaments," as Ribbentrop called it, released a new movement for re-armament of the most dangerous kind.

Hitler Germany intends to profit by it most of all. If Germany secures the naval position which the agreement allows, her military strength will be increased far more than the tonnage of the new warships suggests: the power which, according to the *Deutsche Wehr*, is already the strongest on the continent in land forces, possessing a powerful air fleet which can be used either by land or by sea, adds to her forces the most up-to-date navy.

In order to realise the full strength of Germany's naval position it must be considered in connection with her land and air armaments. Another important aspect of war equipment has also to be

taken into account; Germany will be better able to take advantage of technical developments than other countries in the next few years. It is a result of the rapid progress in technique, making older ships useless in a very short time, that a new naval power which carries out intensive construction for a time, overtakes its older competitors and becomes considerably superior in strength, even with an equal tonnage.

But it was not for these reasons alone that Germany counted the naval agreement among its successes. Hitler believed that this agreement carried out the principle which he set himself to follow in his foreign policy in relation to Britain. In *Mein Kampf* he stated explicitly that England had to be induced to help Germany to secure a victory over those States which were to be her opponents in the stage of the Pan-German conquest of the world. In this way England would become completely dependent on Germany—when these other countries had been defeated, Britain would have lost not only her world position, but also her national independence.

For this policy Hitler in his book used the phrase "a deal with England." A policy of continental expansion would have to be carried

out against Russia, and for this an alliance with England would be expedient. "But colonial expansion is only possible in opposition to England, and the obvious ally is Russia. In the end there must be war, whether the decision is to make an alliance with Russia against Britain, or the other way round." (p. 157.) But if a policy of European conquest were to be pursued, then England would be the only possible ally, and Germany must not hesitate at any sacrifice to win England's support. The effects of this might hamper Germany for a time, but "a great and powerful future" would be all the more certain. "A deal of this sort can very well be managed with England. British diplomacy has always been clever enough to know that there must be a *quid pro quo*." (p. 155.)

An alliance with England, like any other, would be limited to a certain stage. England does not want Germany to become a world power, but at the moment Germany is not fighting for world supremacy, and England may very well become Germany's ally. (p. 699.)

Until Germany's position in Europe is assured, it is madness to fight for a position outside Europe. (p. 706.) The process, therefore, involves first the breaking up of the system of collective security, then war, which must be conducted on the principle of conquest by stages, of wiping out

one individual opponent at a time. England, according to Hitler's plans, is only to be involved in the struggle for "position outside Europe."

England in Decline

But a policy is only justified by its success. In Germany, in spite of the naval agreement and the official pro-English attitude, there are great differences of opinion on the question whether Hitler's combination with England will be effective, or whether it does not involve a fundamental error. Even those who accept the policy laid down in *Mein Kampf* disagree over important details.

For a long time there have been exponents of the view that Britain's power was doomed to collapse, however formidable it seemed; and the Abyssinian war strengthened this opinion. Britain has immense resources, and great military strength, but she has to defend possessions all over the world, and may be attacked in several directions at the same time. The whole of Britain's forces cannot be available on different continents, and in a military sense Britain is losing strength because the forces of her opponents have increased enormously. At the present time Britain depends more on treaty undertakings and less on military power than any other country, and, in a world of highly-armed States, this may

be disastrous. In particular, the Abyssinian war revealed Britain's impotence. The navy, supposed to be invincible, was terrorised "by the Italian air-fleet in the Mediterranean, which was in control of the situation all through the Abyssinian conflict." (*Deutsche Wehr*, May 7, 1936.) "England's fear of having to fight Italy, without the active participation of France, and her appeals for help to Greece, Jugo-Slavia, and Turkey, showed up the whole position and placed the prestige of the British Empire in a dilemma such as had never been known."

After this there was a marked change in the tone of the journal of the General Staff when it referred to Britain; its comments varied between friendliness and threats. But some German politicians regarded Britain as a desirable ally just because of her weak position; an ally whose available forces could be made use of, while Germany hastened the collapse of Britain and prepared to take over her inheritance. The practical question for German policy is the question which way Britain will ultimately take. Will it be to take a direct and active part in a military alliance against Germany (as at the beginning of this century), or will Britain go back to the traditional policy of Lord Beaconsfield (the Nazis prefer not to call him Disraeli) and adopt the advantageous position of the powerful outsider

in the conflict between France and Germany?

One of the main aims of German politicians is to turn Britain away from the policy of collective security. On May 28, 1936, the *Deutsche Wehr* reported that this point had "very nearly" been reached.

"For Britain, as well as for Germany, the stage of pacifist faith in collectivism is past, or very nearly."

For the British Empire, according to their argument, collective security is an unnecessary burden. A book by a Tsarist general, published in Berlin in 1936 (*Britain's World Power*, by N. Golovin), put forward the view that "the British Empire at the present time is the strongest military power in the world. Its rulers may not always have found the best methods of utilising these military resources. But a study of their policy makes it certain that in the end they will find a way of using their great military strength to the utmost." (p. 151.) If this happens, then "no outside forces will be able to prevent the British Empire from becoming an empire in the Indian Ocean. That would mean that Britain would be able to set up a League of Nations of her own in the region of the Indian Ocean, under her own cultural, political, economic and strategic authority."

An enormous concentration of British forces

around the Indian Ocean has actually taken place since the war. While British rule was finally established in Palestine, Transjordan, Arabia and Mesopotamia, and all the former German colonies in East Africa were absorbed into the British Empire, the whole of the Indian Ocean was transformed into a British inland sea: "After the war the British Empire, which used to be scattered more or less equally all over the world, acquired a very different geographical character. Around the Indian Ocean British possessions began to merge into each other and to form a very powerful empire." (p. 123.)

Golovin was convinced that the policy of splendid isolation, which would best meet the needs of this empire of the Indian Ocean, had already been adopted as the line of British foreign policy. This was supported by the fact that Britain was not enlisting a large army, in spite of the sharpening situation on the continent and the experiences of the World War. It was clear, therefore, that Britain intended to take no part in European disputes. The air policy of Great Britain was following the same direction. The intention to surpass France must not be misunderstood. The formula of the "One Power Standard," which applied to the British Navy, was also a first principle for the air force: i.e. to be stronger than the strongest power in the world.

“In practice this obviously means to be stronger than France. But it does not imply any hostile intentions towards France, although it undoubtedly means the end of the previous military alliance against Germany. The possession of an air force superior to the French air force would make it possible for Britain to go back to what used to be called the policy of splendid isolation.” (p. 81.)

Baldwin’s statement, that the strategic frontier of Great Britain was on the Rhine, was misinterpreted when it was taken as being directed only against Germany:

“It is not a question of the defence of France but of defending the strategic balance of power in Europe, which was established by the existing position on the Rhine, to the advantage of Britain; it makes no difference whether the *status quo* is attacked by Germany or by France.” (p. 81.)

The Illusion of the Balance of Power

It suits British interests best, according to Golovin’s theory, to maintain a balance of power between Germany and France, and this can be done by keeping to the existing frontiers and supporting equal rights for Hitler Germany. But there is a decisive objection to this theory. Is not the balance of power an illusion? Are not the

status quo and the balance of power incompatible? Can equal rights really be maintained between an aggressive State and one which is seeking to preserve peace? To put these questions is to give the answer. The powers will not all remain equally strong, even if the *status quo*, that is to say, the existing frontiers, are untouched, nor will the position remain as it is at a particular moment, in spite of mutual recognition of equal rights and independence. On the contrary, the balance will be constantly altering, and in practice this policy of the so-called balance of power means an increasing advantage to Germany, and therefore a strengthening of the forces making for future conflict. Germany, under cover of such a policy, can reach a strength which will be superior, first, to any single opponent, and then to a combination of opponents, and in the end will be able to fight for supremacy in Europe.

All these declarations of Hitler's supporters, including Golovin, about a European balance of power, have one definite aim: to represent France as an enemy to Britain at least as dangerous as Germany; to denounce France as a violent State which is driving ahead for domination in Europe, following the Napoleonic tradition and the method of alliances, and once again concentrating the main attack against Britain, because of the British policy of the balance of power. Nazi

literature is putting forward this view with great energy, obviously because it is expected to bring results.

But Fashoda, which is used as a symbolic example, because England and France came very near to serious conflict, remained an isolated incident, and the course of events afterwards showed a totally different tendency. According to Delbrück, the reason was easy to find:

"English statesmen were convinced that the French would not be a danger in the future, in spite of their great colonial possessions, because their population was no longer increasing."

Britain's Military Power

The conclusion drawn by Golovin from the fact that Britain is not enlisting a large army also fails to carry conviction. He argues that: "If, after the experience of the war of 1914-18, Britain is not preparing for another great European war, this can only be explained on the ground that she intends to return to the traditional Beaconsfield policy of isolation, after destroying Germany's naval and colonial power."

But to introduce compulsory military service in time of peace is quite contrary to the traditions of British government. Britain built up an empire with voluntary forces, and this tradition is so

strong that it can only be reversed in a time of crisis.

The struggle against the threat of German domination on the continent was the driving force of British policy before the war. It was this conflict which gave the policy of the Entente its direction and its main motive. When a highly-armed Germany embarked on an open struggle, then England entered into the war, thereby completely changing her previous methods and abandoning the attempt to avoid European complications by the policy of splendid isolation.

The fear that a defeat of France and Russia might be the prelude to a defeat of Britain led the British government to take a direct part in the war, in spite of all traditions, and contrary to the expectations of German diplomacy. In August 1914, Bethmann-Holweg, in the hope of securing British neutrality, offered an assurance to the British government that, in the event of a German victory, no European territory would be taken from France—at the most, the French colonies, and perhaps not even those. To this Sir Edward Grey replied that without actual loss of territory in Europe, France might be so crushed as to lose the status of a great power and become subject to German policy.

Even without the violation of Belgium the British government would have decided to take

part in the war, because they were afraid that Britain's world power was in danger. This was the view expressed by Oncken, in *Nation und Geschichte*, published in 1935.

"The question of German domination was the supreme issue, the real cause of the World War, and the struggle against this danger in Europe became the battle-cry with which England entered into the war."

Splendid Isolation Impossible

Criticism of Hitler's policy in relation to Britain, as Hitler himself presented it in *Mein Kampf*, and as it was interpreted by the Tsarist General Golovin, finds expression in the form of reviews of the past, like Oncken's statement quoted above. The critics believe that all these speculations about Britain's return to a policy of "splendid isolation" are based on a fundamental error, because it is no longer possible for Britain to go back to that policy. In a military and political sense England has ceased to be an island. This was apparent in the last war in a change which would hardly have seemed possible before 1914: Britain aimed at a decisive victory on land. But the change was something more than a mere change of method in the war itself: it arose from the new inter-relation of modern conditions, and was emphasised by every new

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military and political development. Speculation about splendid isolation led to the same mistakes that were made by German politicians before the war; the mistake of regarding Britain's concessions in foreign policy as the sign of a fundamental change in the relations between England and Germany, the mistake of exaggerating the importance of amicable arrangements, even of the naval agreement, and of misunderstanding the main tendency of British policy. It is an illusion to believe that the attempt to secure England's help in winning supremacy on the continent can be repeated successfully with cleverer tactics, that a skilful policy can manoeuvre Britain into the "splendid isolation" which must be disastrous. As soon as the real basis of British policy is revealed, by any attempt on the part of Germany to snatch at supremacy in Europe, then Britain's opposition to splendid isolation will be clear.

CHAPTER IX

WE SHALL BEAT FRANCE

A HUNDRED AND FIFTY years ago a song became popular in Germany, and it has remained popular for a longer period than anyone then would have thought possible. It was sung in 1870, and once again in March 1936 it was heard at festive gatherings, in public houses and in improvised barracks. Young Reichswehr soldiers, fresh from their training, Hitler Youth and Storm Troopers sang:

*“ They shall not have it—the free German Rhine,
Though for it like ravenous dogs they whine.”*

The sacred book of the Third Reich, Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, explains this joy in hate and why it is that a song and its theme can for so long be apposite. On p. 699 we find:

“ For we must at last be absolutely clear on this point: France is and remains the implacable and deadly enemy of the German people. It makes no difference who the rulers are or may be, whether Bourbons or Jacobins, Napoleons or bourgeois

democrats, clerical Republicans or Red Bolsheviks—the ultimate aim of their foreign activity is always the attempt to take possession of the Rhine territory and make this river safe for France through a dissolved and dismembered Germany.”

The people who sang this song of hate in March 1936 were “absolutely clear” that they were marching against their hereditary foe, and that the claws of this foe had been cut by the tearing up of the Treaty, by the direction in which the marching columns advanced. Millions had once again been caught up by the doctrine of the hereditary foe, strengthened by the doctrine of revenge.

The Old Reckoning

An old reckoning had to be settled: Versailles. This was the feeling of many among those who ran alongside the troops, to the great delight of the real wire-pullers, the National Socialist leaders and the Pan-Germans. The date of the dictated peace was not forgotten—June 28, the day of shame, the day of misery and humiliation. It was the day which was finally to decide, against Germany, the war for the re-division of the world. It was the day on which defeated Germany was weighted down with oppressive economic and political conditions, although their social

effects were only felt by those sections who had already been the main sufferers from the war, and the ruling section, in spite of all losses of empire, was still left in control of its German house. The burdens of the peace fell on the lower strata. The German expansionists, already determined on revenge, used for their own ends the atmosphere of misery which settled down on the German people after their defeat in the war and the Versailles Treaty. *They* had not really been defeated, as is shown by the confidence with which these groups have made up their minds to conquest and the firm belief they have that they are entitled to conquests. There is something naïve in their one-sided claim to have the sole right to rob. Their attitude is one of indignation and complaint and protest, side by side with the belief that they had not been beaten in the field. This is the underlying *motif* in Oncken's *Nation und Geschichte*, which found a response in receptive minds:

“Then began the long series of humiliations from abroad, the shameful episodes of the reparations demands, the unbridled domination of foreign armies of occupation on the Rhine and in the areas subject to referendum, the overbearing attacks of the military commissions on the sovereign rights of the Reich, the whole carefully worked out system of degradation to which a

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disarmed nation, though unbeaten in the field,
was subjected."

This is not the place to point out how humiliating the success of Pan-German plans would have been for the whole of northern France; the overbearing attacks on the sovereign rights of Belgium and Poland, or the way in which the armies of occupation in the Ukraine and the Baltic States carried out the orders of the Pan-German robbers. We are not concerned with criticising the dictated peace of Versailles, nor with making moral appreciations of the kind written by Oncken. Our aim is to investigate the real basis of the Pan-German and National Socialist policy of revenge. Moral attitudes are only means of propaganda : motives, taken from history and from the future envisaged by men, have greater reality.

The Rhine a German River, not a German Frontier

The argument runs that France has always striven to make the Rhine a boundary, and to make Germany a federal State which would be weak because of its internal disunity. At the same time Germany's own striving for centralisation was crowned with success. Germany appeared on the Rhine frontier as a powerful State, conscious that the struggle for the domination of western Europe would be settled there.

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The Versailles Treaty showed France's robber aims beyond dispute; the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine was the first stage, and the demilitarised zone was only an intermediate stage for further aggression. This aim, so the argument runs on, was repeatedly shown—by the military occupation of the whole Rhineland and the seizure of the bridge-heads, and especially by the attempt to retain the Ruhr.

The Ruhr, it is said, is "the historical aim of France's robber desires." The dangerous proximity of the frontier is stressed; reference is made to the intolerable pressure which France exerts on this industrial heart of Germany—a pressure which France can at any time increase. Much is said of the importance of the Ruhr: its mineral wealth, increased in importance during the last century; the great increase in industrial capacity; the vast economic significance given by the water-borne traffic of the Rhine and the canal system linked with it. The main aim of any far-sighted policy, it is said, must be to keep the enemy far away from this valuable territory; hence the old slogan is revived, though in completely altered conditions, that the Rhine must be a German river, not Germany's frontier. The *glacis* which is to protect the industrial stronghold round Essen must, it is argued, be as wide as possible.

Racial Pretexts for War

The situation can only be saved, therefore, in accordance with the old rule that the best means of defence is attack. Anyone who wants to protect the arsenal of the Reich must have the courage to carry out a surprise attack on the enemy. Volume I of the *Handbook of Modern Military Science* contains the following:

“ In wars of attack and conquest, for example, a young and fresh nation that is capable of development but is hemmed in by political and geographical barriers tries to win for itself the territory it lacks to make life possible, which senile, moribund States still possess but are no longer able to fill and put to use.”

If the reader will recall the talk about the nation lacking space and the Pan-German arguments about the bad frontiers of the Reich, and compare the expression “ a young and fresh nation ” with the whole Nazi propaganda, especially among the youth of military age, it will be obvious which nation is referred to in the General Staff's thesis as “ a nation that is capable of development.”

And who is the “ senile ” opponent ?

Hitler answers this on p. 730 of his work :

“ It is not only that her army is being strengthened to a constantly increasing extent from the

coloured human stock of her gigantic empire: France is also making rapid progress in becoming negro."

This presentation is by itself enough to encourage the feeling of German superiority, on the basis of the race propaganda carried out in the Third Reich. Hitler paints the terrifying apparition on the wall, and prophesies a great closed colony from the Rhine to the Congo, filled by "a *lower* race which is slowly being established by a long process of bastardisation."

The General Staff's war of attack thus receives its racial baptism. The arsenal will be saved by a lightning war. Space will be won, a tired nation will be given its *coup de grâce*, and the bastardisation of Europe will be prevented.

These propagandists do not worry themselves over the contradiction of these arguments with those which represent France as an untiring robber State. In any case, they say, France's aim has been and still is to dismember Germany if Germany is big, and to keep her small if she has been beaten.

Will Richelieu Never Die?

The Nazi Press represents French diplomats—without bothering to distinguish between friends of peace and warmongers—as a species of bogymen. Even the titles of articles dealing with

foreign politics present the Quai d'Orsay as a kind of witches' kitchen in which new brews are constantly being prepared for the destruction of Germany—"The Modern Talleyrands," "Will Richelieu never die?"

These historical references are not accidental: they serve to create the impression that the "hereditary foe" has a constant line of policy. In the *Bergwerkszeitung* of February 1934, Spitama strives to establish, by historical illustrations, "France's traditional policy against Germany." As in all its foreign articles, the *Bergwerkszeitung* is here not only following the tactics of the thief who runs along shouting "Stop thief!" The passing references to historical events are only a basis for the sharper presentation of the present: the charge is laid against the modern Talleyrands. In *Nation und Geschichte* (a radio speech in 1929) Oncken described the work of these Talleyrands as follows:

"The greatest danger first developed when French diplomacy, whose demand for the left bank of the Rhine had been defeated at Versailles, once again set itself to attain, in a time of peace, this old aim of its historical Rhine policy. It based its efforts on the one hand on the use of force in the military occupation, in economic and moral pressure and in underground propaganda. And, on the other hand, on the unsettled

problem of the reparations demands. . . . The ultimate aim was: not only to separate the left bank of the Rhine and the Ruhr area from Prussia, but also to cut them off from the German Reich . . . and with this fatal amputation to achieve the desired aim of killing the Reich itself. . . . In this way action was taken in the name of the Versailles Treaty which went far beyond the words and the meaning of the Peace Treaty. This, too, belongs to the history of the false peace, that the disarmed German nation, four years after the conclusion of peace, had to wage a war of liberation with most unequal weapons, in order to save the German Rhine and the existence of our State. A struggle in which what was left of our well-being was lost, all faith in the rights of man threatened to disappear, and our Reich—in the form in which we had been able to save it from the world's onslaught—was brought to the point of foundering.”

This charge is made in the name of the people, though it was their attitude which saved the Ruhr at the moment when the German industrialists who make the charge were flirting dangerously with separatism. It is a charge which speaks of the amputation of Germany to the same public as had had the amputation of Belgium and northern France presented to it with equal fervour. It is a charge made at a time when the

nations had won an epoch of peace and were striving to make it secure. But Pan-German propaganda does not regard an epoch of peaceful agreement as any change of course: to it there was no change until Hitler.

The Change for the Better

“With the handing over of the Chancellorship to Adolf Hitler in January 1933, the second epoch of Hindenburg's presidency opens.” (Oncken.)

This declaration shows clearly that what was at issue was not the pacification of the conflict. The turning-point, to them, came when the chains were shaken off that restrained Germany from arming, when the German Reich, once more a warlike power with equal right to attack, was able to take its place in the ranks of the European Powers. The turning-point came when the Pan-Germans saw the day of revenge coming closer, when all efforts at reconciliation had been finally discredited by the tearing up of treaties and the sabre rattling of the new Germany.

According to the Pan-Germans, the fact that the two nations had not succeeded in coming closer together was the fault of the French, who had always sabotaged any such attempt. Oncken writes:

“We know what makes the soul of the French

nation so distrustful and its enmity so unconditional. In the first place it is the naked thirst for power, conceived by the peaceful elements as a need for security and familiar as such in the language of the Cabinet. And then in particular it is fear lest the German Reich, so soon as it had been given greater freedom of movement and equality of arms, should develop a warlike spirit and use force to compel the revision of the dictated peace of Versailles."

Views of a Polish Staff Officer

In the *Polska Zbrojna* (1936, No. 101) Lieutenant-Colonel Murin Romeyke analyses the situation, from the starting-point of Marshal Foch's dictum: "We need the line of the Rhine, nothing more and nothing less." It is the unanimous view of all General Staffs, the Polish expert states, that frontier fortifications have not only a defensive but also an offensive character. With the abolition of the demilitarised zone, have the French fortifications lost their value? It is certainly true that at the first glance the advance into the Rhineland seems of less military importance than the introduction of general military service on March 16, 1935. The raising of recruits also in the Rhineland was a necessary consequence of the laws for the formation of the new

army: no one could doubt that the new legislation would apply also to the fourteen million inhabitants of the Rhineland. Nor could France think that, after the military occupation of the Rhineland by Germany, great squadrons of bombers would be stationed close to the frontier; these air forces would be more useful further in the interior of Germany. Why then, the Polish expert asks, such excitement in France about the German occupation?

His conclusion is:

“ The French fears are based on other factors, and refer to the German fortifications which may now be built. All the gigantic military advantages which the French have prepared will become of less and less value, from the moment when Germany marched into the Rhineland. The French fortifications will be faced with German fortifications of offensive and defensive character. In this way the idea of French security, the idea of waging a defensive war with the aid of natural obstacles, will become steadily more and more unreal. On the other hand, from the side of Germany, not only does the occupation increase confidence in the protection of the industrial provinces along the whole left bank of the Rhine (which is of very great importance for Germany), but the possibility of an attack on France is also increased to a high degree.”

Foch on the Re-militarised Rhineland

Is this possibility of an attack on France real? In any case, the re-militarised Rhineland provides a favourable base for attack and war, and no one has shown this more convincingly than Marshal Foch, in his military and political review of the 1914-18 war, which is a kind of "testament" of the French General Staff. We refer to his Note of January 10, 1919, "to the plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers," the decisive points of which were incorporated in the "Memorandum of the French Government on the setting back of Germany's western frontier to the Rhine and the inter-allied occupation of the Rhine bridges," dated February 25, 1919. These two documents examine from all points of view the part played by the Rhineland as a base for attack. The military part of this examination has again acquired immediate importance.

The Memorandum states:

"The fact that Germany was able to plan and carry out its sudden attack, which in five weeks might almost have decided the outcome of the war, was due to the fact that Germany was in possession of the left bank of the Rhine and had made it into an offensive military base against her neighbours, and that control of the

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Rhine bridges made it possible to keep this base supplied quickly and permanently.

"All military history since 1815 proves this, and the plan in all its details existed in publications as well as in the documents of the German Staff. First the historical points, from 1870 and 1914.

"In 1870, in spite of the then inadequacy of the Prussian railway system, the deployment took place on the left bank. This fact is all the more significant for the reason that at that time the French Army was reputed to be taking the offensive and the Prussian General Staff, under the influence of this, was very cautious. Nevertheless, and allowing for the fact that France would take the initiative in military operations, Prussia had limited her plans to deployment to a more easterly position, but still on the left bank of the Rhine.

"In other words, Prussia had never thought of seeking shelter behind the river, and regarded it as in any case an essential base for the carrying through of an offensive plan. In actual fact, thanks to deployment on the left bank of the Rhine, the Prussian Army forced its way into French territory within three weeks.

"In 1914 the same situation led to the same results. The only difference was that, thanks to the great technical developments, everything

happened in a shorter time. On this occasion, too, Germany, deploying her armies on the left bank of the Rhine (and, thanks to her completed railway net, much closer to the French frontier than in 1870), was able within a few hours to carry the war into Belgium and France, and within a few weeks even into the heart of France. Even before the declaration of war Germany had occupied territory from which France drew 90 per cent of her ore production, 86 per cent of her pig iron output and 75 per cent of her steel output, and 95 out of 127 furnaces fell into the enemy's hands. Thanks to this situation Germany was able to increase her military resources and at the same time to deprive France of her most essential means of defence. It almost led to the taking of Paris in September 1914, and of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne six weeks later.

“All this was only possible because Germany was in possession, at our gates, only a few days' march from our capital, of the strongest base for offensive operations ever known in history.”

For this reason, the Memorandum continues, Germany had: “constructed fortifications, prepared camps, and above all organised a great railway net for purposes of attack, and by means of bridges across the Rhine had linked this up with the whole railway net on the right of the

Rhine, also constructed with a view to this offensive. . . .

"So both geography, history and the doctrines of the German General Staff are in agreement that Germany's offensive capacity essentially depends on the strategic railway net which she has constructed in conjunction with the fortifications on the left bank of the Rhine, that is to say, in the last resort, that the possibility of this attack depends on possession of the bridges."

On the basis of new technical possibilities, Hitler Germany intends to prepare this base for attack in such a way as to make absolutely sure of a German success in a sudden attack on France. The building of motor roads—whose offensive aim, as a glance at the road map shows, besides Czecho-Slovakia is undoubtedly also France—is intended to increase Germany's power of attack to an undreamed-of extent.

The Danger of Surprise

Both the Foch Note and the Memorandum consider the danger of the next German attack on France as exceedingly great. The Memorandum says: "It is clear that Germany will invade Belgium and France, with the even clearer recognition than in 1870 and 1914 that time is the condition of success"; and Foch prophesies that the attack "can be even more powerful."

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In the World War the overwhelming military blows of the invading armies were only warded off after a situation of extreme gravity had arisen. With modern means of attack Hitler Germany, with the re-militarised Rhineland as the point from which to deliver the blow, has far greater chances of carrying out a lightning war with success. The danger which exists for France of being overrun and beaten down in a first onslaught, before allies can come to her aid, cannot be lightly dismissed. Germany can, in fact, start a lightning war in the expectation that the speedy subjection of France can make any intervention by France's allies appear hopeless, and thus by means of the attack itself prevent any such intervention. As the Memorandum observes, this was probably Imperial Germany's plan in 1914:

“What happened in 1914 was only possible for one reason: Germany had the Rhine bridges and her organisation of attack, which she had built up on the left bank of the Rhine, and therefore considered herself able to crush the western democracies, France and Belgium, before these could receive aid from the democracies overseas, Great Britain, the Dominions and the United States. Germany decided to attack because this was possible.”

The Russian Factor

In this connection Foch's Note contains the following view of the military importance of Russian help at that period :

"During a great part of the war Russia's huge armies kept a considerable part of the German forces engaged. Through this the Entente in 1915, 1916 and even during a great part of 1917, had the numerical superiority on the western front."

Foch considered the military weight which Russia was able to throw into the scale in the World War of such importance that he repeatedly comes back to the point in his Note. Another passage runs :

"If these powers (France, Britain and Belgium) were able to put up a resistance against Germany in the years 1914-17 and England had time to complete her armaments, especially to bring in conscription and other emergency measures, if they made it possible for the United States to bring in her decisive help, this was due to the fact that Russia was fighting on their side, and that because of this they had for a period the numerical superiority on the western front."

If the blow against France can be struck quickly enough, from a military standpoint it cuts out the western powers from any inter-

vention in a continental war; and on the aggressor's side it removes the danger to the Ruhr district, Germany's industrial heart, and opens the way for an attack to the east. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler bases his plan for the destruction of France on this consideration:

"Only when this is fully understood in Germany, so that the German nation's will to life is no longer allowed to degenerate in a mere passive defence, but engages France in an active and final settlement and hurls herself into a final decisive struggle with the greatest aims on the part of Germany: only then will we be able to end the eternal and fruitless struggles between us and France; on the condition, however, that in the destruction of France Germany sees only a means to being able to give our nation at last the expansion that is possible in another direction." (pp. 766-7.)

In this passage Hitler merely translates into a more political formula the traditional plan of operations of the German General Staff—first to annihilate France, in order then, with Germany's rear secure and not menaced by France or any other western power, to develop a Napoleonic campaign to the East, and finally to proceed to the conquest of the world. The occupation of the de-militarised zone was a decisive step in preparation for this plan.

Germany as the Market for Central Europe

Skilful German propaganda asks: what is the significance of such an alliance as the Little Entente? The Reich is the largest market for central Europe. People don't strangle their best clients.

The figures issued by the League of Nations (and since then conditions have altered only in further support of the line of argument) provide the following impressive statistics: of the total exports from the Danube States (Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, Hungary, Jugo-Slavia, Bulgaria and Rumania) the proportions to certain countries are:

Germany	30·7 per cent
Italy	10·9 per cent
Britain	8·7 per cent
Poland	5·9 per cent
Switzerland	5·5 per cent
France	3·3 per cent

Germany therefore takes from the Danube countries almost ten times the quantity of exports taken by France. According to *Volk und Reich*, the leading journal dealing with foreign affairs in Hitler Germany, it follows that Germany is the natural organiser of central Europe. And the propagandist continues:

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“When it could no longer fail to be seen that France could provide no more money, that the old credits would hardly ever again produce interest, and repayment had to be deferred to the mythical distance, France began that production of plans of which each was more beautiful and each more hopeless than the other. They were all attempts to wed fire and water. On the one side the plans had to be so constructed that they would make the States, together with France, defend with their last breath their ‘indivisible security’ against Germany. On the other hand, they had no longer to cost France anything, but, on the contrary, through their internal reconstruction, they were to provide the guarantee that the old credits would pay interest and be amortised.”

In view of the constant assertions that France intends aggression, the ironical inverted commas given to indivisible security are all the more significant. Pan-German politicians regard the thesis of collective security as the greatest danger to their policy of military alliances. They regard themselves as encircled, and attribute their own aggressive intentions to States that attempt to safeguard themselves. They cannot admit what in fact has brought about Germany’s isolation. The peaceful States are striving to safeguard themselves against an aggressor. The ring of the

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peaceful States must inevitably be closed round the State which has only too clearly showed its warlike intentions through re-armament on a gigantic scale, through leaving the League of Nations in order to be able to carry out its war preparations in a more unrestricted way, and through the tearing up of treaties. Hitler Germany fears that the united front of peace may break its war plans. It seeks allies who may be able to provide a better chance for war, and has recourse to the "exposure" of the hereditary foe, France. And at the same time it sets to work systematically to destroy the League of Nations, drives its saps under the positions occupied by its opponents, uses the very methods with which it charges its opponents, and brings the Danube States under its financial tutelage.

Thirty per cent of the export surplus from these States is taken by Germany. The coal supplied to Mussolini for carrying on the Abyssinian war was allowed to be paid for in shares of Vienna banks. Factories were built in Hungary, and subsidies were given to estates in Rumania and the Hungarian Pusta. A stream of State visits followed. Serbia was flattered by Nazi journals as the most courageous of Germany's former enemies. With absolute certainty of the prospect of war, credits are given which take the coming

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war into account. The Central Control of German Food Supplies is provided with so-called "mixed commissions" with plenipotentiary powers, their main aim being to import food and fodder from the Balkan States which will be necessary for the coming war and which Germany lacks. The Balkans, as was mentioned above, are becoming the reserve depot for the provision of supplies to Germany. Soya beans are being planted in Hungary, oil-bearing plants in Jugo-Slavia—and in this way it is hoped to break up the Little Entente. They are confident that French policy can be given its death blow, and they are aiming at drawing supplies for the war against France from the countries which were once her allies.

CHAPTER X

SPAIN AS A GERMAN ALLY

WITH SPAIN AS AN ALLY, Hitler Germany could threaten France from two sides. There are historical precedents for this policy. In 1869 Spain was looking for someone to fill the throne, and it became known that Prince Leopold von Hohenzollern was a candidate. The ruling groups in France regarded this as one of Bismarck's intrigues directed against France; they expressed the view that it was impossible for France to allow a Prussian prince to be in control of France's Pyrenean frontier and to menace any French action in Europe with the threat of an attack in her rear, which in a war would bring France between two fires. The Franco-German war of 1870 developed out of this Hohenzollern candidature for the throne of Spain. Bismarck had prepared a great intrigue in order to bring about the outbreak of the war at which he was aiming. Through the interventions of Benedetti, the French Ambassador in Berlin, he had discovered what he wanted to know: that the putting forward of the Hohenzollern candidate meant immediate

war with France. This provided him with the means of bringing about the outbreak of war at any time that suited him. When Bismarck's military preparations had been completed, and he was ready to strike, he baited the trap for Napoleon III with the Hohenzollern candidature, and this led immediately to war, although Louis Napoleon, in view of his inadequate war preparations, did his best to prevent it.

Certain parallels can be drawn between the 1870 events and the events of to-day: the part played by the threat of a German attack on France's rear from the Pyrenees, and—of even greater significance—how pretexts for war are prepared, how a war is launched with deliberation and design, and at the same time the final odium of having started it is put on the victim of the aggression. There is the further point of the mechanism of a lightning war: that from a military standpoint everything must be ready to the last button, and that rapid victory (in 1870, the quick German blows from Spichern and Wörth up to Sedan) can have a more decisive influence in localising the war than long-drawn diplomatic negotiations.

To-day, however, Spain is not only the occasion and pretext for a great diplomatic intrigue—Hitler Germany is actively engaged in the turbulent events in Spain, and is pursuing

very concrete aims: to get a firm foothold in Spain. On this occasion Germany is not content merely to lay a trap for bringing about a lightning war, but aims at organising a Spanish front for this war. And for the purpose of this lightning war which is intended by Hitler Germany, because of the new conditions the Pyrenean front is of less importance than another, the Mediterranean front.

The Strategical Base Theory

The strategical base theory as put forward by the Army and Navy General Staffs of the Hitler Reich runs somewhat as follows: the degree of preparation for war does not mainly depend on the numerical proportions of the military requisites in the hands of the belligerents; of equal importance is the geographical-strategical situation of the sources from which the opposing forces can be brought into use. This is true of war on land, and even more true of naval warfare. On this question Rear-Admiral Gadow, in an article on "Strategical Naval Bases" printed in the War Ministry's journal *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau* (Vol. 36, No. 4), states:

"The theory of a naval war, as an important and very often decisive sector of a war as a whole, takes into account two things as elementary

factors in sea power: the fleet, and the strategical bases. Each complements the other with strategical necessity, and it is superfluous to examine which is primary." (p. 511.)

"Naval bases are of the first importance for the maintenance and protection of overseas possessions as well as for the conduct of the war at home and abroad. Sea power cannot exist without them. They, or other near-by places protected by them, represent points where fleets can be formed, armed, equipped, provisioned, repaired and improved; as a rule, they are also the chief points from which crews are drawn. Operations start from them, and the naval forces return to them after these operations. Naval bases abroad form the axis and the base for cruiser and trade warfare, for the distribution of fighting forces along the routes to be protected, in certain circumstances up to very great distances. They are all the more important where, in order to protect valuable possessions, military operations of a combined character have to be securely linked with their rear base." (pp. 511-2.)

The standard work issued by the German General Staff in 1936, the *Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften* (*Handbook of Modern Military Sciences*), attributes the same importance to the problem of strategical bases:

"The strength of fleets has to be measured

by the marine interests which have to be protected in peace and war, also by the number and strength of the probable opponents, and by general strategical, and especially geographical, considerations, which are decisive for the operations of both one's own and the enemy's fleets. All this makes necessary a very far-seeing policy, for the special features of naval warfare, the complicated character of the fighting material, the difficulty of increasing its strength, and the dependence on naval bases make any form of improvisation in this sphere even less possible than in any other sphere of warfare. This holds good especially in the question of naval bases. The further a nation's marine interests extend, the more difficult it is to protect them, and the more essential it becomes to secure adequate naval bases. This need is of such importance that the naval base policy has always played an important, often even decisive, part in the foreign policy of the great naval powers." (p. 492.)

German military politicians complain that prior to 1914 Germany showed great neglect in this field. Naval bases were lacking, and the navy suffered from this lack, but the naval authorities of that period made no effort to remedy the situation. Gadow declares in the article to which reference has already been made:

"Apart from Tsingtao in China, which was

quite inadequate, Germany completely lacked any naval bases abroad in the World War. The cruiser warfare abroad—the importance of which for the military and political deployment of forces (which in the future is identical with the phase of the lightning war!) and even for the will to war itself, is perhaps still underestimated—found itself dependent for its supplies on captures of coal and food from merchant ships, and on secret supplies organised—relatively brilliantly—by the Admiralty Staff at distant and concealed points. But although perhaps it was not altogether left hanging in the air, it lacked the decisive spine of fixed bases, and therefore the possibility of occasional temporary extension.” (*Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, pp. 522–3.)

The experience of the war proved the inadequate recognition at that period of the importance and scope of the problem of naval bases. But the Army and Navy General Staffs of Hitler Germany attribute to it the greatest importance in the general question of foreign policy. They treat foreign policy as a struggle for the best strategical position, a struggle which must be carried on in time of peace. Lengthy preparations to meet an opponent on his trade routes and sea connections, wherever serious military operations are to be anticipated, is one of the requirements of a careful and “scientific”

preparation for war. However, a State which is not in a position to secure naval bases directly for itself must remedy this defect by a policy of winning appropriate allies:

“In the case of a naval power which is deprived of the possibility of acquiring or building its own naval bases overseas, the naval base policy must be substituted by the policy of alliances, in order that in the event of war the naval bases of its allies may be available for use.” (*Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften*, p. 492.)

In the preparations for the next war, Hitler Germany's military experts declare, the mistakes and shortcomings of the last war must not be repeated; therefore it is necessary to initiate and carry through a consistent policy to secure naval bases. The activity of Hitler Germany in Spain must be regarded from this point of view.

In Spain Germany would win an extremely advantageously situated key position for her expansionist aims. The military advantages of Spain's geographical position have increased in recent years, inasmuch as the importance of the sea routes passing the Spanish coast has increased. The most important connections of three great powers, France, Britain and Italy, cross at that point, and this gives Spain a dominating position at a point of extreme importance

for world politics. Besides its Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts, its north-eastern province and the Canaries flank the Atlantic sea routes, and the Balearic Islands flank all lines of communication in the Western Mediterranean. Spanish North Morocco dominates the ten-miles wide Strait of Gibraltar, the closing of which would be decisive for all Mediterranean powers in the event of war. In a word, Germany, now without any base of its own abroad, in the event of its influence becoming dominant in Spain, would at one stroke have at its disposal a whole system of naval bases which would be of immense service to it in the event of war.

An incident of the 1914 war—the attack by German warships on Algerian ports—serves as a pointer. A reference to this incident in *The Mediterranean* (a book published by Kurt Vowinkel in 1936) shows the keen interest taken by German military publicists in the whole problem:

“The shock caused by the bombardment of Algerian ports by the *Goeben* and *Breslau* on August 4, 1914, still has its effect in France to-day. At that time the whole French fleet was engaged in convoying transports from the Mediterranean, and this greatly facilitated the German warships' escape. After that, the mere rumour of a German cruiser having appeared in the Atlantic resulted in the stopping of Moroccan transports and their

being directed from Gibraltar to Marseilles. Only when a British cruiser squadron arrived did the French dare to resume the use of the Atlantic route. The after-effect of that incident shows the French fear of any repetition."

A Naval Offensive

Too little attention is paid in other countries to the fact that the conduct of the naval war by Germany has undergone very fundamental examination and has finally been condemned.

The French admiral, Castex—now director of the French military academy, and author of the well-known *Théories Stratégiques*, a book which has been very carefully studied in Germany—sums up his examination of the conduct of the naval war by Germany by stating that its plan of operations showed neither science nor insight. Admiral von Tirpitz comes to much the same conclusion, although he was most directly concerned in influencing German naval strategy during the war. He expressed the view that the German fleet was wrongly used in the war, and not for its proper purpose. It should have assumed the offensive, as the British fleet, which had the dominant position, avoided battle.

Polemics between publicists of the Army and Navy Staffs in Germany show that both had completely wrong conceptions of the part played

by the fleet in the war. The admirals reproach the General Staff for having kept its plan of operations secret, and not having aimed at or even thought of any co-operation with the navy in a campaign which was to be carried out through Flanders, and in which a lightning attack of the German fleet on the English Channel might have brought a speedy and victorious conclusion to the land operations. This reproach is not without foundation. The recognition of operative work during peace—on the lines of Hitler Germany's present policy in Spain—and of co-operation between the army and the navy was in fact lacking. The German General Staff counted on a short war, which, as in all previous wars, the army would settle victoriously on its own, leaving the fleet intact as the instrument for enforcing a "German peace" against Britain.

On the other hand, the wrong strategical theories of the German admirals during the war have been much criticised—theories which retained throughout the fixed ideas of a decisive engagement. The fleet had been built for this decisive engagement; the types of ships and their armament had been designed with this in view, and the fleet had been educated and trained in tactics appropriate to this central idea. From a military standpoint, the outcome was a fiasco. Through merely being kept in readiness for this

decisive engagement, the critics declare, the result was that the fleet was kept intact only to meet destruction through being handed over to the enemy when the war had been lost.

This criticism, and the new German naval strategy, accepts the views of Captain Otto Groos, stated in his book *Seekriegslehren* (*Theories of Naval Warfare*). One of his main conceptions is that naval strategy must be cut to German conditions, and that means, the conditions of a continental State. It must not take over without consideration a strategy which may suit English conditions, in which the strategists are thinking in terms of oceans and not coastal seas, but is not appropriate for Germany.

Groos, following the line of the new strategy, treats naval war as a part of "totalitarian war." He opens by dealing with the connection between the conduct of a war, finance, economics and politics, and the problems of preparing for a war, propaganda and the Press; and he speaks of the lack of strategical ideas with which the German navy, highly developed from a technical standpoint, entered the war. War needs theory; it is a part of politics, and must be conducted by politicians, on whom the general responsibility rests. The leading statesmen must, therefore, understand war.

Forms and methods of warfare are discussed,

and the connections between a land and a sea campaign are shown by examples. Control of the sea is the aim of the war and a strategical means, and the sea engagement and the blockade are both means to the achievement of these aims. The war showed that Germany, as the blockaded country, had to seek a naval engagement. Admiral Togo, at Tsushima, acted with classical correctness; but conditions must be set for the place and time of the engagement. The blockade by Britain was the necessary—though only slowly effective—consequence of a superior position (the German Admiralty considers it is in a similar position as against the Soviet Union).

The blockade maintained in close proximity to the enemy ports belongs to the past, as mines, torpedoes and aeroplanes have extended the effective range of the defence. The distant British blockade is also considered not to have been quite satisfactory, and the effect of the submarine war drove Britain, also, to seek battle. The attitude of the German fleet is described as a “strategical defensive.” But the defensive in naval warfare must not result in the weaker fleet withdrawing to its base and leaving the seas to its opponent; it must mean only that at first, as a concentrated unit, through strategical or tactical measures it avoids any decision, in order to maintain its readiness for the moment when conditions have

become favourable for throwing it into battle. But in order, even on the defensive, to remain a constant danger for the enemy, it must keep the enemy busy and above all must strive to attack the enemy's important lines of communication. If this is not done, the enemy will very soon be able to ignore it. It was only with von Scheer's attacks and the Skager Rack battle that the wrong original application of the principle of the strategical defensive began to be modified in the right direction.

Revolutionised Naval Warfare

Apart from fleet attacks, sea power can be contested by cruisers and smaller ships. Their use can prepare the way for decisive engagements, as in the case of the Japanese torpedo attack on Port Arthur in 1904, which was carried out as a lightning attack without a previous declaration of war. The work of German cruisers during the war can also be taken as an example. The few German cruisers which were active on the trade routes proved effective means of drawing off valuable forces from British home waters, for a considerable time.

In an article on "The Tasks of the German Navy at the Beginning of the World War" (*Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, 1936, No. 3, pp. 362-3), Admiral Bauer states:

“The support given by these could have been further increased, if in the planned preparation of the German offensive one or more battle-cruisers had been put on the trade routes of the Atlantic, which were indispensable for Britain. Any British cruiser convoys put up against them would have had to look out for their own safety. They could only have been pursued by a superior force of British cruisers, which could only be taken, and would have had to be taken from the Grand Fleet. Such an allocation of German ships must have caused serious doubts on the question of coal supplies, so long as these ships remained tied to their home base. But it would have been quite different if, losing touch with the home base, these cruisers had been able in a planned way to have recourse to bases overseas already prepared during peace, in addition to living on their own prizes. Two German battle-cruisers on the open seas would have revolutionised the whole conduct of the naval war by the British.”

The lightning methods of Port Arthur and the Tsushima strategy must serve as models for the conduct of the naval war by Germany. Above all, the naval forces must really be thrown into action in accordance with the requirements of the conduct of the war as a whole.

The *Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften*

considers the possibilities open to the German fleet of carrying on the war in an active way, even if they do not desire, in the first instance, any decisive engagement. Such active operations may serve political ends, or military ends on land (combined operations, protection of the transport of troops or attack on such transport) or economic ends (protecting the import of supplies, maintaining communications) or "psychological" ends (aimed at affecting the *morale* of the enemy or allies). In the course of events, too, the aim of the naval operations may be repeatedly changed, and necessitate the continuous transfer of the focal point from one area to another or against different important lines of communication or points where the enemy is concentrating. Moreover, operations on subsidiary fronts may effectively prepare the way for a decision in the main theatre of the naval war, inasmuch as precisely such "strategical manœuvres" are the pre-condition for a favourable distribution of forces in the main theatre and thus lead to the decisive engagement.

The vast extension of the areas of naval warfare, together with the speed and period during which naval and air forces can remain at sea, opens up new possibilities for the conduct of a naval war along these lines. It is only through the constant changing and co-ordination of all

forms of operations—of small ships, mines, cruiser attacks on trade routes, blockade, and small and large-scale fleet actions, that a strategical situation can be created which alone makes possible the attempt to bring about a decisive engagement.

The main doctrines of recent German naval strategy can be summed up as follows: In naval warfare there is no such thing as a successful defensive for the blockaded power—the offensive must be the main form of its naval operations. These doctrines take a slogan form: “We must get out of the dead-end of the North Sea!” “The nation that wants victory at sea must always attack!” “Did Cortes conquer Mexico without burning his ships?” (Applied to the present situation, this is meant to convey: Can France be crushed in a lightning war without large sections of the German fleet, if necessary, as for example in the Mediterranean, being thrown away?) It makes no difference where Trafalgar is fought, in the North Sea or in the Mediterranean—the result will remain the same, these strategists say with great significance. All the slogans are slogans of an offensive and apply in the first place to a lightning war, the beloved dream of the German generals, who are to-day completely fascinated by this idea. And this is above all a war of determination, of swift action, of surprise attack, of action without regard

to consequences, of the offensive to its highest degree; for all weapons an active and not a passive war. And this includes the weapon of naval warfare: in fact, the lightning stroke of a surprise attack must be supported from the sea with all available resources. The lightning attack must come from all directions, water, land and air, it must strike like a hurricane, destroying everything with elemental force.

A Lightning War in the Mediterranean

The peculiar feature of the German naval lightning attack, however, is that its direction will be determined by the requirements of a lightning attack on land, for the reason that land operations are decisive in the conduct of a German war. The army carries out the surprise blow, with the annihilation of the enemy's land and air forces as its aim; it overruns the country, occupies the industrial and raw material areas, and in this way destroys the source of the enemy's strength. The use of the fleet and the choice of the area in which it will operate, etc., consequently depend on the requirements of this main blow.

The unanimity of the military statements published in Hitler Germany shows that France is considered as the probable object of the German lightning war; all preparations point in this

direction, and most of the military and technical conditions for the success of such a lightning attack are present in the case of an attack on France—in a word, the lightning war is the special form of German attack on France.

If this is recognised, various stages in the development of the lightning attack can be indicated in advance; and also the place where a German fleet action, in support of a surprise attack on land, would have the greatest effect, follows as a matter of necessity. The Western Mediterranean basin, France's transport route from North Africa, separated from the main theatre of war by the sea, is of the most decisive importance for a lightning war during the first few weeks. It is far from the main theatre of war on land—unlike, for example, the English Channel—and there can be no direct contact between the land and sea forces. But it is in the Western Mediterranean that the most effective co-ordination of the naval forces with the army can take place in the case of a lightning war. For it is here that the lightning naval attack can be directed against the route between France and her colonies, along which would go the troops who would be the first and most accessible resources at France's disposal in the first few weeks of an invasion by Hitler Germany. The resources which might be brought from England,

and those from other allies—apart from air forces—could only come at a later date. But in a lightning attack the blow must be stopped within the shortest possible space of time. The German Admiral Bauer, in his criticism of German strategy, treats as a particularly serious mistake the failure to use the opportunity of throwing in naval forces to facilitate the land operations. Had the German fleet attacked the Channel at the right moment, Antwerp would have been taken earlier. "It is difficult to form a wide enough view of the possible consequences of taking Antwerp some five days earlier. The investing army would have been released correspondingly earlier, and would have been able to occupy the Belgian and French coasts of the Channel as far as Calais. The bloody battles of the Yser and Ypres would have been unnecessary; the flooding by the enemy of the Yser lowlands would have been impossible."

Wherever the circumstances require, whether in the English Channel or in the Mediterranean, naval forces must be flung into action regardless of cost, provided this is of service from the standpoint of the war as a whole.

It is in this connection that Hitler Germany's activities in Spain acquire a quite concrete significance as preparations for war: they are a part of the German mobilisation, just as much

as the German armaments, for Spain as a base for German strategy can be as useful as for example the formation of a number of new army corps.

The Transport Route between Africa and France

German military writings treat the chances of a successful surprise action in the Western Mediterranean as very favourable. The Algerian coast has no natural harbours, and the artificial harbours constructed by France along this coast can be easily attacked and damaged.

“The loading and discharging of ships is carried out almost without shelter, so that troops could only be embarked in face of the danger of attack from the sea or from the air.”
(*Der Mittelmeerraum*, p. 73.)

Another important point in favour of a surprise attack is that France has only a relatively small number of ships available as transports.

“During the war a dangerous shortage of shipping made itself felt. The question of sea transport between the Motherland and North Africa is, however, in the view of the French, a vital one. It is all the more surprising that in spite of many complaints no fundamental change has as yet been made. There is a monopoly of the flag on the route between France and Algiers. Passenger and postal traffic is confined to

three French companies, with twenty-seven ships between them; they have to undertake certain obligations. After the war eight new fast steamers were built by the State in order to improve the shipping available, and leased to the companies concerned. The fast passenger steamers are expected to be used as transports in the event of war. The quickest connection is between Vendres and Algiers, taking twenty-one to twenty-two hours. Whether this time can in the event of the need arising be further reduced is not known, but it is possible." (*Der Mittelmeerraum*, p. 73.)

The publicists of the German General Staff show themselves to be astonishingly well informed on all these delicate problems—certainly better informed than the other side, and this is a factor in favour of Germany whose importance it is difficult to estimate. The reference to the dangerous shortage of shipping is in fact a broad hint to the lightning war strategists. If a surprise attack succeeds in destroying a part of this shipping, it would mean a loss at a critical moment which could not be easily or quickly repaired.

Hitler Germany's interest in these problems is so exclusively military that the whole problem of the French colonies is approached from this standpoint. *Der Mittelmeerraum* declares that the economic importance of the colonies:

“Is far less than their military and political value. The main purpose of the French colonies is to-day to provide the greatest possible number of soldiers, in order to fill the gaps which are developing in the white army at home. As far back as the 1870-1 war, Algerian auxiliary troops were fighting on the side of France. In the World War the number increased to an extraordinary extent. The French colonies provided a total of over 700,000 coloured soldiers and some 240,000 coloured workers. Of this total, the Atlas country alone provided 262,700 soldiers and 129,300 workers, who were also superior in quality to the other colonial troops. The French regarded the North African regiments as some of the best troops, and the Berbers proudly called themselves France's picked troops. Through the introduction of three years' military service for the coloured races (in Algeria two years) these numbers will be considerably raised in the future. According to Colonel Fabry, $1\frac{1}{2}$ million coloured troops can be counted on for a future war, of which total 600,000 to 700,000 will come from North Africa and the Senegal district. According to the League of Nations report, the active French army of some 643,000 men contains about 270,000 coloured soldiers. The coloured troops therefore represent even to-day an essential element in France's army,

which will be of all the greater help the more quickly and securely their transport is effected. The transport question is therefore the main anxiety of the French General Staff." (*Der Mittelmeerraum*, p. 71.)

With equal justice it could be added that the German General Staff is no less occupied with this question, from the standpoint of their plan of operations for a surprise attack on this "life-line" to force a speedy decision.

German Interest in the Balearics

Der Mittelmeerraum goes into this question in greater detail:

"It was in the World War that France first recognised the full importance of her sea connections with North Africa. According to the particulars given by Admiral Castex, the number of men transported by sea for France alone, from 1914-18, totalled 2,365,000 (including expeditionary forces, men on leave, etc.) ! If we take into consideration that these figures will be still higher in the future, we will realise that the main task of the French navy must be to make this transport of troops absolutely secure. The construction of ports and railways serves this purpose as well as the new construction of French ships in recent years. It is true that the French

navy of to-day is not one of the biggest in the world, but it is superior in numbers to the Italian navy. Toulon and Biserta in the Mediterranean, as well as numerous other bases, are at her disposal as naval ports. The French system of bases in the Western Mediterranean does not however make a 'French sea' of it, for in the south it is cut by the great British sea route Gibraltar-Suez, and to the west it is flanked by the Italian island of Sardinia. Almost exactly in the middle of the sea route between Marseilles and Algiers there are the Spanish Balearics, which through this acquire extraordinary strategical importance. French sea transport can be interrupted at any moment from the Balearics. For this reason the attitude of Spain in any Mediterranean conflict is of decisive importance." (p. 74.)

On June 4, 1936 the *Deutsche Wehr* observed that "Spain's importance for French diplomacy is growing greater." The sentence might equally have run: "Spain's importance for German diplomacy is growing greater." Hitler Germany's policy in regard to Spain is based on this maxim. It has long been striving to bring Spain under German influence. An article in the *Deutsche Wehr* of December 19, 1935, is of extreme significance in this connection.

The problem of the Balearics was put as the central point. They have always had an almost

magical attraction for the Pan-Germans, because, as the *Deutsche Wehr* explains, of the "decisive position of the islands from the standpoint of world politics."

"The Balearics lie on no less than all power-lines of the Western Mediterranean. In the first place, they lie near and even on the French life-lines from Toulon or Marseilles, Sète or Narbonne to Biserta or Bone, Algiers or Oran. The route from the French Mediterranean ports to the Atlantic runs through the waters of the Balearics. In the second place, they lie on the Italian life-lines to Gibraltar and the open sea. Minorca, the eastern point of the group, is less than three hundred miles away from Sardinia. If a conflict developed between England and Italy, every Italian attack on the closing of the Strait of Gibraltar would pass through the waters of the Balearics and transform them into a theatre of war. Thirdly, they flank what, in relation to a British-Italian conflict, would be the weakest section of the English life-line through the Mediterranean because it contains no base—the section Gibraltar-Malta. Minorca was once English, from 1708 to 1783. English Mediterranean squadrons even to-day regularly visit the Balearic waters. Perhaps that direct threat to the western coasts and harbours of Italy, which fascist sea and air armaments have for the

moment struck from England's hand, will be renewed from Minorca.

"In French hands," the *Deutsche Wehr* continues, "the Balearics would mean an almost unbreakable domination of France alone in the Western Mediterranean. Spain would then be hemmed in by France not only in the north and south, but also in the east. In Italian hands the Balearics would be the springboard to the open sea and to a 'mare nostro,' perhaps with an Italian Gibraltar or Tangier as western barriers. In English hands the Balearics would be both the end of French domination of the Western Mediterranean and also of the Italian idea of the 'mare nostro.' They would also perpetuate British foreign domination over Spanish ore and the political control of Madrid by London. Each of the three world powers therefore looks on the Balearics as a rich prize at the cost of Spain. Spain has every reason not to hand herself over to any of them."

But, the Hitler politicians argue, can Spain think of improving its own position, can it avail itself, to the extent required and rapidly enough, of technical advances and so forth, receiving help from abroad, without thereby risking the loss of its own independence? And their answer is: all this must be provided by a strong ally, who is not in the position to bring Spain into subjection,

HITLER'S CONSPIRACY AGAINST PEACE

as France, England and even Italy are. As things stand, this strong ally can only be Germany. If Germany spreads her protecting hand over Spain and Spanish possessions, France will not dare to impose her will on Spain. But Germany can build railways in Spain and her colonies, open up mines and organise the country's finances, without endangering Spanish sovereignty, because they are not neighbours, nor does Germany possess a fleet of the strength of the British fleet. Here we have an objective relation, given by nature and history, which must necessarily always work in Germany's favour.

Spain's policy, so the *Deutsche Wehr* argues, must therefore be neutrality—of course, neutrality with Hitler Germany as the strong ally. "Spanish neutrality will then be even more proud, more peace-bringing, than it was once before in the World War in spite of the Entente's threats."

Spain should continue its policy of the World War period, when it remained neutral, with the greater part of the aristocracy and the army officers secretly on Germany's side. And for that matter, the all-powerful clergy too. Archbishop Antolin of Tarragona declared in 1917: "Gibraltar is a name which sears like a lash, which reddens our face."

In the *Deutsche Wehr* of September 10, 1936, Rear-Admiral Gadow expressly referred to these

sympathies, in an article on the Spanish navy, which supported the government against the Fascist rebellion :

“ The fate which has overtaken this navy along with the army and the whole Spanish people must be very painful to Germany. All the more so, because their military sympathies during the World War were most decisively on Germany’s side, and a defeat of their powerful French neighbour, whose hand was often felt in Catalonia, or of domineering England with her commanding fortress, would have opened many paths to a higher political significance for Spain. Connections between the German and Spanish navies were very cordial, as was proved by many ship and fleet visits; the king, too, was a friend of the German navy and of the Reich.”

The German admiral attempted to characterise the present position as follows: “ That a victory of the military party is not in French interests is clear.”

Gadow also speaks of the Balearics in the following passage :

“ Spain’s strategic needs can be more closely defined in that she must protect the neutrality of her waters in the area Barcelona–Valencia–Malaga–Gibraltar, along with the Balearic waters, and especially the islands themselves, which in a war would be an invaluable half-way point for

France in its transport route Toulon-Algiers, and for a power hostile to France, an equally invaluable naval base."

It has already been made sufficiently clear who this "power hostile to France" is.

The *Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften* also urges "neutrality" on Spain:

"The heightened value of Spain's geographical position from a military standpoint must decisively influence her armaments and her alliance policy. Her neighbours on the frontiers, who may be made uncomfortable by the strengthening of Spain's strategical position, come in question as opponents. The experience of the World War must cause Spain to make herself so strong from the military point of view that her neutrality can be protected and she can remain able to find allies. She seems to be particularly exposed to danger from the side of France, who already surrounds her territory to north, east and south, and must secure the line of communication with Africa."

Spanish "neutrality" should therefore be directed against France.

The African Coastal Districts

In addition to the Balearics, there is another Spanish possession on which the Hitler Reich would like to lay its hands—the whole of Spanish Africa. At many points this territory lies in front

of French colonial territory, and can therefore be useful to a power which knows how to exploit such a position. The *Militär Wochenblatt* (June 11, 1935), observed that there were three districts:

“First, the zone of Spanish Morocco, embracing the Riff mountains and neighbouring territory; then the Ifni enclave in South Morocco; and finally the Spanish Sahara district, Rio de Oro. It was only in the summer of 1934 that Ifni was occupied by Spanish troops, after France had broken the resistance of the tribes in the surrounding country. In Rio de Oro the range of Spain’s authority is limited to a few coastal forts; the inland area is peopled by absolutely independent and warlike tribes. A glance at the map shows that France’s interests are directly affected by the situation in Rio de Oro. If there is to be communication between Morocco and Senegal—either in the form of a railway or any other—the line of communication would not be safe so long as the danger of constant unrest beside the line, originating from the Spanish Sahara region, existed in such direct proximity. . . . The North African railway, which now terminates in Marrakesh, once the adjacent zone on the south has been pacified, can be carried further south with the aim of forming a link between North Africa and Senegambia. Such a railway would

be of incalculable value for France. The important colony of Senegal, whose population of 1,570,000 is becoming a more and more indispensable recruiting ground for the French army, has connections with North Africa and the motherland at present only by sea—if we leave out of account the air line Toulouse-Casablanca-Dakar. There has been much discussion in France on the need to change this unsatisfactory position, and it is known that the various projects for a Trans-Sahara railway which have been under discussion for over fifty years, are based on the desire to have military access so that black auxiliary troops from Senegal and Sudan can be brought to the Mediterranean coast quickly and safely. The Trans-Sahara railway, according to the plans put forward up to now, is to link the terminus of one of the Algerian lines with Gao at the northern point of the Niger bend; the sector Colomb-Béhar-Gao already has regular air and motor connections."

Der Mittelmeerraum also regards the Sahara railway as chiefly of military and political importance:

"Senegal and Sudan would be linked by it to Algeria and the Mediterranean ports, so that the long journey by sea would be avoided. The strategical importance of the Trans-Sahara railway is clear when we realise that negro troops

from the Sudan could be brought across the Sahara in five days to Algiers and six days to Marseilles."

Continental Line Rhine-Congo

France is considering how to secure connections for bringing troops from her colonies, while Hitler Germany is thinking how to drive sap-heads close to the enemy positions. The Hitler strategists are preparing a whole system of bases round North-West Africa, so that in war they can strike from these bases at the enemy's lines of communication. They want to draw into this system all of Spain's possessions, which are all extremely favourably situated from a military standpoint. Both Spanish bridge-heads on the African coast are specially suitable, with the Canaries developed as a strong naval base. The ports on the southern coast of Spain provide a firm network of bases for closing the Strait of Gibraltar, and for cruiser warfare against the transport routes in the Mediterranean and the alternative routes in the Atlantic (British alternative route round the Cape, and French Atlantic route). If Italy and Portugal could be brought within this system—a possibility that cannot be lightly dismissed, even though contradictory interests in the Mediterranean may also bring Italy and Germany at each other's throats—then the

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prospects for a lightning war would be extremely bright.

Writing in the *Daily Herald* of August 10, 1936, Lord Strabolgi (formerly on the Admiralty War Staff, and Assistant Chief of Staff at Gibraltar), treated this aspect of the situation in the following way:

“ Our nearest Atlantic bases, supposing France was on our side, would be Bordeaux, deep in the Bay of Biscay, Brest and Plymouth. For operations on the Atlantic trade routes, especially on the very important sea communications with South Africa and South America, our opponents would be on interior lines. Such convoys as we brought from the Cape or managed to escort westwards through the Mediterranean would have to run the gauntlet of attack from these Spanish and Portuguese harbours. As if this were not enough, a Spanish alliance might give the Fascist Confederacy a cruiser base in the Canary Islands and at Rio de Oro, in Spanish territory, on the north-west shoulder of Africa. Our difficulties of trade protection at sea in the last war were child's play compared to the problems set by such circumstances.”

Once the enemies of Britain and France succeeded in taking Spain in tow, they would immensely increase the opportunities open to them for operating in the Mediterranean. A

sudden and powerful attack could make mincemeat of France's mobilisation of colonial troops at the start of the war, and in this way help to ensure the success of a lightning war in Europe. France has to reckon with this danger. With Spain as her ally France could avoid any danger to her sea transport, by bringing the troops through Spain. A land route would be open from the Rhine to the Congo, as *Der Mittelmerraum* (pp. 75-6) suggests:

"As France apparently does not feel quite secure at sea, she strives to shorten the sea route as much as possible. Spain forms a western bridge towards Africa. If France could succeed in bringing her troop transport from Africa overland through Spain, she would successfully avoid any possible attacks at sea. Several attempts have actually been made to induce Spain to double-track the railway Irun-Madrid-Algeciras on the French gauge and to open it for French troop transport. Up to the present, however, these attempts have been unsuccessful. It can be expected, though, that they will crop up again when the projects for the Gibraltar tunnel and the Trans-Sahara railway are carried out. The linking up of these, provided Spain gave permission, would provide a French continental line from the Rhine to the Congo, which would not be vulnerable at any point by naval attack."

Morocco Once More

In the intrigues connected with Morocco Hitler is also following pre-war traditions. During the whole century before 1914 conflicts connected with North-West Africa played a part in world politics. But the Moroccan question seemed to have been long settled, with the French and other frontiers determined and Germany finally eliminated. But Hitler Germany does not propose to abandon any of the former Pan-German aims, and so the Moroccan question is once more on the agenda. The *Deutsche Wehr*, on September 3, 1936, wrote of Spain's historic role in world politics:

"But Spain must herself be clear that the resumption of her historic role must begin at the Strait of Gibraltar, while her general field of activity is to be sought in Europe and North Africa. There, with a spirit of determination and good leadership, the Spanish people, twenty million strong, could make a good showing even to-day."

Concrete tasks were set for the Spaniards, namely, to strive to get the Morocco question raised again. Spain holds the key for this in her control of North Morocco, which, it is true, represents only the smaller part of Morocco, but it is the most important part for world politics—the

northern coast, facing Gibraltar. " From Larache on the Atlantic to the south to Melilla on the Mediterranean to the east the ring of Spanish garrisons runs, holding France back from the Strait of Gibraltar. The acquisition of this territory was an immense gain for Spain, of vital importance in defence against France's all too close embrace on three sides.

- " The Moroccan problem, to-day and for the future is, however, not Spanish Morocco but Tangier. In this town, whose international status can only seem ideal to a Geneva egg-dancer, the Morocco crisis of the past lives on and has become a permanent crisis. It is true that the stage is very much narrower—373 square kilometres with some 70,000 inhabitants—but at the same time it is politically the most important corner of North-West Africa, the key to the Mediterranean. International control of a politically important city means, according to all the teachings of history, the postponement of a decision feared by all nations; though the question arises: Can problems of world politics be postponed at all, and, if so, for how long? Every time when decisions of world politics approach a problem which has been postponed in this way, the greatest danger threatens world peace, which has been maintained with great difficulty in view of its insincere and dishonest character. So it is

to-day, when in Spain nationalism and the sense of honour are in open struggle against international Bolshevism. Within a few weeks of civil war discontent was knocking insistently at the gates of Tangier, that is, of Europe."

Spain must energetically proclaim her desire to replace international control by Spanish control—under the protectorate of Hitler Germany.

Not only French, but also British and even Italian interests are concerned in Tangier. The international régime in Tangier was due to Britain:

"After the war had interrupted the Tangier negotiations, the powers resumed their former standpoints: Spain declared that Tangier belonged to her zone; France wanted it given to the Sultan, i.e. placed under her domination; Britain favoured neutralisation, which was finally brought about after intense political work with the help of a Spanish breakdown: the Statute of Tangier was ratified by the three powers in 1923. It came into force in February 1925. Article 3 placed Tangier under permanent neutrality and forbade military actions of any kind within, against, or based on the zone, and all military fortifications. Soon afterwards Italy stepped in, naturally having a burning interest in the Tangier question. . . . In the revision of the Tangier Statute of July 25, 1928, Italy ensured, with

British support, her participation in the zone, so that the coalition in the Tangier Council against the principal States, Spain and France, was considerably strengthened." (*Der Mittelmeerraum*, p. 154.)

A power which had won Spain as an ally could soon control the whole Mediterranean:

"Tangier in Spanish hands, together with the favourably situated *presidios* in Spanish Morocco, especially Ceuta, would constitute a dangerous menace to the position of Britain."

CHAPTER XI

KINGDOMS IN THE EAST

ANY NATION that stands in the way of German domination of the world, eastwards as well as westwards, is an enemy of Hitler Germany, though it may at the moment be able to boast of Hitler's friendship.

German-Polish Interests in Treaty Revision

Poland has allowed herself to be taken in tow by the Pan-Germans: in spite of fundamental contradictions which continue to exist, Poland is bound to Hitler Germany by many aims involving the revision of the Versailles Treaty.

Aims directed towards the Ukraine and the East in general.

Aims directed towards Czecho-Slovakia, for Poland would like to link the rich mining and industrial basin on the Polish-Czecho-Slovakian frontier with the Ostrau-Karwiner coal basin, and also to divide Slovakian territory with Hungary, in order to have a common frontier with her Hungarian ally.

Aims directed towards colonies, for Poland

hopes for a new distribution of colonies, which could only be brought about in alliance with the "dynamic" powers, especially Germany.

In addition to the traditional Polish attitude of seeing the German upper classes as the "natural lords of Europe," there are also class motives. The great Polish landlords believe that they will fare best if they place their interests in the care of the powerful Pan-German usurper.

Poland the Hereditary Foe

What is the attitude of Hitler Germany to these aspirations of the ruling circles of Poland? A Machiavellian pact has been signed with Poland, but this does not mean that Hitler Germany has accepted Poland's independence. In spite of the pact, German propaganda against Polish independence continues. The official textbook of the Nazi Sport Organisation, published in 1935 (the German-Polish pact was concluded in January 1934) contains the following:

"The mistake made by the peace-minded Chancellor Bethmann-Holweg, who promised Poland independence and allowed her to organise her own army, had its terrible consequence on the outbreak of the revolution in 1918. Polish legions snatched whatever they could, and strove to extend the Polish State as far westwards as possible." (p. 194.)

That Hitler will repair this "mistake," that therefore he will ultimately deprive Poland of her independence, is confidently expected. The foreword to this book is written by the special confidential agent of Rudolf Hess. Millions of sportsmen are thus trained in the idea of revenge against Poland, and this fact weighs more heavily than Hitler's pacific speeches.

A similar attitude is expressed in the *Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften*, published in 1936 under the patronage of the German General Staff:

"Poland's overstrung position of power can only be maintained, from a military point of view, by a policy of armaments at home and above all a foreign policy with a military orientation." (p. 685.)

Another passage, on p. 546, dealing with the motives of Poland's military policy, states:

"The birth of the Polish State—at the cost of its neighbours—and conditions on its frontiers compelled Poland from the start to adopt a conscious military policy."

The neighbours at whose cost Poland came into existence include Germany herself.

"*Schnapps-drinking Iroquese*"

It will all be demanded back again, and with interest. Whether the territory is purely Polish or

mixed, it will be "got," according to a declaration made by Dr. Johann von Leers, one of the Nazi politicians dealing with the east. The fact is that claims to the return of territories given to Poland by the Peace Treaty cannot be based on arguments about the population, for in all these territories the Germans are in a minority. Even Leers admits that "the possibility of a referendum has no meaning." As against this, he proclaims the "right of German creative labour" to the German Vistula region. He regards it as "an exaggeration of the democratic principle to claim to determine the national ownership of any territory purely by the number of heads in the population." (*Polnischer Korridor oder deutsches Weichselland*, published by the official Nazi publishing house, Fritz Eher, Munich.)

"Examination must be made of who has built the schools and brought light to dark heads—and who has let the schools tumble down and brought the children back into the beloved darkness of illiteracy and blessed stupidity. Examination must be made of who has raised the man who toils from the difficulties of the land and burdensome labour to culture—and who has bowed him down again in the dark stupidity of the serf's mentality."

Leers gives the answer himself, in his description of the Prussian invasion of 1772:

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“In the year 1772, when the Polish State, completely ruined, and long since ‘moribund’ through its unrest, its incompetence and the bloody rule of the great families and their hangers-on, was at last divided up, to the applause of all serious statesmen, Friedrich the Great, “Alte Fritz,” added the miserable territories of West Prussia and Netzegau to his poor, clean, honest Prussia. The Polish murderers did not dare to fire a single shot against Friedrich’s invading troops; but the German population, oppressed, impoverished and persecuted, regarded the Great King as their saviour.”

In Leers’s presentation, the development that followed was that Frederick the Great transformed a “Canada peopled by schnapps-drinking Iroqueuse” into a clean, law-abiding land; and hence “what has been lost must not remain lost.”

The Prussian Legend

But in reality Prussian policy in this territory was very different from Leers’s picture. The simple testimony of Ernst Moritz Arndt shows that, immediately after the occupation of these districts, Prussian agrarian policy began to destroy the middle peasants. He writes: “So it came about, especially after the Seven Years War, from 1760 until 1790, that the peasantry was not only burdened with unlimited obligations of service,

but through the transformation of the villages into great estates and sheep runs was at last practically destroyed."

Another witness, the historian Delbrück, compared the situation in the German and Russian parts of Poland, in a report of a tour published in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* (Vol. 98) in October 1899. He wrote:

"The Russian Government has freed the Polish peasants, under very favourable conditions, from their former feudal lords, and made them into free owners. . . . The Prussian Government has not given the peasants anything like the same favourable conditions, because it wanted also to be just to the nobility." Finally he admits that of the two parts of Poland, "the Russian has mainly an industrial basis, the Prussian an agrarian."

Everyone knows what the Russian Government was like at the turn of the century. And yet two impartial witnesses testify that the German authorities were even more backward than the Russian. They gave the peasants less, they held back the industrial development of the country, because they followed the classical policy of the big Prussian landowners.

The legend of Prussia's great cultural achievements in the east cannot therefore be sustained. And there can be no worse testimony for the German authorities than the depopulation of

whole areas, which Schacht, Hitler's Minister of Economics, brings out clearly:

"While our average density of population, 139, is far higher than the Polish average of 80, and in other words our pressure of population must necessarily be greater, the Polish Vistula region has an average of 99, and the former Prussian territory robbed by Poland 75; but the German frontier district Posen-Westpreussen shows only 43, Rummelsburg district, 29.5, and German Krone 29.7 to the square kilometre. Nothing can more clearly show the emptiness of the east and Poland's pressure on it."

The pamphlet from which these figures are taken was written in 1932, when it was distributed in the election campaign against the Papen government; it puts forward, as the only solution for the settlement of Eastern Germany, the distribution of land. But it was precisely in order to prevent this solution that, as we have already pointed out, the big landowners pressed Hindenburg to make Hitler Chancellor of the Reich. As the solution of settling peasants on the land is deliberately excluded, the only way left is the "race war" to take by force areas in which the Prussian landlords can rule.

The "natural" race conflict, however, is only put forward as the basis of a necessary enmity in order to cover up the deep-lying social motives

of the German-Polish conflict. German racial pride as against the Slavs has been carefully cultivated by the racial propaganda of the Hitler régime. The German is to be the master, the landowner, and the Pole the serf, the labourer. This social relationship is to be stabilised and made unalterable through "the eternal law of blood."

German General Staff on the Polish Army

The Poles are not treated as allies of equal standing, even in the Press controlled by the German General Staff. All unfavourable opinions about the Polish army are carefully noted. The *Militär Wochenblatt* of January 18, 1936, contained the following note:

"*Polska Żbrojna* (the organ of the Polish General Staff) No. 354/35 deals with illiteracy in Warsaw, on the basis of reports from the recruiting commissions, which have noticed illiteracy more and more frequently among the youth in the countryside. . . . The 'spectre of ignorance' . . . also threatens the State's capital, as the figures of the last census eloquently show. Warsaw has 1,171,898 inhabitants, and of those 10 years and over 26,649 could *only* read, and 97,961 had had no education of any kind—9 per cent of the total. . Since then the percentage of these must have increased, taking into account the ever-growing

number of children who can find no place in the schools. The author of the note is certainly correct when he says that this is 'a real scandal for Warsaw, the centre of the intellectual life of a 33 million State.' "

The *Deutsche Wehr* of July 25, 1935, speaks contemptuously of the motorisation of Poland :

" Recently the Polish Press has been more and more insistently demanding the speedier motorisation of Poland. Detailed statistical material shows the low level of motorisation in Poland compared with other countries, and this is presented as shameful for a country of Poland's importance. In Poland there is one motor for 1,200 inhabitants, while for example in Syria there is one for 276 and in Morocco one for 311, leaving quite out of the picture the civilised States of the world."

Hopes of an Alliance

On May 7, 1936, the *Deutsche Wehr* published a detailed study on the Polish army. After dealing with the small extent of mechanisation and the impossibility of financing it from Poland's resources, the social factor—the morale of the troops—is critically examined, and the conclusion drawn is :

" In this connection another factor must be

referred to, which is also of importance. As we have seen, Poland is to-day affected by the economic crisis to an extent which would have been thought hardly possible for an agrarian State. The agricultural difficulties, especially in Congress Poland and the eastern Wojwod districts, face the government with steadily increasing tasks. The first result of these difficulties has been the steadily more universal radicalisation of the broad masses of the population. Even in the industrial areas of Upper Silesia, Dombrova and Lodz the position is bad. The regrettable events in Cracow, Czenstochau and especially in Lemberg, with their calamitous street battles at the end of March and beginning of April this year; the strikes constantly breaking out in many industrial centres; the more and more frequent strike calls; the recent action of the government against the Communist movement and the astonishingly numerous arrests, with Communist cells suddenly appearing in every part of the country; finally the realisation that the illegal Communist Press shows a big increase—all these things tell a clear but devastating tale. In addition there are the repeated signs of unrest at the universities, which often lead to the temporary closing of these institutions."

The writer concludes: "The question presses itself also on the outside observer—will all this be

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without influence on the spirit of the army in the future? ”

The Warsaw correspondent of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, the Nazi official paper, stated on July 26, 1936:

“ In Poland millions of very small peasants stand face to face with a few large landowners. Up to now no government of the new Poland has succeeded in solving this question satisfactorily. On the other hand, the radicalisation of the countryside is to-day on the increase—a fact that must cause misgivings from the standpoint of the military striking power of a Poland which is 70 per cent agrarian.”

In September 1936 the *Polska Zbrojna* (No. 210/36) published an article with the title “ We must have Land for our Emigrants.” This article stated that fifteen years ago, when Poland's boundaries were finally settled, there were approximately 27 million inhabitants, but with an annual increase of over 400,000 the present population was 34 million. It regarded this as the source of Poland's economic difficulty, as neither agriculture nor industry, nor handicraft and the professions, could provide work for the surplus population, which “ surpasses our real possibilities, our financial resources.” The *Militär Wochenblatt*, the journal of the German General Staff, commented on this article:

“ Everyone who knows the situation in Poland must doubt this, for much too much money is allocated for army and navy, and too little for the reclamation of the great marsh and forest areas and the settlement of people there. And also, as is well known, the improvement of the main roads and the construction of canals lags far behind the need.”

The German militarists, who think it quite in order that a vast proportion of Germany's national income should go on armaments, reproach their Polish friends for the same policy !

The Polish paper continued to portray the country's social difficulties. It regrets the restriction of emigrants to Germany, the drop in emigration to America, and the expulsion of Polish workers and artisans from France, and then asks the question : “ Is there, then, no country to which the surplus population living in poverty in the home country can be sent ? ” Reference is made to the immense areas of land in South America and Africa lying totally unused, and concludes that “ the problem of emigration and colonies has become an immediate one for Poland.”

The *Militär Wochenblatt* replied to this :

“ We must note that the *Polska Zbrojna* has already repeatedly referred to the former German colonial areas.”

Hitler on Poland

Shortly after his coming to power, Hitler made a reference to Poland in a speech:

"No new European war can put anything better in the place of the present unsatisfactory relations. The mentality of the past epoch, which believed that it was possible to make a German out of a Pole or a Frenchman, is foreign to us."

The *Gazeta Polska*, the paper of ruling group in Poland, in its issue of May 22, 1933, commented on this passage that: "These words of the Chancellor can be subscribed to by everyone"; it expressed delight that Hitler was not thinking of a policy of Germanisation such as he had put forward in his book *Mein Kampf*.

No one in the *Gazeta Polska* seems to have turned up Hitler's reference to Poland in *Mein Kampf*, in which he gives free rein to his hate of the Slavs. He boasts that he became a "revolutionary" through his hatred of the Hapsburgs, because they gave the Slavs too much protection. (p. 13.) He came also to hate the Social Democrats because of their anxiety to favour their "Slav comrades." (p. 39.) The Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Serbs and Croats were to him—and naturally still are—a "repulsive" race. The Poles are specially low in his scale of values: he

puts them on a level with the most hated races (to him), the Jews and the negroes. (p. 488.)

Moreover, a closer examination of Hitler's reference to Poland in the speech referred to above shows that its diplomatic purpose really covered up a contemptuous reference to the Poles. For in Hitler's chapter on the State, he complains of the misuse that has been made of the idea of "Germanisation." Even in Pan-German circles, he says, there are many false conceptions, such as the belief that it was possible to Germanise the Slavs—"which shows that they are not in the least clear on the fact that Germanisation can only be undertaken in reference to land and never to people. . . . It is almost an inconceivable error to believe, for example, that a negro or a Chinese can become a German because he learns German and is willing to speak German in future." (*Mein Kampf*, p. 428.) Such a Germanisation would be in fact, he continues, a de-Germanisation, the beginning of a bastardisation, the sinking of the level of the higher German race, whether such blending took place with negroes or Slavs, including Poles.

"The Polish policy demanded by so many in Germany in the sense of a Germanisation of the east was unfortunately almost always based on the same sophism. People thought that a Germanisation of the Polish element could be carried

through by making them speak the German language. Here, too, the result would have been unfortunate: a people of foreign race, expressing their foreign ideas in the German language, compromising the dignity and majesty of our own nationhood through its own inferiority." (*Mein Kampf*, pp. 479-80.)

Hitler's speech was therefore characteristic of both the methods and the content of German policy towards Poland and her other Slav neighbours, and note must be taken of the distinction made by Hitler—that the Pole cannot be Germanised, but Poland can.

There were always historians and politicians in Germany who supported an agreement with Poland, with the aim of using Poland as a dagger against Russia. In the war this policy led to the re-erection of the Polish State: but, of course, the millions of Poles in Germany were to remain German subjects. Delbrück, in *Preussische Jahrbücher* of November 26, 1916, described the mission which the new Poland was to fulfil for Pan-Germanism:

“ The active ideal of Polish nationalism will be directed not westwards but towards the east, to the territory where even to-day the Poles form the upper social stratum and represent the higher culture. This pressure of the Poles towards the east can be foreseen with such assurance that the

guarantees which we must demand on the formation of the new State need not be directed towards protecting us against a Polish *Irredenta*, but rather towards ensuring that Poland cannot drag us into a conflict with Russia which has nothing to do with our own national needs."

"Our own national needs" also determine the policy of Hitler Germany. Poland is intended to serve as an important military and political base both against east and west. With Poland as an ally in a war, Germany's offensive both against east and west would be made far easier, from a strategic standpoint and also from the standpoint of food supplies. Poland is to be a base of Pan-Germanism within the Slav countries, as during the war "the old Austria, which with its Slav majority entered the war against the Slavs." (*Deutsche Wehr*, October 30, 1935.)

After Gamelin's Visit

Even the visit paid by Gamelin, the French general, to Warsaw, and the return visit to France of the Polish General Rydz-Smigly, made no fundamental change, according to *Polska Żbrojna* (No. 221/36). This paper stated diplomatically that the visits proved that the Franco-Polish alliance was stronger than ever. But it added that "the mechanism of Polish-French co-operation requires new consideration from time to time."

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The author had to go into the Polish-German relations, however much he may have disliked dealing with this subject. He stated that recommendations of a reconciliation with Germany had actually come from Paris, while there was not the faintest suggestion that Poland should place herself under Russia's protection. This would be fatal for France, for Poland must aim at "a policy of balance between Germany and Russia," as in the event of misfortune "Russia would not help Poland out of the mud."

But among the people of Poland the so-called pact of January 26, 1934, between the Polish and German governments does not find acceptance. An agreement which is to be accepted by the people can only be made with a State which is bound to the agreement by its own outlook and interests. Common interests, a common mission and common aims exist only between the big landowners of Poland and Germany.

Paradise Lost

With the formation of the new national States of Poland, Latvia, Esthonia, Lithuania, and, in the south, Czecho-Slovakia, the German upper classes in those countries lost many of their privileges. As a result of Germany's defeat in the war, a dominant position which had been maintained for centuries had to be sacrificed.

The Hugenberg Memorandum in London specially referred to the annexation of the Baltic States by Hitler Germany. In these States—Latvia, Esthonia, Lithuania—there were 150,000 Germans, who up to 1918 formed the most important economic power in those areas. In the first rank there were the thousand landowning noblemen, to whom the greater part of the land belonged. The noble German Junkers owned 53 per cent of the land in Courland, and 60 per cent in Livonia. Nine noble families owned two-fifths of all Courland. It is difficult for a western European to imagine the medieval privileges enjoyed by these thousand Baltic barons. They owned almost all the forests; they had rights of hunting and fishing even on peasant land; industrial and commercial enterprises could only be set up on land owned by the barons. The large estates were privileged for taxation purposes. In addition there were the political privileges under the so-called “self-government” system, which gave the owners of the large estates sovereign power in the local councils. In the towns, the large merchants, financiers and manufacturers were mainly German. The franchise for the towns was based on high property qualifications, and so the Germans also ruled the towns. They maintained their power only through their privileges and an undemocratic constitution;

democracy was bound to push them into the background. They therefore concentrated their hatred on any sign of democracy. In 1905 the Letts had risen; the rising was subdued, and the German Junkers exacted the most fearful reprisals. The Russian punitive expedition, led by the German Junkers, shot two thousand Letts and mishandled their womenfolk. Thousands were forced to emigrate.

So long as the Baltic barons possessed their estates and enjoyed their privileges, they showed no longing to return to their native land. The state of things in Tsarist Russia was eminently satisfactory to them; they served the Tsar as trusted officers, and were the most zealous advocates of national oppression, which served to defend their class rule. It was only when the political revolution also affected their social position that they came back into the German Reich and discovered that they had had a political mission in the east. It is not an accident that the Baltic German Rosenberg is the ideologue of racial superiority, or that he is one of the most ardent and influential advocates of the foreign policy which to him is also a private policy of revenge. The re-conquest of their dominant position in the east is openly stated as the aim. Hitler's expansionist politicians rely on the reckless proclamation of their war aims to the

east having a soothing influence in the west.

In *Memelland* (published by Eher, Munich) Dr. Johann von Leers states:

“Between Germany and, say, Lithuania or any other market State there is not only a difference in size, but also a difference in historical rank, which cannot be sacrificed through suffering encroachments on our rights without a lasting loss to German prestige—and with this, immediate material and ideational damage to the whole of the Eastern European peoples.”

Leers then speaks of “the robber States, Poland and Lithuania,” and finally openly advocates a military attack on Lithuania. On p. 30 he says: “The necessary condition of any successful German policy in relation to Lithuania is therefore the drastic clearing out of the Lithuanians from the Memel district.”

The fight for the territory torn from Germany must be taken up with determination, because this is the only way in which “the German nation can solve its social problem.” Here once again we find the *motif* of diverting the people’s attention from the unhealthy conditions in Germany by war propaganda. On p. 6 Leers says:

“What we have lost must not remain lost ! We believe in the eternal right of peoples to live—so long as it has behind it the will to use the bayonet and the last cartridge !”

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But Leers aims not only at recovering territory, as his reference to Poland shows: "With the coming into existence of Poland the most dangerous enemy of Germany in all her history has come into being—anyone who fails to see that has understood neither Poland's nor Germany's history."

The Sergeant-Major as Saviour

In *Oberschlesien* (also published by Eher, Munich) Leers urges not only the recovery of former Prussian-Poland, but the taking of Germany's old colonisation area. The first blow must be directed against the Corridor, and Upper Silesia must be taken.

"Of course, the Polish fortune-hunters and thieves will not let Upper Silesia go without a fight. But if to-day the poor deluded population of Kattowitz, Rybnik and the whole ruined coal district are compelled to dig 'poverty shafts,' where the workless miners dig coal to sell to stop their hunger, and the Polish military shoot them down while they are doing it; if they are to-day crying out for a saviour who will clean out the Augean stable—then we will show them the saviour from the misery of Polish Upper Silesia. This saviour will be: the German sergeant-major, who will send the robber band home to

Galicia, and the German gendarme, who will lock up the public thieves."

Once on the march, Leers sends on the sergeant-major to the former Austrian Silesia, sections of which are now occupied by Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. But he does not allow him to halt even there—"That opens up also the whole question of the Sudeten Germans and the question of the Slovakian nation." The appetite grows with eating.

In a Berlin meeting, according to the *Völkischer Beobachter* of October 5, 1933, Dr. von Leers announced that "Poland is facing her fourth partition." In *Oberschlesien* (p. 32) Leers wrote:

"For us it cannot be merely a question of making rectifications in the frontiers fixed by the acts of force embodied in the Peace Treaty. The task of a strengthened Germany is to create a German Upper Silesia by bringing together old possessions which had been lost, which alone would make the economic development of the country possible and at the same time, from a strategic standpoint, separate Germany's two enemies, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, and make possible a German bridge-head towards the Ukraine and Hungary, with a post on the Jablunka Pass."

The Jablunka Pass is the key position for an advance south and east into Slav territory.

CHAPTER XII

THE TWILIGHT OF THE GODS

BACTERIA AND BACILLI are to be soldiers in the next war. It is certainly not merely a personal conjecture when the military expert Banse prophesies that the war of pestilence, or biology as a means of warfare, "will win a position for itself under the necessities of the next war." Biology will give the next war the character of a struggle for the complete extermination of whole peoples. (*Wehrwissenschaft*, p. 36.) Already all preparations which can serve this noble end are being systematically made. The infection of drinking and other water with typhus germs, and the spreading of typhus through fleas, as well as of plague through artificially infected rats, have been considered. All of this is described as atrocity-mongering—but it is all to be found on p. 37 of Banse's work.

Aeroplanes coming down in the enemy hinterland and letting loose germs can achieve "specially favourable results." According to the military experts of Hitler Germany, biological war is a weapon specially adapted for Germany :

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when the existence of the State and Nation are at stake, any means of securing victory must be justified.

The alarm expressed abroad as a result of this book, led to the immediate announcement that it had been prohibited. But the "prohibited" book remained available as the text-book of military education in the army, the Storm Troops, and the sports and other leagues. Banse was not persecuted. After the "prohibition" of the book the *Deutsche Schule*, journal of the German teachers' union, published an article by Professor Banse demanding war against France with poisoned rats, fleas and plague germs!

But whether plague rats are already being reared or not, the plague rat ideology comes out in every line written by the military leaders of Hitler Germany. They speak mystically of "the twilight of the gods"; the horsemen of the Apocalypse sweep over the battlefields, surrounded by myriads of germs.

The kind of warfare that they have in mind can be illustrated from Rosenberg's *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts* (*The Myth of the Twentieth Century*), page 557:

"Quite apart from the conscious rejection of liberal 'freedom,' it is the military-political position itself which compels us to wipe out the

cities of the world. Possible future wars will be very much wars of air fleets. The aim of gas and explosive bombs will always be the large towns. The more scattered the towns and factories, the smaller the damage from successful air attacks. Fate compels to-day, as in former times, the whole people to take part in the struggle for its existence. The lord of the city used to build a wall round the citizens' houses, all of whose inhabitants had to take part in every battle. The liberal epoch formed professional armies; the citizens had their lives protected by soldiers—and incidentally accused the soldiers of militarism. This pseudo-idyll is now over; technical developments, which once built a steel wall round a whole city, have now broken it down again, and restored the old organic relation between war and the nation.

“And so both fate and the world outlook make the demolition of great cities necessary, and the building of towns and railways based on strategical considerations. Once people built proud castles on the tops of mountains; to-day everything of any importance will be hidden underground in concrete vaults. A whole town of high buildings will be folly—and the recognition of this will make definite changes necessary in building plans.” (p. 558.)

Here we find that national defence is a

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“pseudo-idyll.” The real idyll is the aggressive war, which must be prepared for by putting the whole economic system into a “state of alarm,” the mobilisation of everything, gas-shelters in every house, life in underground concrete vaults, constant thinking in terms of war ideas, the hundred per cent infection of the nation with plague-rat ideology, cruelty as the most humane weapon—the preparation of the appalling end, the “twilight of the gods.”

The Document of Folly

“The Twilight of the Gods” is the title of the immense essay published on June 13, 1935, by the *Deutsche Wehr*, as the Tables of the Law for the future.

Everything which we have tried to set forth in the previous chapters reaches its highest point in this official ukase: Nazi demagoguery and ideology, annexationist arrogance and wails about bad frontiers, religious racial mania and theory of aims by stages, the scream for raw materials and defamation of the country's neighbours, the whole propaganda of Either-Or, of Eat or Be Eaten. These things cannot be said more openly, more cynically, more menacingly. It is the philosophy of the footpad, crafty and brutal, pathetic and cold-blooded. It is the document of politicians of

catastrophe: the rules of the most modern and abandoned gamblers. They are not ashamed to talk of the soul: they mean the nerve power which they have to raise against the horrors they will let loose. The plans of their General Staff are based on the will to break down even the most ultimate resistance.

“In such a war”—so the document runs—“there will be no longer victors and vanquished, but survivors and those whose name is stricken from the list of nations.”

It is bluntly stated that there will not even be any negotiations about the terms of peace: these will be laid down “as we see fit.”

Obviously referring to France, it is stated that European civilised States are losing their nerve. What will their fate be when the “robust” Pan-German Army advances against them?

“Neither the biological nor the spiritual forces of a nation are inexhaustible. A war waged energetically and consciously for the purpose of spiritually breaking and destroying these nations can be a death blow especially for those civilised nations whose elasticity [the reference is to Britain] and whose powers of regeneration [the reference is to France] have already suffered to a considerable degree.

“Many an apparently invincible Colossus in reality stands on feet of clay, and what one or two

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generations ago was impossible has to-day already become possible: with a single powerful blow to break a nation's spiritual backbone, to destroy it for ever and trample it in the dust."

The victor, like the Roman Cæsars, sits with his foot on the neck of his vanquished foe.

"Just this is the essence, the numbing aspect of the war of annihilation. The *élite* lies torn to shreds and poisoned on the battlefields. The survivors, a leaderless, demoralised mob of human beings crushed and broken by nameless horrors and sufferings, by unspeakable terror, stand defenceless and without any will before their victor—clay in the potter's hand."

The German General Staff as the potter! It mercilessly surveys its material, the peoples. Their number makes no difference:

"Their number does not matter. Once the bodily and mentally whole, the real men who form the actual war force of a nation (and their number to-day is not great), have been destroyed in the war, it is a matter of absolute indifference how many others survive.

"Fifty million trembling fellaheen are not more difficult to bring into subjection than five: for many million times nought is still nought."

The author remains general throughout the first part of his vision of the end of the world. Only in the second part, where he inveighs

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against the over-estimation of the value of technique, does he refer to his own nation. He is confident that he is addressing a proud and willing nation when he tells them that "victory will not be bought by a higher utilisation of benzine, but by streams of blood and tears." Sure of himself, he adds: "Ever more, and more than ever." For in the future it is certain that:

"A nation will no longer want *something* from its opponent, but *put an end to its opponent*—make an end of it, once and for all."

He himself emphasises the difference between the aims. Pan-Germanism will not put up with the satisfactions of former victors:

"What is at stake in the next war is more than dividends—it is *everything*."

Here again emphasis is laid on what has changed—a vague word instead of a precise one. We are told that "the World War was only a prelude, a curtain-raiser to an immeasurably greater drama."

"This coming war will be the most stupendous and appalling that humanity has experienced and will experience—a collective achievement of power and genius, and at the same time a catastrophe without its like. When the nations fight for victory with all their strength and resources, with all their abilities, craft and science; when gigantic war machines on land, air, and water

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struggle in saurian combats of prehistoric fantasy; when all the passions and instincts, hatred, fury and despair, the most exalted heroism and the basest treachery, let loose by the storm of events, fill the world with legendary deeds of fame and unspeakable horrors, then will the people of those days think the end of the world has come, the mythological world conflagration, the twilight of the gods."

The suicide of mankind is here put forward as inevitable. The gods of Valhalla cut each other's throats. The nations writhe on the ground. There is not a line which deals with avoiding the catastrophe. The apostle of German imperialism ends—on June 13, 1935—with the significant instruction to his enslaved nation:

"We, however, will strap our helmets tighter on."

Six months after the publication of this document, the *Deutsche Wehr* published the sequel to this ukase. It leaves no doubt: Germany has a part to play in this twilight of the gods—the part of the victor. That is the "immovable goal of a view of the world which starts with the claim to totality." The whole population must be caught up in it. Private life must cease. The conduct of war forms the only content of life to such a degree that "the idea of a civil population will no longer exist." Everything must be discarded

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which does not serve "the sole still recognised aim of existence"—which is, the annihilation of the enemy.

Unambiguous words, which must summon all the peace forces of the world to be on guard. For here we have the determined will to catastrophe, with everything being done to make a nation numbering millions ready for the organised act of madness.

Monomania of War or of Peace?

"Not only because of the consequent increase in the aggregate effort in the war," but more especially because of the danger of resistance, it is necessary "to reduce the number of inactive persons to the lowest possible. For the inactive person in a war community is an element which endangers itself and others.

"The person who shares with the rest of the nation only the general pressure of anxiety and privation, but not the great experience of transcending his own self in active participation for his nation and his fatherland, is particularly susceptible to weakening attacks of doubt and faint-heartedness and to the whisperings of underground enemy propaganda. On the other hand, the consciousness of personal participation in the greatness and responsibility of the hour gives the active person a heightened power

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of resistance to dispiriting influences, to which he is also less exposed through the very fact of his constant pre-occupation."

In other words, every citizen must become a functionary in the war, in order to still his mind. The pre-occupation of every citizen in exhausting activity is the antidote to the natural desire of the people for peace. The gravity of the moment must be hammered into the individual "through all the arts of influencing the masses," in order to arouse his inner willingness and readiness for sacrifice.

The document concludes:

"In this way the energies which would otherwise be devoted to private affairs or frittered away in the thousand petty concerns of everyday life must be brought together at a single point, in one mighty accumulated charge. To the functionary, the war must mean not only his own participation, but it must be the idea which dominates everything else, filling him completely and leaving no room for anything else, his great passion, his sole pleasure, his vice and his sport: *a real monomania of war.*"

The recognition of Hitler Germany's criminal aims must rouse the peoples. We must create a monomania of peace. Let our reply to Hitler Germany be an urgent warning to Europe, to all the peace forces of the world—an appeal to the

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“inactive,” to the millions who hate war; an appeal to all against the few who hope to be able to start a new world conflagration. This book has shown that those who desire war are using every form of craft and cunning to bring it about. Our hope must be that the history of the coming years will record that the peoples have barred the road along which the fascists are advancing to war.

THE END